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In this dissertation I evaluate the efforts of international tribunals to strengthen the
rule of law from the perspective of the people who were directly involved in the war
crimes, whether as a victim, perpetrator, or both. My research in a small Croatian
community is an investigation of the local legal consciousness to understand if tenets of
the rule of law promoted by the tribunal are compatible with the prevailing norms. The
focus on a community of Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees highlights the
concerns of minorities living in Croatia after the 1990s conflict that included ethnic
cleansing, displacement and destruction of property in this area. The everyday conflicts
that people must negotiate shape their views of accountability, fairness and security, all
components of the rule of law.
Most rule of law initiatives concentrate on institutional reforms, but here I
emphasize the importance of a transformation of norms at the local level. Only a
profound understanding of the local legal consciousness will allow initiatives to
effectively promote change. In this analysis the local legal consciousness in Croatia does
appear to support many components of the rule of law as it is conceived by the tribunal,

Katharine Brooks Richards – University of Connecticut 2013
but it falls short of being considered a rule of law culture. There are considerable
obstacles in the form of opposing norms that conflict with rule of law values. Those
obstacles are: (1) the nature of law, (2) ethno-religious nationalism, (3) the impact of
insecurity, and (4) the lack of political agency. The role of the Croatian government,
particularly in its perceived shortcomings by the public, is integral to the relationship
between the international and local. My research demonstrates that there are elements of
the local legal consciousness that both reinforce and oppose the strengthening of the rule
law. This understanding aids an assessment of how salient rule of law initiatives will be
to local communities. What is at stake in this research is a fuller understanding of the
apparently limited ability of the ‘international community’ to generate local support for
international courts engaged in post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and
accountability.
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Chapter 1 – The Rule of Law from a Local Perspective

Introduction
At its heart, this is ethnography of a war-torn community in Croatia that examines
if and how it may be affected by international efforts to strengthen the rule of law through
criminal trials for perpetrators of human rights violations. This is an attempt to
understand how real change may take place as a consequence of the relatively new
international approach to prosecute individuals for their part in mass atrocities. In
particular I examine the concept of the rule of law as a critical component of transitional
justice agendas and the degree to which that concept is reinforced or opposed by the legal
consciousness of a local community. This research acknowledges that post-conflict
transition is a long, arduous process and the twenty years or so since the violence began
in the region allows for some reflection on the methods used to understand and resolve
the challenges of addressing mass violations of human rights, rather than assuming that
academic inquiry into these issues is passé in the Former Yugoslavia. In this case the time
that has passed since the trials began and violence ended is an advantage to assessing
longer-term repercussions of international trials.
The period immediately following a major political upheaval is a time when truths
about the past and directions for the future are established. Leaders of the fledgling
government must enforce their newfound authority in order to create an image of
legitimacy and, in a democracy, must have power grounded in popular support. In these
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tumultuous times people speak of justice, rights and equality, and addressing the wrongs
suffered in the past as an integral part of building the new nation. One major component
of such a project that is critical for the development of order and fairness is the rule of
law. The rule of law is, “the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today
(Tamanaha 2004:4)” and it is through trials for perpetrators of atrocities that the power of
legal and political institutions is visibly demonstrated to the citizens of the state and to
the world. Trials publicly document crimes such as ethnic cleansing, forced displacement
and genocide and then formally assign responsibility to individuals while recognizing the
plight of victims. This dissertation challenges the assumption that the rule of law is an
ideal which follows as a consequence of trials by exposing the difficulties of imposing a
rule of law where distrust in political and judicial institutions is pervasive. It also
identifies how trials have contributed to some key successes in the cultivation of a faith in
the rule of law.
Of the former member states of Yugoslavia, Croatia is unique for the degree to
which it took both the roles of victim and aggressor in the 1990s conflict, with local
experiences being quite diverse and multifaceted. Croatia was also seen as relatively
well-off in economic terms and its development of civil society, yet corruption and
discrimination persist. Much of the research presented here was conducted in a village
near the Bosnian border, part of the Serb Krajina region during the conflict period, that is
now home to Serb returnees and relocated Bosnian Croat refugees. Both groups have a
type of minority status in Croatia and their families, homes, health and economic status
were greatly altered by the events of conflict. They are the people for whom proponents
of trials attempt to create remedies by bringing the guilty to justice and instilling a faith in
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the rule of law. The interactions between these groups and the challenges they
collectively face continue to be shaped by the violence in many ways.
As anywhere, people in this community negotiate conflicts as part of their daily
life, ranging from very minor arguments to extreme instances of physical violence. These
everyday encounters both contribute to and exhibit how people view tenets of the rule of
law. Most investigations of the rule of law focus on domestic courts, police, and written
laws – the level of institutions. Instead, this study is an evaluation at the local level for
the existence (or lack of) a rule of law culture and how that contributes to the success of
the international tribunal’s initiatives to strengthen the rule of law. More generally, it
adds to an understanding of how international legal trials during periods of transition are
viewed by local populations. Is the tribunal successful from a local perspective? The
analysis of ethnographic research presented here indicates a discrepancy between the
ideals of a strong rule of law and the reality of corruption and distrust in political and
legal institutions.

The Research Question
The main question of this inquiry was formed in response to claims that
international tribunals strengthen the rule of law. The International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (its full title is “The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991” and will be referred to
here as the ICTY or tribunal) states that strengthening of the rule of law is one of its core
achievements. The list of the ICTY’s self-proclaimed achievements include: holding
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leaders accountable, bringing justice to victims, giving victims a voice, establishing the
facts, developing international law, as well as strengthening the rule of law
(www.icty.org/sid/324 accessed 10/7/12). But how has it contributed to rule of law
initiatives and is it successful? What does it mean to strengthen the rule of law? Is that
what people need? Is it what they want?
In this study I seek to understand the local socio-cultural understanding of law
and how (and if) it fits with the ICTY’s attempts to achieve justice through trials that are
based on international human rights law. It investigates the efforts to build a stronger rule
of law through international human rights courts (such as the ICTY) to see if they match
the needs and hopes of a local post-conflict community. The main research question I
pose is: To what degree are the tribunal’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule
of law in post-conflict Croatia reinforced or opposed by a local experience of the rule of
law? To break this question down to its smaller and necessary parts I will include
discussions of:
•

International norms of the rule of law

•

The tribunal’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law

•

The rule of law in the context of Croatia

•

Local experiences of the rule of law

•

Analysis of how local experiences affect rule of law initiatives

•

Broader implications of this local legal consciousness approach

Thus this dissertation presents the norms of international rule of law initiatives,
particularly those embodied by the ICTY, and the local perspective of a post-conflict and
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ethnically mixed community in Croatia to understand if there is local support for a
stronger rule of law.

The Research Focus
My interest in justice for human rights violations developed from my
undergraduate studies in sociology and peace studies. I decided to apply the holistic
approach of anthropology to problems of conflict and cooperation in my graduate studies
and found that much of the current study centered on human rights. Conflicts are often
categorized by the type of human rights violated and intervention is based on the degree
to which rights were violated, among other factors. After learning that courts are
increasingly utilized in the post-conflict transition process and often initiated by
international organizations I wanted to understand how the courts are viewed by the
people directly involved in the conflict. In the literature there are many complaints that
the reality of international trials does not meet the expectations of human rights advocates
or proponents of international law. If advocates of the trials are not satisfied then is it
possible to fulfill the expectations of victims?
The lives of people affected by human rights violations are impacted in a dramatic
way. What it means to achieve justice for those violations varies greatly from person to
person and will likely change over time. Desires are often impossible to fulfill as many
victims sorely want life to be as it was before, at least in terms of a loved one’s life back
or a destroyed home returned. Trials for perpetrators of human rights violations hold the
promise of public punishment, recognition of wrong doing, truth finding, and closure for
victims. The resolution of the wrongdoing has the potential to prevent the perpetuation of
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violence. In this way, trials as a method of conflict resolution may be a productive way to
minimize future conflicts and thus aid the understanding of why conflict occurs in the
first place. This is an exciting prospect for advocates of peace and human rights such as
myself. I want to learn more and designed this study to do so.
This topic interests me on a personal level because of my family’s experience in
World War II that altered the course of my grandparents’ lives. My mothers’ parents met
at Cornell University, he studied entomology and she studied math. They married, started
careers and a family with prospects for a bright future before my grandfather was drafted
into the American army and shipped overseas. He was stationed in France and Germany
for several years and for some of that time was in charge of a German prisoner-of-war
camp. After the war and a joyful return to his family my mother was born. At first it
seemed that their life would return to its path begun before the war, but signs of a change
soon showed.
My grandmother would hear stories that he told people bizarre tales and promised
to take on projects that he did not have the skills to undertake. It was understood in the
family that the horrors he witnessed and learned about during the war were
incomprehensible to him and caused a retreat from reality. Today his altered perception
of reality would likely have been diagnosed as post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD),
but then the doctors prescribed sedation through medication. He was not able to work so
my grandmother supported the family financially while living at her parents’ home. My
mother had an unusual family life for the time with her mother being the breadwinner and
father at home. He had a calm, pleasant presence and rested often. My grandfather died in
his sleep due to heart failure that may have been caused by the sedatives soon after my
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mother married at age twenty-one. His wartime experience clearly had a profound effect
on his wife and children and I never had the opportunity to meet him or know the person
he would have been without that experience. Thinking about what must have happened to
affect him to such an extreme disturbed me. How can people be so cruel to each other?
How can it be stopped? I realized that this impact on my family was quite small when
compared to targeted victims of the Nazi regime and people who lost lives during the
war. Genocide goes well beyond the persecution of one group by another and truly
affects entire societies, even the world, in so many ways. This drives me to understand
how lives are changed by mass atrocities and what can meaningfully be done to move
towards a more positive future for all.
I recently learned that my grandfather was chosen to be in charge of the German
prisoner-of-war camp because of his own German ancestry. I imagine that he wondered
what would have happened if his family had stayed in Germany. Would he have taken
part in the crimes or stood up against them? Would he have survived? In mass atrocities
there is sometimes a fine line or none at all between who is a victim and who is a
perpetrator of human rights violations. People who were the victims at one point in time
may become perpetrators later in an attempt to revenge the wrongs. People may feel
forced to commit crimes in order to avoid becoming a victim when an influential leader
claims that not joining the cause makes you against it and a target. This type of pressure
was certainly present as Yugoslavia dissolved into smaller states with contested borders.
The complexity of victim and perpetrator identities in the 1990s conflict of Croatia
intrigues me. All sides say they fought because they were victimized, citing recent
incidents and some a thousand years old. As with most violent conflict there are survivors
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who are not satisfied with how it ended. It is also likely that continuing emotions felt
from hurt, loss, and indignities will be manipulated to aid agendas for power and material
gain. The promise that trials can minimize future violence is certainly worth
investigation.

Current Debates
The topic of this dissertation informs several areas of specialization within
anthropology and the studies of law and society, human rights, globalization and
transitional justice. The findings of this research that illuminate a local perspective of
international law are relevant to the anthropological study of legal consciousness
stemming from theories of a new legal realism (Merry 2006, Silbey 2005). Debates of
legal consciousness question the relationship between internal and external sources of
consciousness, both in terms of formulating understandings of the law and in terms of
how laws are created. This dissertation is a study of legal consciousness in that it searches
for “the forms of participation and interpretation through which actors construct, sustain,
reproduce, or amend the circulating (contested or hegemonic) structures of meanings
concerning law” (Silbey 2005:334). This applies in particular to international human
rights law and the concept of the rule of law.
As law is internationalized so is the scope of its study within anthropology,
stimulating new questions and phenomena to investigate. Avenues of inquiry include the
nature of its development, grounding of its authority, possible manifestations of law, the
extent to which it produces real change, and how it might prevent future violations. In
this dissertation I investigate how international human rights law in the form of criminal
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trials translates to local populations of people directly affected by the violation of human
rights. In character with research in the discipline, I look at the larger social processes
from a local viewpoint based on ethnographic study. This also adds to our
anthropological understanding of globalization by examining the reciprocal relationship
between the global and local perspectives of law and human rights. The findings help to
demonstrate how (and if) people who are directly affected by human rights violations
identify themselves as victims and make claims based on those rights.
The scholarship on transitional justice is rife with debates, many of which relate
to this research and analysis. One topic is the relative importance of a retributive versus a
restorative approach to achieving justice. While today this is not often seen as an either/or
debate, the best way to incorporate the two is actively questioned. Criminal trials are a
form of retributive justice, but the line between that and restorative justice is not clear cut
especially considering that the ICTY claims that it gives victims a voice, an outcome
usually associated with restorative approaches, along with claims of strengthening the
rule of law. A closely related debate concerns the emphasis placed on building
institutional capacities and legitimacy versus an emphasis on providing basic needs to
local populations during transitional periods. The focus on institution-building is also
juxtaposed with a more ground level approach that seeks to alter local norms regarding
the rule of law and human rights. This dissertation addresses this debate directly by
looking closer at the local norms, or local legal consciousness, than most evaluations of
this subject matter.
Another topic of contention is the balance needed between remembering and
forgetting the atrocities that took place. Trials are sometimes criticized for keeping angers
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alive because they contribute to a continuing public consciousness of the violence and, as
the thinking goes, potentially leading to further conflict. At the same time trials are
praised for bringing an end to cycles of violence by publicly declaring responsibility for
wrongdoing and impartially punishing those acts. Another response to this debate is that
“forgetting” is a falsehood – people do not forget such wrongdoing and wounds fester,
thus trials are critical for providing a resolution. The research presented here contributes
to our understanding of the importance of trials, the salience of rule of law initiatives in
local populations, and the needs of victims in periods of transition.

Organization
The organization of this dissertation first presents the general topic and context
for the questions addressed by the research I conducted in Croatia. In chapter two the
research methods are explained, including the preparation, data collection, a description
of the research site and community, and some history of the conflict that continues to
shape everyday life. The place of this study in relevant literature is the topic of chapter
three. There the major concepts are also clarified, such as what is meant by the “rule of
law” and a summary of the development of international human rights law. Next, in
chapter four I present the research findings that uncover a local perspective of the
international tribunal and its agenda to strengthen the rule of law. An examination of the
components of the rule of law follows in chapter five. This chapter also questions
whether or not a rule of law culture in line with international human rights norms exists
in the local community. In chapter six I explain the obstacles to rule of law initiatives
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found in my research. The final chapter concludes the dissertation by explaining how the
research informs the questions posed and applies to scenarios of a larger scope.
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Chapter 2 – Research Methods

This research was conducted to fill a gap in studies of the rule of law which focus
primarily on institutional reforms rather than the norms which shape the local legal
consciousness. The objective of strengthening the rule of law is used as a justification for
intervention and validation for diverse development projects internationally. It is one of
reasons the ICTY was established and is claimed to be one of its achievements. Surely
the perspective that victims of human rights violations have toward the rule of law and
the ICTY are important elements in an evaluation of the tribunal’s success because they
are considered to be the main reason for its existence. I use the holistic approach of
anthropology and the intimate perspective gained from ethnographic methods to
contribute crucial information to the analysis of rule of law initiatives. The combination
of qualitative and quantitative data yields significant findings for this subject that has the
potential to alter the lives of people affected by violations of human rights.

Refining the Scope and Methodology
My initial thought was to evaluate the ICTY from a local perspective using the
insight gained from ethnographic research to inform international policy making. I kept
this purpose, but narrowed it down to the specific goal of the tribunal to strengthen the
rule of law after realizing how incredibly complicated it is to evaluate the achievement of
justice. I must acknowledge that the rule of law is also quite complex and people vary
greatly in what they mean by the term, but, as one element of justice that is directly
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associated with criminal trials, the rule of law is both central to claims of justice and
smaller in scope. Strengthening the rule of law is one of the achievements boasted by the
ICTY and one that warrants attention due to the multitude of outcomes assumed to be
associated with it.
Before I started fieldwork in Croatia I explored several ways to approach the
complex and sensitive topic of human rights violations in conversation and research. In
2007, I conducted a preliminary project funded by the Human Rights Institute at the
University of Connecticut with a sample of undergraduate students to help develop the
research methodology for the current study. The seventy-five interviews targeted
personal conceptions of justice and knowledge of human rights. The questions gauged
students’ knowledge of international law and asked them to assess its legitimacy. Their
reactions to the subject matter were varied. Most often it appeared that human rights was
not a subject they had previously considered in much depth, though a few students were
well informed and carefully explained their stance on controversial issues. I also gained
experience managing research assistants and conducting qualitative and quantitative
analysis of ethnographic data on the subject.
This initial study raised questions about how to define some of the core ideas, for
example what is justice and how can such egregious wrongs be made right? The
difficulties of developing a plan to achieve justice when the meaning of the term is so
personal and pathways multi-faceted were made clear. I also learned the importance of
carefully wording survey questions. After an examination of the data collected I saw that
certain questions were too vague and therefore people had interpreted them in different
ways. What I did see was that most students thought justice for human rights violations
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was a topic distanced from their own lives. That would not be the case for the people I
would speak with in Croatia, so building local connections and spending a prolonged
period of time in one place was needed to better gain trust and understand local
perspectives.

Field Sites in Croatia
I carried out informal and formal research throughout my time in Croatia and
during travel to neighboring Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and nearby Macedonia. Most of
my time was spent in Croatia – Zagreb, Gvozd, Osijek, Varaždin, Vukovar, Zadar, and
Nin – to gain a local perspective. Croatia has a population of approximately 4.5 million
people of which 58% now live in urban areas (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2009).
The main field site, Gvozd, is a rural community selected on the basis of its historical role
in the 1990s conflict for Croatia’s independence from Yugoslavia and current social,
economic and political circumstances. It is also a place of interest because each of the
two main groups of people now living there have had to alter their idea of “home” due to
forced displacement and destruction during the conflict, though from different situations.
The economic hardships felt throughout Croatia are particularly present in Gvozd
because industries present before the conflict have not rebounded. Minority policies that
affect treatment of returnees and refugees continue to be a major stumbling block to
Croatia’s bid for EU membership. In addition to the my time in Gvozd I spent several
months in Zagreb to meet with leaders of local NGOs, politicians and scholars connected
to rule of law initiatives. I attended conferences on the tribunal and domestic war crimes
trials that added other perspectives to my understanding of the research question.
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I first came to the village of Gvozd to volunteer at the non-governmental
organization (NGO) named Suncokret created to address various post-conflict needs of
the area. This NGO encourages international volunteers to help with community projects
and share their own cultural knowledge with the community in an effort to expand local
worldviews. The history of international visitors to the town eased my own introduction.
Gvozd, known prior to the end on the conflict as Vrginmost, was the location of
aggression from both Serb and Croat groups at different points in the conflict. Gvozd is
the name of the county as well as the name of the main town within that county (as the
name Vrginmost had been used previously). Before 1991 its population was about 90%
Serb, and when Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia local groups of Serbs
pushed out the Croat minority. As happened in much of this region, Gvozd, then named
Vrginmost, became part of Croatia’s interior region called the Krajina that was taken over
by Croatian Serb groups in an effort to create a “Greater Serbia” for which reason homes
of non-Serbs were vandalized or destroyed (Goldstein 1999:233).
During the interviews many of the Serb returnees wanted to correct the town
name, saying it should be called Vrginmost even though Gvozd has been the official
name since 1996 when the county lines were also redrawn and this town became a part of
Sisak municipality rather than Karolvac or Kordun municipality. The name change
occurred soon after this area was taken back by the Croatian army during “Operation
Storm”, which included the destruction, murder, and forced displacement of the Serb
population there. About half of the Serb population has now returned and shares the
village with Croat refugees from Bosnia. These Bosnian Croat refugees mostly come
from the area around Banja Luka which is now part of the Republika Srpska political
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entity within Bosnia that was created by the Dayton Peace Accords. The Croatian
government gave the Bosnian Croat refugees homes in Gvozd while the Serb population
was still displaced elsewhere. Today in Gvozd there is a housing shortage, even though
the population fell to only about 4,000 county residents in 2001 (58% Serb and 40%
Croat) from 16,599 in 1991, which necessitates families of six to live in cramped, aging
two room apartments (Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2001). The lack of housing and the
severe lack of local employment add pressure to the existing tensions between the two
groups as demonstrated in local politics and by the nationalistic music played in cafés.
The 2011 census shows that about 3,000 people reside in Gvozd municipality of which
1,022 live in the town of Gvozd (Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2011). Next I will describe
my travel and research in detail before giving a description of life in Gvozd.

Building Local Connections
I spent a total of sixteen months in Croatia collecting data from local residents to
understand the local legal consciousness. My initial trip to Croatia was exploratory and
structured by a Croatian language course at the University of Zagreb during the summer
of 2006. Zagreb proved to be an effective starting point for making connections with
professors, professionals and NGOs. It was through my conversations with Vesna Pusić,
sociologist and politician, that I became more aware of the internal political divides in
Croatia regarding refugees which later became a part of my research focus. The research
design was developed following guidelines for ethnographic research, beginning with the
review of relevant literature, preliminary travel to the research sites and experience
conducting research (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 1999; Bernard 2002). At the
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first stage the focus was narrowed through identification of pertinent domains such as life
conditions prior to 1991 and after the conflicts in 1995, experiences of violence, family
dynamics, education, political stance, history of the particular research site, knowledge of
and involvement with legal processes, and life expectations.
The main research site was established during the second trip from July to
December 2007. By then I was comfortable traveling around the country and wanted to
explore more to find a promising research site. It began with a language course in Zadar
while staying with a local family. I then volunteered for six weeks at an NGO suggested
by a human rights contact in Zagreb. Suncokret Center for Community Development is
located in Gvozd, a village in Sisak county close to the Bosnian border. The word
“suncokret” translates to “sunflower” and likely was chosen to reflect the organization’s
sunny, positive outlook. Here I worked with adults and youth trying to build bridges
across ethnic lines which broadened my understanding of current social issues stemming
from the 1990s conflict. For the next three months while living in Zagreb I kept contact
with people in Gvozd and started formulating a research plan to be implemented there.
During this period I lived in the city with two young Croat professionals as roommates
and took an additional language course at the University of Zagreb. The perspectives of
my roommates on the war and ethnic relations seemed to differ from my contacts in
Gvozd in ways that signaled that their social class and urban life were important factors.
This observation reinforced my decision to concentrate research in the rural setting of
Gvozd where national politics were rivaled by local agendas and where people were more
directly involved with the conflict itself. The research domains were explored through
key informant interviews, unstructured observation and participant observation on this
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trip, resulting in better definition and identification of those domains and the methods
needed to proceed.
Over the next semester I wrote grant proposals and refined the methods to be used
upon my return to Gvozd for the summer in 2008. The research began with broad openended questions eliciting life stories and opinions which led to the creation of a structured
interview for the collection of quantitative data. The people who participated in the
research came from a stratified network sample formed with the assistance of key
informants of different genders, ages and ethnicities. This longer stay in Gvozd enabled
me to build new relationships and learn more about the complex interplay of politics,
economics, religion and ethnicity in everyday lives. This gave me a better view of the
society as a whole and therefore the issues influencing conceptions of the rule of law.
Semi-structured and structured interviews conducted during this time collected valuable
data regarding local legal consciousness to be later supplemented and explored during my
final stay.
My fourth trip to Croatia in January 2009 was also spent primarily in Gvozd. For
six months I extended the research begun during the previous summer by continuing the
structured interviews and conducting semi-structured interviews with key informants to
seek more detail and operationalization of the factors and variables related to the analysis
while testing preliminary conclusions (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 1999). This
research design starts out with exploratory methods and proceeds by investigating the
relationships between identified variables and their ability to explain people’s beliefs
regarding justice for war crimes and the international efforts to strengthen the rule of law
(Handwerker 2001). At the end of this period I also traveled to Osijek and Vukovar in the
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Slavonia region to gain another perspective in this regionally diverse country on the
pursuit of justice for the crimes of the 1990s conflict. A connection I had made
previously with one of the NGOs monitoring domestic war crimes enabled this visit and
shed light on the domestic efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Croatia.

Data Collection
The research presented here is was conducted through particiapt observation,
semi-structured interviews and structured interviews/surveys (for overview, see Table 1).
Throughout the entire research period I gathered data through participant observation by
living in the communities among local residents and participating in daily activities. In
Gvozd, the main research site, I spent some time on most days at the Suncokret Center
interacting with youth who gathered to work on art and educational activities or just to
spend time with friends. The Center provides internet access, help with navigating
through municipal and federal bureaucratic procedures, computer classes for kids and
adults and, primarily, a place where nationalistic ideologies and music are not allowed.
Also, sharing meals and neighborly coffee visits became a regular occurrence and at other
times shopping at the local grocery store was a chance to build contacts and get used to a
limited selection of food and goods.
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Table 1: Research Methods and Implementation:
Stage
Methods
1
Literature review,
preliminary travel
to research sites
2

3

4

Key informant
interviews,
unstructured
observation,
participant
observation
Semi-structured and
structured
interviews,
participant
observation
Semi-structured and
structured
interviews,
participant
observation

Goals
Understand the
research problem,
identify relevant
domains, and form
hypotheses
Define domains and
identify related
factors and variables

Implementation
Began literature review in 2004
through course work and
independent study, two trips to
sites (2006, 2007), conducted
preliminary research
Conducted key informant
interviews, lived and volunteered
in the research sites, made
connections with informants and
local scholars (2007)

Operationalization of
factors and variables,
build rapport with the
community

Lived in Gvozd and took part in
community activities, conducted
15 semi-structured and 85
structured interviews (2008)

Further testing of
hypotheses,
operationalization of
relevant variables and
their relationships

Continued participant
observation, conducted 15
additional semi-structured and
49 structured interviews (2009)

Building on my research through particpiant observation I developed semistructured interviews to gain a deeper understanding of the local legal consciousness. The
semi-structured interviews allowed people to use their own terminology to explore the
variability of opinions. Some of the questions that I posed were: (1) What do you
understand as ‘justice’ for war crimes? What do you see as the biggest obstacles to
achieving justice for war crimes? (2) What kind of impact has the ICTY had on everyday
life in Croatia? (3) What are the most important changes needed to improve your life?
(4) Where do you find trustworthy information about the ICTY? (5) Do you agree with
ICTY judgements? For this stage, a quota sample was sought by including people from
diverse groups, of various ages and different socio-economic background. Some of these
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thirty interviews were conducted with lawyers, teachers, and government personnel. The
settings for these interviews included coffee shops, the Suncokret center and the person’s
home. The interviews were conducted with the aid of a local research assistant for added
rapport with participants and accuracy of translation when needed.
In order to gather data to make quantitative comparisons I chose to conduct
structured interviews as a main component of the research. Participants for the structured
interviews were selected by quota network samples as used for the semi-structured
interviews. It was restricted to local residents aged twenty and older so that they would
have some personal memory of the conflict and aftermath. An equal number of men and
women were successfully sought to limit a gender bias simply by working with key
informants of both genders that had different networks. Roughly half of the participants
were self-identified as Croat and the other half as Serb by using the same strategy. A total
of 134 structured interviews were conducted between June 2008 and June 2009.
Different procedures were used to conduct these interviews based on the informants’
language skills, comfort level, and timing. On some occasions the interview was
conducted by me asking the questions and recording the answers, other times a research
assistant took this role and in some cases the informant wrote down their own responses.
The interviews included: 1) demographic data, 2) attitude toward ICTY activities, 3)
attitude toward EU (ICTY compliance effects EU membership), 4) legitimacy of various
judicial entities, 5) dilemmas that demonstrate moral reasoning, 6) How ICTY decisions
affect feeling of personal safety. These interviews enhanced the qualitative data by
building on the findings of semi-structured interviews and allow for quantitative analysis.
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Data collected from each step is used to build cultural models for comparison
with the international conceptions of the rule of law (D’Andrade and Strauss 1992). The
participants defined the variables, such as ethnicity, identity, nationality, and economic
well-being, throughout the research process, rather than having my own ideas impose a
specific definition. The evidence required to address the research question consists of
people’s attitudes toward the ICTY, perceptions of accountability, fairness and security
and their own methods of negotiating conflict to ascertain the local legal consciousness.
It also consists of conceptualizing the rule of law from an international legal perspective
to evaluate the convergence between the two. This research was funded at different stages
by the Anthropology Department, Human Rights Institute and Graduate School at the
University of Connecticut and by the National Science Foundation.

Analytical Constraints
It is important to recognize the limitations of the research presented here. Like
any research endeavor the circumstances and methods yield information that must be
interpreted carefully without over-generalization. Participant observation was aided by a
few key informants who shared invaluable insights, personal stories, and helped me to
make connections in the community. Some of these people were what Bernard refers to
as “solid insiders” who “say they feel somewhat marginal to their culture by virtue of
their intellectualizing of and disenchantment with their culture” (2002:190). That critical
perspective helps an outsider like myself understand things better. It also brings the
potential to miss some of the variety of local perspectives.
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The structured data collection took place only in Gvozd with a non-probability
sample of that population. The people who participated were largely chosen due to their
connection with the local NGO Suncokret or through their network of family and friends.
That connection likely biased the sample to include people more likely to be tolerant of
inter-ethnic socialization, a goal of the organization, and a somewhat higher awareness of
human rights and general international issues. The surveys inform us about how those
particular people answered particular questions that to a degree is also informative about
the wider population in Gvozd and Croatia. The questions of the survey themselves have
their own limitations and were possibly interpreted differently by the people who
answered them, thus some error is inherent to the survey process.
While I believe the data from Gvozd sheds an important light on larger issues
relevant throughout Croatia, the background of the people in this location is not typical of
Croatia. The Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees will differ in some ways from the
“Croatian Croats” who are the majority of the country. The survey data can be
generalized to Gvozd, the counties of Sisak and nearby Karlovac, and the country of
Croatia with cautions about how much the data truly reflects the people in those larger
groupings. For reference, the 134 people who completed the surveys come from the
municipality of Gvozd that has a population of about 3,000 which means about 4% of the
people participated.
The quantitative data is evaluated using univariate and bivariate analysis methods
to look closely at the data itself and explore correlations between variables. The software
used for quantitative analysis is SPSS, statistical analysis software for the social sciences.
I use the data to describe the sample of people that completed the surveys more than to
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infer generalizations. Where I do think the data represents something shared beyond the
sample population I often reference other data sources to demonstrate that similarity. As
with any correlations a causal link is not implied from the statistics alone. Unidentified
and unknown intervening variables may affect the correlations presented from the survey
data. In my analysis of the research findings I use my own judgment along with statistical
calculations of likelihood and significance to make interpretations.

Local History
It is useful to begin with some explanation of how Croatia became the newly
independent state that is currently vying for accession to the European Union. The
development of political pressures that exist today will be clarified in the process of this
explanation. Croatia is considered a part of Southeastern Europe and has long been
considered a borderland to the Muslim world for Western Europeans (Goldstein 1999:
30). It is situated on the Adriatic Sea to the east of Italy and south of Slovenia, Hungary
and Austria. Croatia’s eastern border is shared with Serbia and to the south it is bordered
by Bosnia Herzegovina. It is an oddly shaped state with an extensive coastline to the west
and narrower territory extending to the east. In the past, this land was under the control of
the Roman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. It formed a
part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the early 1900s, that later became
the Republic of Yugoslavia (Goldstein 1999:112, 153). This republic was a federation of
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.
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During World War II, the German Nazi regime occupied much of this area and
the involvement of some Croats with this regime was later used to incite Serb nationalism
in the ethnic cleansing of the early 1990s. These Croats participated in the genocide of
people targeted by the Nazis (including Jews, Roma, and homosexuals) and extended the
massacres to ethnic Serbs (Goldstein 1999: 136-9). According to Hagan, “a half-million
Serbian lives were lost to the Nazi-inspired Croatian ‘Ustasha,’ many at the infamous
Jasenovac extermination camp (Hagan 2003: 10)”. Josip Tito’s partisans and Soviet
forces freed the area from German control, and then performed their own mass
executions of the Croats who supported the Nazis and of Germans within Yugoslav
borders. “In retaliation, more than a hundred thousand Croatians were killed by Tito-led
forces (Hagan 2003: 10).” The military success over the Nazi puppet regime is mainly
credited to Tito and not the Soviet aid, which helps to explain some of Yugoslavia’s
distance (in terms of control) from Soviet influence despite the installation of a
communist government after WWII. Many socialist policies were put in place at this
time, though Yugoslavs were allowed some private ownership rights to property, goods
and small business. Under Tito’s four decade-long reign the Yugoslav identity was
publicly placed before “nationalist” identities such as Serb, Croat or Muslim (Bringa
1995:77).
In the 1970’s, Croat intellectuals and younger political hopefuls that felt Croats
were not given a strong enough voice in government headed a nationalist movement
known as the “Croatian Spring” (Goldstein 1999:180). Tito displayed no tolerance for
this dissent and many Croats involved in the movement were jailed, exiled or left the
country of their own accord. There exists speculation that if these Croats had been
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allowed to stay involved in the political sphere, the events after Tito’s death would have
taken a more peaceful course (Pusić 1998:112). Tito’s purging is one source of the
extensive Croat diaspora that exists today with significant ethnic populations in
neighboring states, Australia, and the United States (Peisker 1999:354). The suppression
of nationalist ideologies went in conjunction with a suppression of religious practices,
whether Orthodox, Catholic or Muslim. This placement of communism over religion led
to the association of communism with atheists and a Yugoslav identity opposed to ethnoreligious identities of the area (Bringa 1995:164).
The motto of Tito’s rule, “Brotherhood and Unity”, was tested when Tito’s death
in 1980 left open a coveted position of power. Nationalist identities became a rallying
point for political support (Silber and Little 1996:25-27). Verdery makes the case that
Tito’s policies created this importance of ethno-religious national identity, even when he
sought to equalize power between the Yugoslav states (Verdery 1998:7). Tito mandated
political representation of ethno-religious minorities in all the states, for example Serbs,
Croats and Muslims (Muslim was considered by Tito to be a political category, not a
religious one) each were recognized and proportionately represented in Bosnia’s
government by law (Bringa 1995:9). The disintegration of communism in the late 1980s
compounded the struggle for government control within Yugoslavia. Serbs were the
majority ethno-religious group and Slobodan Milošević was seen to be heading a
movement to make Serbia the dominant power in the Yugoslav government (Gagnon
2006; 2004:84). In response, Slovenes, Croats, and later Bosnians saw a dismal future for
themselves in this federation of states and declared independence as autonomous states.
They were recognized as such by the international community in 1992 as a military clash
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took place between Croatia and the Yugoslav army, the JNA, (mostly made up of people
with a Serb ethno-religious identity) in a fight over borderlines (Silber and Little
1996:201).
The ethno-religious identities recognized by Tito did not equate to any geographic
reality (Bringa 1995:27). People self-identified as Croats lived in Croatia, Serbia,
Slovenia and Bosnia Herzegovina (and other states). By many accounts, the conflict was
a political attempt to seize power in which nationalist rhetoric was used to garner public
support. The seizure of power included a reorganization of the borders to conform to the
identity of people living on the land and movement or destruction of people to conform to
borders, which was further complicated by the fact that most villages consisted of
multiple ethno-religious nationalities (Verdery 1998:11). It was also complicated by the
fact that many people have mixed ethnic ancestries. Other accounts, also numerous,
attribute the conflict to “ancient ethnic hatreds” and the “backwardness” of the Balkans,
explaining that, “hatreds of and resentment against members of other ethnic groups,
rooted very deeply in the culture and society of the region and submerged for fifty years,
[that] suddenly burst to the surface with the weakening of communist rule (Gagnon
2006:Appendix). The violence did not fall neatly along ethnic lines and so any accounts
that use ethnicity as an explanation for the conflict fall short of a complete (and accurate)
description. Gagnon’s analysis identifies a strategy of demobilization that used fear to
keep opposition at bay by labeling people who questioned the nationalist agendas as
traitors (Gagnon 2006:182).
During this time many Croats also fled the state to escape the violence,
contributing to the growing number of Croats outside of Croatia’s border. This
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contributed to the changing composition of the area due to the displacement of Serbs in
1995. “The mass exodus of about 180,000 Croatian Serbs before, during and after the
fighting made Croatia more ethnically homogenous by reducing the ethnic-Serb share of
Croatia’s population from 12 percent to less than 5 percent,” though these numbers are
debated (Pusić 1998:115). Croats participated in the conflict both as aggressors (towards
Serbs and Muslims), and as victims (mostly at the hands of Serbs) (Silber and Little
1996:246). Conflicts between Croats and ethnic Serbs living within Croat borders began
soon after the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. “Thousands were killed and
wounded; hundreds of thousands became refugees (Pusić 1998:114).” The cities of
Vukovar and Dubrovnik were all but destroyed and Serb forces occupied much of the
interior section of Croatia on the Bosnian border, a third of the state’s territory (Bideleux
and Jeffries 2007:202).
Croatian Croat forces in conjunction with ethnic-Croat forces in Bosnia led
attacks on Serbs, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Pusić describes the role-reversal
from the Croat perspective, “Their country, which had so recently been the victim of
aggression, was now acting as an aggressor in neighboring Bosnia. Croats were
committing atrocities not unlike those that had been committed against their compatriots
only a few months earlier (Pusić 1998:114)”. In the mid-1990s, the greatest number of
deaths and injuries took place in Bosnia, mostly of Bosnian Muslims at the hands of
Serbs and Croats (Silber and Little 1996:27). Most of Croatia’s territory in the Krajina
region was taken back from Croatian Serb forces during Operation Storm led by General
Ante Gotovina after Milošević withdrew support for the Serb groups in Croatia. Pillaging
and murder of the remaining Serbs by the Croat forces accompanied the campaign for
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control of this territory, adding to the violence (Pusić 1998:115). The conflict ended in
1995 as a result of international intervention with the signing of the Dayton Peace
Accords that created a situation in which there were no real winners and many were left
feeling like losers (Silber and Little 1996:377). The Republic of Croatia continues to
debate treatment of refugees from the ethnic cleansing and many Croats deny that the
state played an aggressive role in the conflict. The new Croatian state is a struggling
democracy seeking economic development and a way to deal with its past.

Current Life, Needs and Challenges
Nearly everywhere that I traveled in Croatia people exclaimed how wonderful
Croatia is and how I must understand that it is the most beautiful country and is steeped
in tradition. Those traditions vary by region and the particular history of each area. After
Slovenia (EU member in 2004), Croatia is considered to be the most economically
developed of the former Yugoslav states. Geography has influenced the exposure to
cultural influences from existing member states and how those states perceive Croatia.
There has been a strong Italian influence in the coastal areas where the culture is
considered to be more Mediterranean, while the inland areas share more similarities with
central Europe. Croats tend to view themselves as more “Western European” than other
former members of Yugoslavia (with the sometime exception of Slovenia).
Through my travels I noticed a meaningful distinction between urban and rural
culture. This dichotomy often came up in interviews when people in the cities were
viewed as having different priorities than those from the village. Some differences in
wealth are apparent based on physical appearance and activities. In Zagreb and other
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cities people wear expensive brand name clothes and seem very appearance oriented.
Women generally wear very feminine and form fitting clothing (dresses or skirts), while
men stick to more business-like attire. Saturday morning coffee at the right café is
practically a mandatory social gathering. My discussions in Zagreb often turned to
international politics, Croatia’s ascension to EU membership, and shopping. In Gvozd
and other small towns some women and men did dress with the trends, but more often the
stereotypical clothing for the oldest generation was wearing business jackets and dark
colors (black head scarves for women), for the middle generation house or work clothing
was common, and the youngest dress something like American skaters or punks with
asymmetrical haircuts and skinny jeans. Conversations in Gvozd centered on the lack of
opportunities in the region, but frequently people stated that they preferred the rural
landscape and lifestyle over cramped, loud city life.
Men of all ages are often drinking kava (coffee) or beer at the café. For a small
village Gvozd has many cafés, about six in the town center. There is, however, only one
restaurant along with two bakeries and five small grocery stores. The cafés are each
informally affiliated with a particular ethnic identity with the only exception being also
the largest and most modern facility. Nationalistic music is not uncommon in the cafes,
nor are arguments and physical violence. The newest café is located in the recently
renovated market area where several new businesses opened shops in the permanent outer
ring building that circles the open market tables. A hair salon, insurance office, and
bakery share the space and there are vacant sections for future use. Gvozd does not have
a bank branch and most financial transactions are conducted at the post office by using
the one ATM located in front of a café, or by traveling to Topusko or Karlovac. On
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certain days there is a large line out the post office door when people come from all over
the municipality to pay for their utilities or pick up government assistance funds.
Many people do not own a car and will walk miles to do their errands; some even
take a cart pulled by horses to town. Buses are a major mode of transportation locally and
regionally. Many people commute to work in the surrounding towns via bus or take it to
shop at the larger markets. School children beyond 8th grade must travel at least 20
minutes, sometimes an hour, to reach their school daily on the public bus which is
crowded and loud. For many families the children attend the school for which the parents
can afford the daily bus fare, rather than based on the school’s specialization or quality of
education. Students are asked to choose a particular career much earlier than in the
United States. Many students in Gvozd choose to specialize in being a waiter or waitress
or to enter the hospitality industry at the age of fourteen based on the school they attend.
Only 54% (n=72) of participants in the survey were employed at the time of this
research. This was at least partly due to the high proportion of older residents in the
population, but there is also a major lack of employment opportunities. Many younger
Serbs who were displaced from this area during Operation Storm in 1995 chose to stay in
Serbia or seek refugee in other countries in the hopes of greater employment
opportunities and so most returnees were older adults that had grown up in Gvozd (then
Vrginmost) and had many memories there. The high rate of unemployment is also a
product of the lack of industry revitalization in this region after the conflict. The Croatian
government has offered economic incentives to bring more industry back (prior to the
conflict there was a furniture factory in Gvozd, now all wood is exported in raw form),
but, according to key informants, this strategy has yielded mostly corrupt endeavors that
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fail to provide jobs or stimulate the local economy. The jobs available locally included
forestry department work, skilled trades, shop clerks, wait staff, local government and
school positions (K-8 only). Landing a government job is a prized achievement because
of the job security and a perception of invincibility. Somewhat as a carryover from
communism, government workers often have a great deal of control and leeway in the
service they give. Having a friend or relative was and is critical for getting approvals or
permissions granted. The bureaucracy is very imposing. My own experience getting visa
approval nearly altered this research project. Clerks at the police stations continually
demanded paperwork beyond that required at the national level and continued review past
deadlines for my stay without the visa approval. Going to the police office was a chaotic,
exhaustive event where people literally elbow in front of you in line and service was not
with a smile. The atmosphere at post offices and stores that were once government
operated is similar.
Homes often consist of multiple generations who pool resources. One of my key
informants was a smart, college-educated young woman dating a local young man with a
steady job. They considered marriage, but couldn’t afford a home of their own. Living
separately with their parents each had good food and family support that they did not
want to give up. Due to the fall of communism and displacement of Serbs from the area
and of Croats from other regions rights to homes in Gvozd are not clear cut. Some
Bosnian refugees who were given permission by the Croatian government to take up
residence in houses and apartments previously occupied by Serbs were required to
relocate when the Serb owner returned, others were not and the Serb owner had to deal
with the loss. As can be imagined, disputes regarding ownership abound. The situation
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with apartments is even more complicated because having previously been jointly owned
by “the people” under communism the right to property ownership is now contested.
Under some agreements the Croatian government gave the use of a particular apartment
to a family with the stipulation that it is a temporary arrangement, but with no end date.
Families live in fear that they may be kicked out of their homes at any time.
The housing conditions are often crowded with two rooms for a family of five,
including the kitchen. Much needed renovation of select apartment buildings took place
during my stay. In these cases occupants were moved to other housing while the building
was torn down and rebuilt from scratch. In some of the older apartments conditions were
quite difficult. One had no working water in the kitchen so dishes must be washed in the
bathroom. Common area windows are broken allowing drafts and rain to enter. When it is
cold outside homes are heated with wood from the local forests. Chopping firewood is a
year-round activity and women often stay home all day and tend the fires throughout the
cold season in addition to cooking and taking care of children. The family structure
remains somewhat patriarchal, though modernization, urbanization and the disruptive
effects of violent conflict have led to many different types of living arrangements.
Some research questions were oriented to gauge perceived quality of life, often
comparing different time periods and thus linked to various historical events such as the
end of communism in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the violent
conflict which led to Croatia’s independence. This line of questioning was stimulated by
preliminary, informal conversations with people in Croatia during which two strong and
opposing views were expressed: one insisted on the great equality, stability and lack of
crime during communist times and the other portrayed the same era as repressive and
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corrupt. Some variability is likely based on the person’s socio-economic status and
association (or disassociation) with the Communist Party. Many people referred to an
inability to alter the political system, often characterized as grossly corrupt, and the
prevalence of nepotism both today and during the past several decades under Tito’s rule.
There was close to an equal divide regarding the question asking which statement
is more true: “If you work hard you can succeed in life” or “Who you know is more
important than how hard you work,” though slightly more people, 52% (n=70), chose the
statement that who you know is more important. There appears to be a feeling of inability
to change, almost that the society is more powerful than the individual. One informant
explained it as, “They (the politicians) play the music and then we must dance to it, we
don’t pick the music.” In the surveys I asked what would most significantly improve
participant’s life in Gvozd with the following options: more job opportunities, owning a
home, greater trust within the community, better health and an option allowing people to
write in their own ideas. The most common answer given by 42% (n=56) of people was
for more job opportunities. Many people chose to select multiple answers and 25%
(n=33) more people included more job opportunities in their answer, indicating that in
total 67% (n=89) believed this to be of significant importance to their life quality. In
interviews many people said that they didn’t want to be rich or famous, just to have
enough money and security to live a decent life.
Another question asked for a comparison between ethnic relations among Croats,
Muslims and Serbs in the 1980s and today. Of the 124 people that responded to this
question 17% (n=23) said ethnic relations are better today, 20% (n=27) answered that
they were the same, and 58% (n=78) replied that ethnic relations are worse today (see
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Graph 1.1). Opinions of this statement did not differ significantly by the gender of the
informant, but their ethnic identity did appear to have an influence. There are obviously
still tensions that play out of local social life and politics.

Graph 1.1: Comparing ethnic relations between the 1980s and today
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The definition of a Croat is not a purely political identity as is usually meant by
the term American (a citizen of the United States of America). An identity is a term of
belonging to a group that has some common element. Self-identity is often made in
relation to what you don’t identify with as much as what you do (ex. Croat equals notSerb or Muslim). Anderson focuses on national identities as “imagined communities” that
contain the paradox of “the ‘political’ power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical
poverty and even incoherence (Anderson 1991: 5)”. This paradox certainly exists for the
Croat nationalist identity which has only recently been attached to an independent state,
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though a powerful term for hundreds of years. The definition of a Croat has more to do
with religious association (Catholic) and common descent than a defined territory. The
importance of language in creating and empowering nationalities is stressed by Anderson
through an account of how Western Europe’s nations (among others) developed. In
Croatia, previous to the conflict, the predominant language spoken was called SerboCroatian. This was essentially the same language spoken in Serbia and Bosnia
Herzegovina; though Serbs used a Cyrillic alphabet as opposed to the Croats’ Latin
alphabet (Bosnian publications generally used both or switched frequently). Once Croatia
declared independence their language was renamed “Croatian” and differences were
accentuated to define it as a distinct language. In this way, history was rewritten to the
extent that this name change was validated by citing distinctions between Serbian and
Croatian language as proof of irreconcilable differences between Serbs and Croats.
I find it interesting that distinctions like those used to separate a Serbian language
from a Croatian language exist in a similar way within Croatian regional dialects. There
are three main dialects of Croatian that are defined by their term for the word “what”.
The što dialect is associated with the capital, Zagreb, and is considered a more formal
version of Croatian, though there are even variations within this dialect. The formal
version is taught in schools across the country, but people often use a regional dialect in
conversation. The existence of such a high degree of language variation may be
representative of the many different conceptualizations of Croatian culture.
The implications of applying Anderson’s theory to the Croat case are most
significant on the subject of forming class identities. Anderson concentrates on
nationalism, but there are many other forms of “imagined communities”. If we see
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different dialects being used in rural and urban (and supposedly by elite versus working
class) areas this supports a division beyond language that unifies these groups. The Croat
Diaspora is another aspect of Croat identity that has been formed through mass
emigrations, first during the “Croatian Spring” in the 1970’s when mostly elite and upper
class Croats fled persecution from Tito, and secondly during the Serb-Croat conflict
when working class Croats fled from Serb forces (Tanner 1997). In some respects the
individuals considered to be Croat are more likely to include people who emigrated
during these times than Serbs or Muslims living within Croatia’s borders. Croatia’s
imagined community is then extended beyond a geographic boundary and becomes even
more “imagined.”
Leonard and Kaneff (2002) make connections between categories of urban/rural,
public/private and upper/lower class in post-socialist countries. They start with
examining the term “peasant” in situations where socialist policies are being replaced by
capitalist privatization. Peasants are not only agricultural workers but include industrial
wage laborers and other occupations usually considered to be working class. Leonard and
Kaneff review historical interpretations of peasantry as divisions of ‘modes of thought’
between “science and rationality’ and peasantry as representing the primitive. They see a
disregard for the interests of peasants as capitalism unfolds, “Capitalism progresses by
playing to tensions already present within the peasant communities, for example the
interests of provincial elites against others; and ultimately, market development means
peasants are displaced as land is commoditized (Leonard and Kaneff 2002:23)”. The
same type of phenomenon is happening in Croatia as capitalism is pushed by the elite,
even though property was never communal in Croatia to the extent it was in other
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socialist states. Many of the people who came out the 1990s conflict with power and
wealth were the ones that bypassed trade embargos to smuggle in weapons and goods and
took part in theft and destruction.
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Chapter 3 – Anthropology and the Rule of Law

In this chapter I review the literature that informed this research and explain how
my findings contribute to this knowledge. It relates to many sub-disciplines within
anthropology and to other disciplines due to the focus on human rights, local legal
consciousness and transitional justice. As discussed below, most literature on the rule of
law examines institutional level reforms and compliance, a structural approach. I build on
some calls for a more norms-based approach that seeks to understand how the rule of law
is perceived in the local legal consciousness and strengthen the rule of law by creating
real changes to existing power relationships.

Anthropology and Law
From the time that the discipline took shape, anthropologists took an interest in
the variety of rules and norms found in societies. The content of legal anthropology
ranges from more informal customs to the formal, written laws that dictate how to behave
and the repercussions for stepping outside the line of accepted behavior. “Law is a basic,
constitutive attribute of our social consciousness. It is a particular way of organizing
meaning and force, and it is out of this that both law in action and law on the books
proceed (Silbey 2005:37).” The focus of anthropology expanded from the “other” to
include “ourselves” as the discipline grew and with this move more attention was given
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to understanding legal systems previously assumed to embody fairness (i.e. American
and European legal institutions), but after investigation appeared to be biased and
perpetuate structural inequalities. Written law and law as it is experienced by the
individual social actor became understood as distinct aspects of the law. Anthropological
studies of colonialism also contributed to an expansion of our understanding of what is
law by demonstrating that imposed legal systems do not replace existing methods of
conflict resolution. Rather, particular legal pathways are chosen by or imposed upon
people based on factors such as the domain (ex. taxes, family or property dispute),
convenience, and possible outcomes. This concept of legal pluralism recognizes that legal
systems coexist, and perhaps they do so now more than ever because as international law
grows the layers of law that govern any individual become more complex.
The anthropological study of law that is interested in how (and if) people
maneuver through legal domains, stake claims, and internalize legal norms – the social
context of law – was first labeled as legal realism in the early twentieth century. At the
turn of the twenty-first century a renewed interest in legal realism surfaced, labeled the
new legal realism, which shares the perspective of “law as it is practiced in everyday life,
focusing on ordinary people as well as legal elites” with the previous incarnation (Merry
2006:975). Merry describes new legal realism as an extension of its first form to include
the phenomena of an increasingly global world. She asserts that it encompasses
transnational and multi-national sited ethnography, takes on the subjects of international
law and human rights law, and builds on new dimensions of legal inquiry such as legal
consciousness (Merry 2006:976). The current study attempts to address many of these
components of a new legal realism. In particular, I use a methodology that “tracks the

41
flows of people, ideas, laws, and institutions across national boundaries and examines
particular nodes and sites within this field of transnational circulation” (Merry 2006:976).
In this case the site is a village in Croatia consisting of people with various roles in the
1990s violence and the subject of analysis is the flow of rule of law norms between the
international and local levels. This is a study of the local legal consciousness to ascertain
if it is consistent with international agendas to strengthen the rule of law. According to
Silbey, “The study of legal consciousness is the search for the forms of participation and
interpretation through which actors construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend the
circulating (contested or hegemonic) structures of meanings concerning law (Silbey
2005:334).” Here I seek to understand if members of a rural, post-conflict community
“construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend” the tenets of a rule of law system currently
being advocated by international actors.
The discussion of a gap between people’s expectations of justice and the reality of
legal processes has a precedent in theoretical debates regarding popular legal
consciousness in U.S. domestic courts (Merry 2003, Silbey 2005). Legal anthropologists
document that plaintiffs’ expectations and conceptions of justice change over time
through their participation in the legal process (Merry 2003). Individuals approach a legal
system with expectations of a specific result that will satisfy their personal sense of
justice, but often, by the end of the process, they have internalized the view that the law is
for upholding rules without real questioning of the law’s validity or moral basis. Whether
this same internalization of legal norms occurs when justice is pursued by an
international tribunal is part of the question posed by this research. People may develop
conceptions of justice and beliefs regarding the rule of law based on the actions (and

42
perhaps simply the existence) of the ICTY, but that cannot be the sole source. Conflicts
and wrongdoing occur at all levels of society and people deal with them as part of their
everyday life. The means that are effective at resolving those conflicts, those that people
directly experience, certainly contribute to their overall cultural understanding of what
the rule of law is and how it fits into their lives. There is also a gap between people’s
expectations of international human rights law and the reality of what outcomes that law
can produce in regards to actual change and achieving justice. The idea of justice in and
of itself is so difficult to define in a manner that all victims could agree upon that its
attainment is nearly impossible. Still, even the attempt to achieve justice can be
extremely meaningful and I do not take the pessimistic view that efforts to achieve justice
are destined to be fruitless. In fact, the research here suggests the efforts do make an
impact as will be detailed in the analysis below.

International Human Rights Law
International human rights law is defined by a web of treaties, declarations,
agreements and custom. While this area of law may be described to be in a state of
development there is a strong trend of recognition for human rights and public support for
their protection to the point that non-compliance with human rights standards often
results in international pressures to comply or even intervention. Some aspects of the law
have a more solid grounding than others in terms of a global consensus and perceived
legitimacy. Early examples of protections include anti-piracy agreements and restriction
on the power of rulers. Rights are categorized as civil, political, economic or social.
Today, human rights may refer to more basic rights such as a right to be free from torture
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and arbitrary detainment or extend to other types of rights such as a right to food and
work. Merry (2006) and Wilson (2006) examine the intersection of anthropology and
human rights and give direction for future research that focuses on the “culture of human
rights” and the “social life of rights,” respectively. This research will complement and
extend further the insights of both of these approaches by examining how daily life in a
Croatian community affected by political violence is framed and influenced by
developments in international human rights law.
The pursuit of judicial accountability for human rights violations is, in many
respects, a recent development in international and domestic law. In the past heads of
state were protected by observances of sovereign immunity for actions against their own
people and those that carried out their orders have stood behind a “duty to obey” to evade
responsibility (Robertson 2000). The trials at Nuremberg after World War II represent the
first shift in paradigm on issues of sovereignty and individual responsibility. Leaders of
the Nazi regime were held accountable through trials for their commands that led to
hundreds of thousands of deaths. The mass atrocities of the Holocaust caused the world
to reflect upon minimum standards of living and a respect for life that should apply to all.
In consequence, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was written and has
become the foundation of human rights law in combination with the legal proceedings of
the Nuremberg trials (Robertson 2000). In terms of impartiality the Nuremberg trials did
not meet ideals, often criticized as an example of “victor’s justice”, and much time passed
before there was another attempt to hold leaders accountable at the international level.
The record of human rights law application in domestic courts is sparse and, when it has
occurred, the trials are often deemed more of a spectacle than a just prosecution (Wilson
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2005: 908). The ICTY was formed as an ad-hoc international criminal court for the
violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia. This mechanism of judicial
accountability for the violations of human rights represents another important step for
human rights law, despite its imperfections. In response to the violence of Yugoslavia’s
break-up war crimes prosecutions are conducted internationally by the ICTY and
domestically in Croatia and other states of the former Yugoslavia. It is one example of
what is now termed as transitional justice, attempts to right the wrongs of a previous
regime that abused the human rights of its citizens and others as a new government is
built.
Transitional justice programmes can involve truth-seeking processes that
map patterns of past violence, and unearth the causes and consequences of
such destructive events; prosecution initiatives that ensure a fair trial
of those accused of committing crimes, including serious violations of
international humanitarian law and crimes involving human rights
violations; reparations programmes that provide a range of material and
symbolic benefits to victims; and institutional reform that includes vetting
the public service to remove from office those public employees
personally responsible for gross violations of human rights
(www.unrol.org accessed 9/9/12).
In response to genocide, apartheid, mass “disappearances” and torture in Latin America,
Africa and Eastern Europe, a dispute has arisen over how to best address the rights of
victims in periods of transition.
The Nuremberg trials established a model of retributive justice which has been
built upon in various contexts since (Borneman 1997, Robertson 2000, Bass 2000,
Hayner 2003). Following a retributive justice approach, perpetrators are punished in
some form to compensate for the wrongs they have inflicted on others. Retributive justice
in the form of a criminal trial is critical because it is a public acknowledgement that
leaders are responsible for wrongdoing and a public recognition that the victim’s were

45
harmed wrongly. In addition it provides a negative consequence for abusing human
rights, there is a potential deterrent effect (by its nature this is complicated to assess), it
creates documentation and a professional assessment of the events that took place and
provides some resolution to the conflict. The other main approach to justice in periods of
transition is that of restorative justice championed by Desmond Tutu and others in postapartheid South Africa. A restorative approach is more victim-centered in that the
primary focus is restoring the victims’ dignity and providing victims with a public forum
to voice their side of events. It usually includes a type of truth commission with varying
degrees of domestic and international involvement to uncover the truth about the crimes
which took place such as what happened to lost relatives, where bodies are buried, and
who was responsible for the crimes (though usually not with the intention to prosecute
those responsible). Both of these approaches may include demotions, bars from
government office, and the reparations to victims in their pursuit of justice. The success
of any approach will be influenced by the nature of the tranistion and degree to which
positions of power are still held by leaders of the previous regime responsible for the
crimes.
Critiques of retributive and restorative justice have led to debates about one or the
other being the best model, but today most transitional justice planning explicitly
includes elements of both in recognition of the benefits each brings to the turmoil of
transitions. During mass atrocities people have extremely varied experiences and even
those with similar situations may diverge greatly in how they conceive of justice for the
harms that occurred. Each transition is unique so the pursuit of justice must take the local
context into consideration, in other words a model successful in one particular situation
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will likely not work in the same way elsewhere. Justice may take place in the public
realm through trials, but often justice at the individual level requires a more restorative
approach. Therefore these approaches are complimentary and need not be seen in
opposition. There is, however, a continuing argument about the relative importance of
components within each approach. Proponents of restorative justice sometimes challenge
the ideals of retributive justice by claiming that trials incite further conflict and emotional
distress, even perpetuating cycles of violence, by keeping the feelings of hurt and anger
alive in the minds of all survivors (Minow 1998, Roht-Arriaza and Gibson 1998, Popkin
and Bhuta 1999). Proponents of retributive justice claim that trials are required to end
cycles of violence because they represent an impartial judgment and legitimate resolution
to the conflict without which feelings of hurt and resentment will fester and resurface
(Borneman 1997, Robertson 2000).
The choices a new regime makes in its early stages of development will certainly
shape the direction of its future and international intervention is increasingly an
influential part of that process. Certain crimes, such as those considered to be crimes
against humanity, motivate an international response simply due to the level of atrocity
(at least in some instances). In most transitional periods after mass violations of human
rights there is a major focus on building institutions that is now being questioned. The
need for institution building is clear, but the degree to which this is a focus in comparison
to providing basic needs for the people who lived through the conflict is contested. The
provision of housing, food, jobs and health care (including mental health care) may make
much more of a real difference in peoples’ lives. If these needs are better met it is
conceivable that it could affect whether or not victims hold onto feelings of anger and
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pain that continue tensions. International human rights law is reinforced through trials for
individuals who violate those laws with increasing frequency, making it difficult for
crimes against humanity to be swept under the rug.
A new regime must balance remembering the past with moving toward the future.
At one extreme regimes purposefully “forget” the past by erasing or rewriting it in school
texts and the media along with barring it from public discussion (for example Franco’s
Spain). At the other end of the spectrum a new regime may imprint the crimes on the
national psyche to the degree that people become overwhelmed by the past through
continual reminders like public holidays, monuments, and repetition in public discourse
(as may be said for post-Holocaust Germany). It is unavoidable that any approach to
justice for the crimes will require some re-evaluation of what exactly took place.
Remembering the past is also critical for the prevention of a re-occurrence, it is
something to learn from and use to guide future decision-making. The key is not to get
stuck in the past with the feelings of hurt, pain and resentment, but to build a new and
more peaceful future.

Interaction between the Local and Global
This is a study of local legal consciousness as much as it is an examination of
international agendas to influence that legal consciousness. It is an intersection of the
local and the global conceptions of the rule of law and human rights. In this way it
informs the study of globalization by tracking a certain flow of ideas – the importance of
a strong rule of law – between the local and global. The anthropology of globalization
describes how culture becomes both deterritorialized and reterritorialized by the
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movement of ideas, technology, economics, media and people across all types of
boundaries (Inda and Rosaldo 2002:12). The research question of this study examines the
flow of an attempt to territorialize a specific rule of law conception. Although I set out to
understand how international processes are understood locally there is also another
dimension to explore by looking at how local conceptions affect international processes.
Surely there is already a greater emphasis in the anthropology of human rights, as
characteristic of anthropology in general, to understand the life and needs of local
populations to inform theories and therefore shape international policies. The conclusions
of this study can also be taken to that next step, adding to the circular influence that the
local and global have on each other.
Another way that this study informs processes of globalization is regarding Lutz
and Sikkink’s idea of a “justice cascade” for human rights violations (2001). They
describe it to be part of a larger human rights norms cascade in Latin America spurred on
by events within Latin America and internationally (for example, the creation and
successes of the ICTY) (2001:29). This cascade is described as a real change in society’s
norms, values and ideas when it comes to human rights, or a “significant norms
transformation” (2001:30). This change means that perpetrators of human rights
violations are more likely to face real consequences for their crimes than they would have
ten, twenty or fifty years ago – in Latin America and beyond. In the case of Argentina
Sikkink explains that the combination of internal and external demands for individual
accountability was needed to gain enough momentum to reach a tipping point in support
that enabled trials to take place domestically (Sikkink 2011). Nettelfield relates Lutz and
Sikkink’s justice cascade to her study of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s local perspective of
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the ICTY (2010:277). She finds evidence of a justice cascade in the sense that the ICTY
has helped to equip domestic courts in Bosnia to conduct impartial trials for war crimes,
though the transfer of cases has had difficulties. She proposes that local initiatives can
complement international attempts to provide justice such as the gacaca courts in Rwanda
working in conjunction with the ICTR, the ICTY’s sister court at The Hague.
Some critiques of international interventions in periods of transition and otherwise
question the validity of international agendas. They claim that initiatives like the ICTY’s
campaign to strengthen the rule of law in the Former Yugoslavia are really “Western”
ideas being imposed on the rest of the world in a form of cultural imperialism. While
there are credible arguments against those critiques (see Carothers 2003, Sen 2006)
organizations like the United Nations take careful steps to demonstrate the validity of
their agendas by pointing out instances of local support and successes. This is largely to
negate claims that the UN’s actions are an outside imposition rather than provision of
needed intervention. If a local culture of the rule of law exists in Croatia that is similar to
what the ICTY condones then the UN’s undertaking here may be validated. Challenges
faced by the ICTY, as well as successes, have and will continue to shape future
international criminal courts.

The Many Conceptions of “the Rule of Law”
What is the rule of law? In this paper I seek to understand the connection, if any,
between international agendas to strengthen the rule of law and local communities
targeted by those agendas. It is therefore important to clarify what is meant by “the rule
of law” and how it is defined for the purposes of this evaluation. It is commonly
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recognized among scholars that there is not a clear agreement on what the term “rule of
law” specifically refers to although it is often cited as a justification for major political
and economic strategies (See Tamanaha 2004:3, Carothers 2009:51, Nelson and
Cabatingan 2009:2). In fact the term “rule of law” may be used to describe a wide range
of judicial standards, accountability practices, and measures to enforce fairness. There are
five recurrent themes identified by Kleinfeld Belton as, “making the state abide by law,
ensuring equality before the law, supplying law and order, providing efficient and
impartial justice, and upholding human rights” (2005:7). Tamanaha’s historical analysis
starts with classical and medieval roots of restraint on the power of sovereigns, such as
the Magna Carta of 1215, and some consensus required by the people to validate laws,
such as with Germanic customary law (2004). Most definitions include this idea that
leaders should be held accountable, though the form and degree greatly vary. In his
discussion of developing democracies in Africa, Sklar looks for origins of a modern rule
of law concept entwined with ideas of constitutionalism in the mid-1600s when the
Levellers in England demanded accountability by, “establishing the rule of law as an
alternative to either executive or legislative despotism” (Sklar 1987:694). In this version
a separation of powers is inferred and additional danger seen in overstepping legislative
authority.
Tamanaha cites Hayek’s definition from The Road to Serfdom (1944) to be, “a
concise and highly influential definition of the rule of law: ‘Stripped of all technicalities,
this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced
before-hand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual
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affairs on the basis of this knowledge’” (Tamanaha 2004:65-66). In Hayek’s definition
there are allusions to a rule by law, restrictions on the use of power and a consistency in
the application of law which promotes greater security in many respects. For Hayek, laws
must be general (not made for a specific individual), equal (applied to all) and certain
(always applied) to qualify as a rule of law system (Tamanaha 2004:66).
Tamanaha’s own classification of the many versions of “rule of law” is divided
into formal/procedural versions (concerned with the source of law) and substantive
versions (additionally requiring a moral aspect) as well as placed upon a spectrum of thin
to thick, meaning they include less to more cumulative requirements. He goes beyond
issues of accountability to add the more recently associated moral dimension to the rule
of law that requires the law to be just (Tamanaha 2004:91-92). From this classification he
finds three “clusters of meaning” which are:
1) Law placing limits on government power – This is the concept that law puts
some restrictions on those in power, limiting the ability to treat citizens in an
arbitrary fashion. This includes restricting a government leader’s capacity to
change existing laws and their capacity to create laws. This notion of the rule
of law refers to a government’s duties and obligations to its citizens, predating
liberalism.
2) Formal legality (rule by rules) – In this sense the rule of law is something that
creates and maintains order in government. Here consistency in the
application of law is crucial, allowing for people to know consequences of
their actions beforehand and act accordingly. This also includes generality and
equality before the law and excludes retroactive application of law. Formal
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legality is the most commonly held meaning of the rule of law by liberalism
and capitalism.
3) Rule of law, as opposed to rule by people’s whims – In this view law is
objective, not subjective as an emotional, biased, or irrational person’s rule
could be. The most important protectors of the rule of law in this case are
judges who personify the law by interpreting it rather than proclaiming it.
Since people cannot be wholly objective this is an ideal that has the potential
to be abused by individuals. (Tamanaha 2004:114-126)
These “clusters of meaning” represent a variety of definitions for the term “rule of law”
and in their adoption can lead to very different legal, political and economic systems. So,
what then is the rule of law? As with many widely used terms the disagreement on a
definition makes it challenging to evaluate. Generally, when referring to the rule of law in
this writing I will use Hayek’s definition which incorporates accountability, consistency,
impartiality, and security.
Several points made by Tamanaha regarding the current discourse on the rule of
law relate well to the current study and analysis. The first is a caution about assuming
that a rule of law implies the law embodies fairness as seen in his description of the three
clusters of meaning: “Neither democracy, nor individual rights, nor justice is necessarily
implicated in any of these themes. This reminder is important because often the rule of
law is discussed in a manner that claims its own legitimacy without respect to whether
the law is just or conforms to the interests of the people (Tamanaha 2004:140)”. This
statement warns us that an agenda to strengthen the rule of law may be strengthening
laws that go against other possible objectives such as building a democracy and enforcing
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human rights standards. The laws themselves may only serve the interests of the elite
concerned with monopolizing power and still qualify as a rule of law system under some
definitions of the term. For example, apartheid South Africa fits some definitions of a
rule of law, except when equality before the law is taken to mean equal rights and
treatment, regardless of skin color, as in more substantive versions. In any historical
analysis of the rule of law definition attention to the era in question is critical to
understanding what is meant by the term because in the past the rule of law was
associated with more conservative political and economic views and today the more
substantive version is associated with more liberal agendas and human rights.
The second point from Tamanaha stresses the significance of public support for
the rule of law. He states that, “Pervasive societal attitudes about fidelity to the rule of
law – in each of the three meanings – is the mysterious quality that makes the rule of law
work (Tamanaha 2004:141).” While an exact assessment of such attitudes is indeed
difficult to assess, public support for rule of law initiatives does appear to be a necessary
ingredient. For example; if judicial reforms are viewed as mere words on paper rather
than actual changes to how law is applied, people may not show confidence in the new
regime by invoking the courts to enforce rights. Instead, alternative methods to maintain
their security may be chosen, perhaps by reinforcing internal ethnic divisions. My own
research in Croatia includes some factors that contribute to such societal attitudes toward
the rule of law – trust in institutions, levels of corruption, feelings of safety, and beliefs in
the importance of impartiality – which will be analyzed below in regard to how they
might demonstrate public support for the ideal of a rule of law.
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Levi and Epperly (2009) recognize the importance of this “mysterious quality”
that legitimates a rule of law and, consequentially, legitimates the state authority. They
present a genuine rule of law regime to be in opposition to a coercive authority because
there is a certain degree of voluntary compliance to the former. Beliefs which legitimate a
rule of law regime, “are a consequence of other prior factors, most importantly the
credible commitment of principled leadership, bureaucratic performance and integrity,
and institutional arrangements that ensure the continued observance by leaders and
bureaucrats to principles of the culture of law they are trying to realize (Levi and Epperly
2009:208).” Levi and Epperly’s argument centers on the impact of “principled principals”
which they describe to be leaders that transparently commit to a set of principals that
uphold the rule of law and create restraints to their own power of their own accord to
display that commitment – to the degree that it constitutes a costly signal (Levi and
Epperly 2009:200). The need to legitimate a new government order is indeed a major
challenge in all post-conflict societies that are cutting ties with the old regime that was
often the source of past violence. An agenda to legitimate the new authority is critical for
its longevity, so when strengthening the rule of law is a stated goal, public belief in the
commitment by leaders will influence public belief in a working rule of law system.
The idea that a rule of law system (particularly one with a moral dimension)
requires transformative change to gain legitimacy has substantial support. Borneman
shares the view that rule of law development is complicated and transformative by nature
in his evaluation of transitions in post-socialist Europe (Borneman 1997). “Not only do
regimes transform in different ways, but some states are transforming better than others;
better because they are more successful at establishing themselves as legitimate moral
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authorities that provide the possibility of justice; better because it is more likely that those
political communities that invoke the principles of the rule of law will not disintegrate
into cycles of violence (Borneman 1997:165).” He stresses that political and personal
accountability is of primary concern when developing a rule of law during transitional
periods, especially in conjunction with democracy building as is taking place in Croatia.
A third point comes from Tamanaha’s discussion of formal legality’s applicability
to various situations. He describes formal legality’s emphasis on rule by rules,
prioritizing objectivity and consistency, as being valuable in some situations and
detrimental in others. “In all instances where social ties and shared understandings are
thin, leading to less security and predictability, as is the case in urban areas around the
world, formal legality will offer important advantages (Tamanaha 2004:139-140).” As in
urban areas, post-conflict Croatia (and other areas of the Former Yugoslavia) certainly
can be considered a place where “social ties and shared understandings are thin” that
would, therefore, benefit from a clearly impartial application of law to improve relations.
This idea is central to my analysis of support for the international tribunal and its rule of
law agenda below. The situations where formal legality may hinder justice are those that,
“require discretion, judgment, compromise, or context-specific adjustments (Tamanaha
2004:140).” For instance, communal approaches to resolving conflict benefit more from
an understanding of the people and circumstances than an objective guilty or innocent
type of pronouncement. The example of Croatia falls under this category as well, at least
in some respects. However, it does not need to be an either-or proposition as is
recognized by Tamanaha in his statement that, “Rule of law systems can also
accommodate doing justice in an individual case, so long as the rules of law are departed
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from to achieve justice infrequently, under compelling circumstances (Tamanaha
2004:120).” These two approaches are similar to those debated in transitional justice in
which criminal proceedings that publicly declare responsibility for wrongdoing are
weighed next to truth-seeking that allows individuals to have their voices heard.
As noted above, more recently analysts of post-conflict transitions give preference
to an approach that is mixed, incorporating some elements of both approaches and
recognizing the merits and downfalls of each (UN Secretary-General 2011:4-6). In this
analysis I am evaluating the tribunal and its agenda to strengthen the rule of law in
Croatia from a local perspective – the tribunal embodies the ideal of rule by rules in
formal legality and strengthening the rule of law includes the building of institutions that
follow the same principles. Tamanaha’s statement that positive change can come from
the incorporation of formal legality where feelings of security are low and government
actions are unpredictable indicate that such trials may be a key part of transitions. The
next task of this evaluation is to identify the definition of the rule of law most consistent
with international human rights law and discuss the components of the rule of law singled
out for study.

International Perspectives
What do international organizations, proponents of human rights and development
initiatives say about the rule of law? In short, many cite it as a major source of concern
and an impetus for intervention. “Rule of law at the international level is the very
foundation of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Secretary-General 2011:4).” Over
150 member states are provided rule of law assistance by the United Nations which

57
established a “Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group” and “Rule of Law Unit”
in 2006 with the motto, “Towards a just, secure and peaceful world, governed by the rule
of law” (www.unrol.org accessed 9/9/12) to coordinate rule of law related activities
within the UN and between the UN and other entities. One main focus is the coordination
of transitional justice initiatives to be in line with rule of law development. “National
consultations are a critical element as successful transitional justice programmes
necessitate meaningful public participation, particularly of victims. These efforts are
linked to and should be coordinated with broader assistance aimed at strengthening the
overall rule of law in the country (www.un.rol.org accessed 9/9/12).” These coordination
efforts include several UN sub-sections such as the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) who specify that strengthening the rule of law is
integral to their missions. Several people in Gvozd worked as local liaisons to these
organizations (UNDP and UNHCR) at some point during projects related to the postconflict transition in Croatia. For the UN, the rule of law is defined by the Secretary
General as,
…a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities,
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated,
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. (UN SecretaryGeneral 2004:4)
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This is a high ideal - the definition explicitly includes a moral dimension by requiring
laws to be “consistent with international human rights norms and standards” as well as
provisions for equality, fairness and transparency that are consistent with Tamanaha’s
more substantive versions of the rule of rule (Tamanaha 2004:102). The United Nations
Security Council created the ICTY in part because of its declared commitment to the rule
of law. This is stated in the 1994 UN Commission of Experts Report:
The Commission would be remiss if it did not emphasize the high
expectation of justice conveyed by the parties to the conflict, as well as by
victims, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations, the media and world public opinion. Consequently, the
International Tribunal must be given the necessary resources and support
to meet these expectations and accomplish its task. Furthermore, popular
expectations of a new world order based on the international rule of law
require no less than effective and permanent institutions of international
justice. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violation of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 must,
therefore, be given the opportunity to produce the momentum for this
future evolution.(United Nations Commission of Experts 1994:320)
This statement is also an example of how justice, peace and the rule of law have come to
be grouped together in international agendas. The tribunal continues to equate
strengthening the rule of law with pursuing justice for mass atrocities as it nears the
conclusion of its mandate and reports on its achievements.
The World Bank, a major source of funding for global development initiatives,
approaches the subject of defining the rule of law in a very different way. It provides a
statement that outlines the various categories of definitions along with pros and cons of
each and then refrains from choosing a specific definition to guide donors, recipients and
policymakers (Stephenson 2005). Instead, the World Bank urges that each initiative
clarify its particular goals rather than use language about the rule of law that may mislead

59
or confuse. In some ways this approach makes a great deal of sense considering the
variation found in definitions, in others ways it seems like an easy way out of defining a
critical concept that inspires extensive reforms, be they deemed positive or negative. Still,
even with this hesitation to define the term, the World Bank funds projects around the
globe that declare strengthening the rule of law as a major goal.
From the sources presented here, the prevailing conception of the rule of law by
proponents of human rights, political and economic development and transitional justice
does go beyond a minimal degree of accountability and rule by rules to a “thicker”
version which idealizes equal treatment to all, transparency in government, and a genuine
commitment to follow the law by people in positions of power.
Rule-of-law aid providers seem confident that they know what the rule of
law looks like in practice. Stated in shorthand form, they want to see law
applied fairly, uniformly, and efficiently throughout the society in
question, to both public officials as well as ordinary citizens, and to have
law protect various rights that ensure the autonomy of the individual in the
face of state power in both the political and economic spheres. (Carothers
2003:6)
The ICTY has directly and indirectly taken on some rule of law improvements in the
areas outlined here, whose impact is discussed below.

Transitional Justice, Development and the Rule of Law
While efforts to strengthen the rule of law can be independent of transitional
justice, economic and political development initiatives, they are often pursued
concurrently and overlap in many areas. Strengthening the rule of law continues to be a
top priority in a wide variety of initiatives because it is viewed as a panacea for
corruption and ordinary crimes that plague transitional periods (Carothers 2009:49). The
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logic behind this connection is that the provision of a set of rules to be followed
consistently allows people to better organize themselves and envision what tomorrow
will hold for them against the uncertainty that is characteristic of these periods.
Consequently it is also considered to be a deterrent of power-grabbing and behind-thescenes deals that may undermine a new regime. Any new regime faces challenges to the
establishment of itself as a legitimate authority and provider of justice. The longevity of
its tenuous hold on power will depend on numerous factors, but a strengthening of the
rule of law promises to be a real asset. Rule of law initiatives address the challenges
faced by new regimes through their leadership’s commitment to public accountability, the
consistent and impartial application of rule by law, and the ability to predict
consequences of actions. These elements can be vital for new governments and citizens
alike.
The need to establish legitimacy is discussed by Wilson in the context of postapartheid South Africa (Wilson 2001). He critiques the Truth and Reconciliation
Committee’s (“TRC”) decision to emphasize a restorative approach for justice as a useful
way to legitimize the new regime at the time because it validated a unification of the
opposing fronts, but a poor means to provide justice for the victims in a way that
provided real resolution and faith in government to punish wrongdoing (Wilson
2001:227). The TRC is given as an example of a balance weighed heavily on a restorative
approach with the consequence that many were left feeling justice did not take place and
it did not further respect for the rule of law. Borneman recognizes the importance of
strengthening the rule of law during transitions in his analysis of post-socialist Europe
(Borneman 1997).
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Not only do regimes transform in different ways, but some states are
transforming better than others: better because they are more successful at
establishing themselves as legitimate moral authorities that provide the
possibility of justice; better because it is more likely that those political
communities that invoke principles of the rule of law will not disintegrate
into cycles of violence. (Borneman 1997:165)
Does the new regime hold wrongdoers accountable? Is there a fair attempt at
providing justice? Though the current study focuses on the ICTY from a local
perspective, a major measure of the ICTY’s success in strengthening the rule of
law is taken by examining what is occurring at the domestic level - the Croatian
government’s support of the tribunal, adoption of rule of law principles advocated
by the ICTY and a commitment of politicians to adhere to consistent and
impartial rule of law. To leave an injustice without correction would open up the
authority to a loss of public confidence and legitimacy. This is recognized by
Scherer in his assertion that, “no sociopolitical system regulating human social
association and interaction can afford to neglect the maintenance of perceived
justice and the need for corrective action in a situation of perceived injustice, at
least for any length of time (Scherer 1992: 3).” It is important to point out that the
perception of justice (or injustice) is of consequence, whether or not this
perception is attributed to norms, ethics or predispositions.
The idea of a justice cascade first proposed by Lutz and Sikkink (2001) is
further reiterated by Sikkink to say that, “there has been a shift in the legitimacy
of the norm of individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and
an increase in criminal prosecutions on behalf of that norm (Sikkink 2011:5)”.
The justice cascade follows one element of the rule of law – individual criminal
accountability – in governments transitioning from a non-democratic to a more
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democratic state, particularly the accountability of political and military leaders
for human rights violations in the previous regime. Here, again, transitional
justice, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are linked together. Sikkink
(2011) presents evidence of a change in norms away from sovereign immunity
and accountability of the state as a whole to one favoring criminal trials for the
individual orchestrators of human rights violations and even applying human
rights protections to the accused. Her account follows the diffusion of norms of
accountability from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to a history of political trials
in Greece that was fundamentally altered when Karamanlis denied the death
penalty as an option in trials of former junta leaders in 1974 (Sikkink 2011:47).
The international trials of the ICTY and ICTR are considered to be a development
building on the history of domestic prosecutions that has gathered momentum
along with trials in Latin America. Sikkink is hopeful that norms of individual
criminal accountability will continue to gain support internationally and
ultimately contribute to a decline in violence based on its deterrence effect and the
alteration of what is acceptable behavior.
Though strengthening the rule of law is a key component of transitional justice,
economic and political development efforts, Carothers identifies four “temptations” of
the rule of law based on how such transitions have unfolded in the recent past –
consensus, reductionism, sequencing and ease (Carothers 2009:51). He warns us that
even though many leaders and societies proclaim an aspiration for stronger rule of law,
the assumption that there is a consensus by all is more than stretching the truth, partly
because there is not a agreement on what is meant by the rule of law or how is should be
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realized. Two people professing to advocate the rule of law may have very different ideas
of how that translates to real changes to law, institutions and norms.
This relates to Carothers’ second temptation of reductionism which he uses to
refer to a more recent trend of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian leaders to publicly
support the inclusion of rule of law measures, but, in doing so, they define the rule of law
in reductionist terms – excluding political and civic rights or other challenges to control
while enforcing a rule by law. This differs from the prevailing meaning intended by
international development, human rights and democracy proponents. This warning ties in
with Tamanaha’s point above that we should not assume support for the rule of law
implies fairness or agreement on what rights (if any) are central to a strong rule of law.
What one person or state means by declaring a priority to strengthen the rule of law may
be quite different from what is meant by another.
Thirdly, the lesson given regarding sequentialism is that current calls to sequence
rule of law building before beginning democracy building have a flawed rationality. This
is so because these processes are not distinct, but rather reinforce one another. Also,
promises to create a democratic political system in the future may be empty and the
sequentialist approach used as a convenient excuse for not working on democracy
building immediately. There are some cases when the process actually happens in
reverse, democracy building, primarily through elections, comes first and later rule of law
initiatives are prioritized.
The fourth temptation is to think that rule of law development is an easy task. It is
a much more complex and long-term endeavor than presumed by many proponents.
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While explaining the challenges to building a rule of law Carothers names what he
considers to be critical elements of the rule of law:
What Western policymakers, diplomats, military officials, political
observers, and others are overlooking in their enthusiasm for the rule of
law as a response to troubled transitions is that achieving the rule of law
involves far more than getting judges trained, putting modern police
equipment in place, and reprinting and distributing legal texts. It is a
transformative process that changes how power is both exercised and
distributed in a society and thus a process inherently threatening to
existing power-holders. It also involves basic changes in how citizens
relate to state authority and also to one another. (Carothers 2009:59-60)
As with attempts for justice during transitions, Carothers’ temptation against seeing the
strengthening of the rule of law as a simple exercise in training and reorganization
teaches that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead careful understanding of the
local context is required to assess existing power relationships and reconfigure them so
that they stand by the tenets of the rule of law. Nelson and Cabatingan reinforce this
caution by stating that, “While courts, constitutions, written laws and other institutions
may have the potential to contribute to a rule-of-law society and the development of the
economy and democracy, there is some agreement that these institutions cannot succeed
without careful forethought, precise tailoring, and a certain degree of luck (Nelson and
Cabatingan 2009:13).” Regardless of any concurrent initiatives the challenges faced by
efforts to strengthen the rule of law begin with clarifying what is meant by the term and,
while making that clarification does allow specific areas to be targeted and real change
made, the complexity only grows when the expectation is a genuine alteration of the
social psyche.
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Strengthening the Rule of Law
Questions about what is meant by the rule of law lead to questions about how the
rule of law can be strengthened. These are also contested. Generally there is an emphasis
on building institutions rather than altering the local legal consciousness. Some initiatives
focus on judicial reforms, legal reforms, creating equality, the police or combating
corruption. The ICTY publicly states how it has strengthened the rule of law in the
Former Yugoslavia on its website and elsewhere (www.icty.org). One way is that the
ICTY has “served as an incentive to authorities in the former Yugoslavia to reform their
judiciaries,” though it is easy to debate the success and methods of these incentives which
could be a study in of itself. The ICTY also claims that it has aided the development of
specialized war crimes courts in the former Yugoslavia. This has happened most clearly
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and more recently in Serbia, but Croatia has made efforts to
equip select domestic courts to handle war crimes trials in accordance with international
human rights standards.
In addition to demonstrating that the international community will take action and
recourse when human rights violations occur (again, this is contentious on many fronts),
the ICTY states:
To further support the process of strengthening the rule of law, the
Tribunal is actively involved in transferring its expertise to legal
professionals from the former Yugoslavia so as to assist them in dealing
with war crimes cases and enforcing international legal standards in their
local systems. In implementing its completion strategy, the Tribunal has
transferred several ICTY cases, as well as numerous investigative files, to
national authorities and courts in the former Yugoslavia.
(icty.org/sid/324#strengthening accessed 11/5/12)
In his quote in the previous section Carothers lays out some ways to strengthen the rule of
law that complement what the ICTY states – training judges, modernizing the police
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force, and publicizing the law. Then he says it goes beyond that to change “how power is
both exercised and distributed in a society (Carothers 2003:60).” In Weingast’s analysis
of the challenges to building a rule of law he states that, “creating the rule of law requires
two separate institutional changes: institutions to provide for the law; and a set of credible
commitments that protect those institutions and ensure that they survive” (Weingast
2009: 29). These additional requirements for strengthening the rule of law proposed by
Carothers and Weingast go beyond an emphasis on institutional reforms to require the
type of transformation outlined by Tamanaha, Borneman and others in previous
discussions above.
When a transformation of power relationships is included in an analysis of the
rule of law the existence of a local legal consciousness that supports rule of law
initiatives becomes vital. The vast majority of rule of law initiatives set out to alter
institutions with an assumption that social change will follow. That assumption goes too
far and lacks evidence. Institutional reforms may take place, but without those credible
commitments discussed by Weingast and the transformation of power relations proposed
by Borneman they will not lead to meaningful change. In order to convince the people
that faith in the rule of law, and therefore the state’s commitment to the rule of law, is
grounded there needs to be a clear communication of the law and peoples’ rights, reforms
that visibly alter everyday interactions with government representatives, efficient and fair
dispute resolution, and safe channels to report corrupt practices.
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The Rule of Law as Accountability, Fairness and Security
In this study I focus on three aspects of the rule of law identified by Hayek and
others: accountability, fairness (including consistency and impartiality), and security. The
forms of accountability under consideration here are the accountability of political
leaders to the public, the accountability of courts and law enforcement to the people, and
personal accountability for wrongdoing. I place consistency and impartiality under the
umbrella term of fairness because they are so inter-related. Consistency refers to the
consistent application of laws and the consistent consequence of punishment for
wrongdoing. Impartiality has to do with the unbiased and fair application of law and
punishment. Security is a critical aspect of the rule of law because it highlights the
juxtaposition of what the rule of law is not – actions without known consequences. In this
study I refer to security as personal security against wrongdoing, economic security
(including housing, jobs finances), and security against the unknown (as is possible).
Next I will present the findings of research in Croatia and examine how a local
perspective can inform international law and policies by putting rule of law initiatives in
context.
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Chapter 4 - A Local Perspective

In this chapter I describe a local perspective on the rule of law based on my
research in Gvozd and other areas of Croatia in order to examine the success of initiatives
that promote international norms of the rule of law from a local perspective rather than
primarily by an evaluation of state laws and institutions. This chapter presents ways in
which Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees navigate conflict in the course of their
daily lives which, in turn, shapes local conceptions of the rule of law and influences
views of the international tribunal. It begins with the interaction between the independent
state of Croatia and the ICTY over the course of their existence. What is the Croatian
state’s perspective on the international tribunal? Official support for the ICTY has
changed with time and circumstance and is complicated by the state’s multiple roles in
the 1990s conflict, in some instances labeled as a victim and in others as an aggressor.
Support also varied with the different approaches of the ICTY prosecutors at The Hague
and the strategies of political leadership in Croatia.

Croatia’s Relationship with the ICTY
Soon after Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991 violence
began in the eastern area of the country bordering Serbia and the Krajina region to the
south (Peskin 2008:95). At the early stages of the conflict Croatia was a strong proponent
of the tribunal, citing the need for justice after the horrific mass killing at Ovčara of
people taken from Vukovar’s hospital by the Yugoslav army and paramilitary. One of the
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people killed at Ovčara was a journalist, Siniša Glavašević, who reported events as he
was able to during the time they sought refuge at the hospital. His death and the death of
hospital staff and patients brought this instance of violence under international scrutiny
and condemnation (Silber and Little 1996:180). I met with Glavašević’s son at the
University of Zagreb where he was studying socio-linguistics. He expressed a desire to
work toward a positive future rather than dwell on the past when we spoke of the conflict.
The basement of the hospital in Vukovar is now open to the public to educate visitors and
memorialize the people who sought refuge there. Much of the city still has visible signs
of the physical damage done by the shelling and attacks, which is rumored to be left in
that condition by the government to remind the world of Croatia’s victim status which
stands in contrast to the rebuilding of Dubrovnik, a major tourist attraction on the coast
and revenue source for the state.
For some people in Croatia the case of the “Vukovar Three” shapes overall
opinions of the tribunal. Vukovar’s status as a symbol of Croatia’s victimhood during the
conflict caused the combined trials of Mrkšić, Sljivančanin and Radić, leaders in the
Yugoslav Army (JNA), to be given special attention from the media. The judgment and
sentencing was heavily criticized in Croatia: Mrkšić received 20 years, Sljivančanin five
years and Radić was acquitted of all charges. Later appeals altered Sljivančanin's
sentence up to 17 years and then down to ten years. In response to the initial sentencing
Prime Minister Ivo Sanander joined protesters at the mass grave site and said “I would
like to say that, in my opinion, this is a defeat for the idea of the Hague tribunal“
(Jungvirth 2007). People I spoke with in Gvozd echoed Sanader's sentiment, often citing
the Vukovar Three judgment, which was passed during my research, as evidence that the
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tribunal was not providing real justice and must be biased. The tribunal justified its
decision by stating that the three people on trial were members of the JNA that should
have taken steps to ensure the massacre did not take place, but it was local Serb defense
and paramilitary groups that committed the physical crimes. This distinction did not seem
to alter public opinion.
Other early instances of violence include the shelling of Dubrovnik, a world
heritage site, and numerous small-scale skirmishes by local Serb groups to oust nonSerbs in response to fear for their future in a Croatia that was no longer part of
Yugoslavia. The JNA occupation of Plitvice National Park was a major loss for the new
state because it helped join areas of the Serb-held Krajina and this impressive landmark
was a point of pride for Croatia. Peskin speculates that Croatia’s apparent lack of
preparation for a violent conflict when declaring independence, particularly in
comparison to Slovenia, to be part of a predetermined strategy to claim victimhood and
thus greater international support for its separation from Yugoslavia (Peskin 2008:99).
The recognition of the Republic of Croatia as an independent state by the European
Union in 1992 was a critical point in the nation’s departure from Yugoslavia (Goldstein
1999:238).
Croatia’s call for justice in conjunction with evidence of human rights violations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina convinced the UN to create the ICTY. However, as the
conflict unfolded Croatia had a hand in violence outside its newly declared borders and it
came to light that crimes also occurred domestically. Tuñman and other leaders of the
HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) political party supported Bosnian Croat control of
territories in Bosnia. The government’s role in violence there became apparent over time
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and Croatia’s victim status was questioned. Allegations arose (and were later confirmed)
that Tuñman and other political leaders shared a goal of creating Croat-controlled areas in
Bosnia to be incorporated with a “Greater Croatia” similar to Milošević’s notion of a
“Greater Serbia” (Silber and Little 1996:132). Aggressive actions were also taken to
reclaim the Serb-controlled Krajina region along Croatia’s southern border with Bosnia
during Operation Storm and to the east with Operation Flash.
The image of Croatia’s innocence and victimhood was altered despite claims of
self-defense because these military fronts included ethnic cleansing, plunder, murder and
destruction of property. “Croatia’s shift from victim to victimizer raised the likelihood
that the tribunal would investigate Bosnian Croat war crimes suspects and complicit highlevel Croatian officials in Zagreb (Peskin 2008: 100).” As the tribunal began to criticize
Croatia’s actions the state’s support for the tribunal waned and there were even periods of
overt non-cooperation and opposition. During Tuñman’s presidency the Croatian
government did hand over evidence of war crimes committed by Bosnian Croats and
brought some indicted Bosnian Croats to The Hague after much pressure to do so, but
any allegations of Croatia’s wrongdoing during the “Homeland War” were dismissed.
The need for cooperation, particularly to gain evidence and people to put on trial, made it
difficult for the tribunal to push for indictments of Tuñman and other political and
military leaders in Croatia.
After Tuñman’s death in 1999 the tribunal voiced more criticism of Croatia’s
homeland war and its role in Bosnia. The leadership of Prime Minister Račan and
President Mesić often claimed to cooperate with demands from the tribunal, but then
delayed actual compliance or criticized the tribunal (Peskin 2008:121). In 2005, Judge
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Meron reported a negative assessment of Croatia’s cooperation due to the harboring of
Ante Gotovina, initially indicted in 2001, “contrary to expectations and despite numerous
promises” (ICTY 2005:35). General Gotovina was charged with crimes against humanity
and violations of the laws or customs of war during “Operation Storm” to take back the
Krajina region from Serb forces (ICTY 2012). In Croatia he is widely viewed as a hero,
though the public has become more tolerable of criticism regarding his military tactics.
During a stay in Zadar I saw many trinkets for sale (pillows, t-shirts, etc.) and graffiti
around the city depicting Gotovina in military uniform next to the word “hero”. Support
for Gotovina is especially strong in this area where he was born. For many years the
Croatian government told the ICTY it was doing its best to locate and hand over
Gotovina as per his indictment, but claimed he could not be found. However, soon after
this failure to produce Gotovina put the state’s European Union membership processes on
hold, he was located. He was arrested and transferred to The Hague in December 2005 by
Spanish authorities that identified him in the Canary Islands based on communication
from the Croatian government and some luck. In April 2011 he was found guilty and
sentenced to 24 years imprisonment which is pending appeal by the defense (ICTY
2012).
Public support for General Gotovina is characteristic of the attitudes many
(though certainly not all) Croats hold toward Croatia’s actions during the conflict that
justify the use of violence as self-defense and consider it to be negligible in comparison
with the crimes of Serbs. A group of young adults I spoke with in Zagreb took this stance
and were adamant that Croatia’s use of violence was only treating the Serbs as Croats had
been treated by them and therefore could not be condemned – they said the Serbs had
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started it. They also were generally suspicious of the ICTY as a source of facts about the
conflict period. Croatia has been cooperative with the tribunal in other respects, but the
delay of action on Gotovina, even after Tuñman’s death, demonstrated only partial
commitment to the purposes of the ICTY.
Since its inception the ICTY has had several chief prosecutors that used different
tactics to gain the cooperation of the former Yugoslav republics. Goldstone and Arbour
were at the tribunal during Tuñman’s presidency when Croatia was adamant that all its
actions were legal self-defense. In order to get Bosnian Croat Blaškić in custody
Gladstone sought international pressures and shaming in conjunction with efforts to
placate Tuñman (Peskin 2008:108). Later, one strategy of Del Ponte’s was to indict
members of each faction to avoid accusations that the tribunal was biased and enacting
victor’s justice as Croatia alleged. Peskin points out that Prosecutor Del Ponte’s choice to
indict Gotovina soon after Serbia handed over Milošević to the tribunal “reflected an
adept understanding of the interrelatedness of Balkan politics” (Peskin 2008:128). Part of
that understanding was that the political leadership in Zagreb, particularly after Tuñman,
had to tread carefully between a show of support for the tribunal and keeping the political
support of Croat nationalists (or at least avoid their opposition). Del Ponte says that, “It
took most of a decade, two cancer deaths, and a political upheaval in the Republic of
Croatia before the Office of the Prosecutor’s analytical staff was able to gather sufficient
documentation to report to me in detail what Tuñman and his protégés had been doing for
years to thwart the tribunal’s efforts and to secure impunity for themselves and Croat
military leaders.” (Del Ponte 2009:243). The hesitation of the prosecutors and lack of
information to indict Croats for actions within the country’s borders had allowed many of
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those responsible to avoid trial and punishment though this strategy had facilitated
cooperation regarding several Bosnian Croats wanted by the tribunal.
Any discussion of Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY must include the
influence of the European Union. Croatia’s membership in the EU is contingent upon
compliance with the ICTY and Croatia’s adoption of international human rights standards
in its politics, laws and institutions. The EU began considering Croatian accession with
the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001 and negotiations for
accession began in October of 2005 (Commission of European Communities 2009).
Negotiations continue despite anticipation that Croatia would have completed accession
requirements by the end of 2009, prolonged due to border disputes with neighboring EU
member and former Yugoslav republic Slovenia and a lack of compliance with EU
standards in the categories of judiciary and fundamental rights, competition and transport.
Delays in cooperation with the ICTY and treatment of refugees have also played a role.
Surveys conducted by the EU show that Croatian citizens’ support for EU accession has
increased and decreased at different periods during the accession process (European
Commission 2005, 2007, 2009). In 2009, the majority of Croatians (52%) did not think
joining the EU would be beneficial and more people believed joining the EU would be a
bad thing (37%) rather than a good thing (24%) (European Commission 2009). In several
of my discussions with people in Croatia they represented EU as another overseeing
bureaucracy (like Yugoslvia was) that would compromise Croatian identity and tradition.
They viewed joining the EU to mean losing their autonomy that was so newly won. Still,
most people viewed accession as inevitable since Croatia is such a small country with big
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and powerful neighbors (referring to past struggles for control of this border zone
between Christian and the Muslim forces).
When asked if Croatia should join the EU during my research 59% of the people
said yes (n=79) and 37% said no (n=50). To follow-up, I also asked how joining the EU
would affect them, to which 22% answered positively (n=30), 64% answered not very
much (n=86), and 13% answered negatively (n=17). In comparison, the results from
Gvozd show a more positive view of the Croatia joining the EU than that of the overall
country surveyed by the European Commission. This may be at least partially accounted
for by the minority status of local citizens (Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees)
who are likely to have more rights as part of the EU than otherwise.
A Ministry of European Integration was formed to coordinate the integration of
EU favored policies and laws and to communicate those changes to the Croat public.
Prime Minister Ivo Sanader ends his introduction to the National Programme for the
Integration of the Republic of Croatia into the EU by stating, “The European Union and
the Republic of Croatia share the same values, the same principles and the same
commitment, and I am confident that by harmonizing our legislation and practices we
prove that Croatia needs the European Union just as the European Union needs Croatia
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration 2005:3).” While it was originally
thought Croatia would be an EU and NATO member by the year 2009, it only joined the
NATO alliance by that time. EU membership is still in limbo with current projections of
membership in 2013. The benefits of EU membership are emphasized in the Ministry of
European Integration’s formal EU Integration Communication Strategy. It explicitly
targets teachers, politicians, public employees and trade unions to communicate what EU
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membership will do for Croatian citizens. Within this document, the government
recognizes that not all citizens are in favor of joining the EU. The concern about a
negative economic impact and a loss of national sovereignty are acknowledged and the
strategy to change those opinions is educating the public about the EU.
Information from a public opinion poll conducted by the Croatian government
provides some insight into which Croats fall into the category of approving EU
integration (Republic of Croatia 2003). In 2003 those people with the most positive views
towards accession are from households with average and above-average incomes. They
are also more likely to have a middle or higher level of education as compared to the state
as a whole. Most of the EU supporters are from younger generations or middle-aged
population (the poll included informants aged 15 and up). Even President Mesić
recognizes that Croat support for EU accession is not unified. In a speech given San
Francisco, Mesić states, “We had major support for Croatia's membership in the EU -- it
was over 80 percent, but due to the delay of opening negotiations as well as certain
obstacles and pressures we faced, euro skepticism got off the ground (HINA News
Agency 2006)”. These obstacles and pressures aren’t detailed by Mesić, but other polls
do identify Croat’s concerns. A 2005 public opinion poll found the four top concerns to
be: 1) the impact of Croatia’s EU membership on the economy (86.7%), 2) the impact of
EU membership on everyday life (84.4%, 3) the rights and obligations stemming from
Croatia’s EU membership (84.4%), 4) the impact of the EU membership on sovereignty
(83.8%) (Republic of Croatia 2005). The high percentages show that these opinions are
shared by people who support and those that oppose accession to the EU. The concerns
certainly tie into Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY, particularly the third concern
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about “obligations stemming from Croatia’s EU membership”. Cooperation with the
tribunal is complicated by this connection to the EU, NATO membership, international
pressures and shaming (ex. requirement for economic assistance and threatened bar from
Olympic events), domestic power struggles, and continuing post-conflict issues (ex.
refugees, minority rights, housing).

Local Perceptions of the ICTY
Trials for human rights violations are taking place at the international tribunal, but
what to people in Croatia think of them? What do people in the local communities
directly involved in the conflict think of the tribunal itself? The ICTY boasts that it
provides justice, gives a voice to the victims and strengthens the rule of law, but is that
what people want? In my initial interviews many people were supportive of the ICTY,
though with multiple reservations. They stated that the tribunal was the best option for
pursuing justice (over Croatian courts particularly), though only partially effective at
achieving justice. Some of the factors voiced as preventing the success of the tribunal
were problems securing firsthand witnesses, a lack of information shared by states of the
former Yugoslavia, the slow pace of trials, putting the wrong people on trial (said should
focus on major political and military leaders), legal technicalities preventing convictions
or adequate punishment, political bias in judgments, and the harboring of war criminals.
A few people said they didn’t know much about the trials and weren’t interested, but
most do pay some attention to it in the newspapers, on television and through discussions
with family and friends.
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Are trials the best choice for pursuing justice? When asked for her opinion one
Gvozd woman repeated a common sentiment that the tribunal “is not enough”, though
what would be enough is unclear. One of my key informants expressed thoughts similar
to what was expressed by many others. She said, “I suppose that it is a good thing that
trials are taking place, but they are too slow, some sentences are not fair, such as in
Srebrenica, and it is impossible to have a trial for everyone who committed a crime.”
Based on these sentiments the ICTY appears to play a critical role in post-conflict
Croatia, though with a flawed performance. Some of the flaws may be inherent to legal
processes in general and to the fact that the ICTY is the first court of its kind and other
flaws may be a consequence of people’s valid or misguided expectations of justice for
human rights violations. As noted earlier, a quarter (25%, n=33) of the people who
completed surveys said that the ICTY is effectively achieving justice for the violations of
human rights that occurred during the war of the 1990s. In those surveys the tribunal’s
top two obstacles to achieving justice were “political biases in the courts” (46%, n=62)
and “witnesses scared to testify” (33%, n=44). In order to better understand what the
political biases were perceived to be I talked with several people in Gvozd and members
of human rights NGOs throughout Croatia.
Sometimes the political biases of concern were of the judges and lawyers thought
to be holding America and European interests over those of the people in the Former
Yugoslavia. A few people extended this explanation to a criticism of the American
actions in Iraq and the refusal to subject American military personnel to international
human rights standards. To other people the political biases were based on ethnicity,
often complaining that Serbs were overly targeted or that Croats should not be targeted
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by the tribunal because their actions were in self-defense. It was also said that the tribunal
focused too much on crimes against Muslims in Bosnia, a population almost absent from
Gvozd (I knew of only two people who identified as Muslim).
The problem of safeguarding witnesses to war crimes is well documented for both
domestic trials and those at the tribunal. There are incidents of witnesses being threatened
and even killed after talking publicly against suspects. In Croatia, witnesses against
Croats considered to be national heroes like General Ante Gotovina face great pressure to
keep quiet. Since the death of President Tuñman that pressure has gradually lessened, but
it still exists. In Gvozd, many of the Serb returnees took part in holding the territory as a
separate Serb-controlled Krajina region after the declaration of independence of Croatia
from Yugoslavia. That control included forcing non-Serbs to leave the area and covering
much of the land with mines to keep them out. During a social gathering in the town hall,
one friend pointed out to me that most of the men in the room were responsible for some
form of war crime. They knew what each other did during that time and choose to stay
quiet. I imagine that speaking out would have a devastating effect on your future in the
community.
When I began to interview people in Gvozd it quickly became clear that some
questions were too abstract to illicit helpful responses. When I asked how people would
define justice or what constituted a just punishment I mostly received shrugs in response.
When directly asked if the tribunal affected their lives most people didn’t see a
connection. During the development of the surveys I found that questions which
compared a few alternatives were more successful. Questions that asked about a specific
way the tribunal might affect their lives also yielded better results. Responses to two
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questions in particular indicate the tribunal’s actions are meaningful to people directly
involved in the conflict. The first asked, “How much do you care about the decisions the
ICTY makes in war crimes trials?” About three quarters (74%, n=99) of the people
responded that they cared at least a little about the decisions of the ICTY trials and the
choice selected with the highest frequency (31%, n=41) indicated they cared “Very
Much” (See Graph 4.1). This means many people do care if defendants are declared to be
innocent or guilty and care about what sentence is given for punishment. The trials at The
Hague are meaningful to the people in this community. However, caring doesn’t equal
agreement with those decisions. In conversation people often say that defendants
commonly known to be guilty weasel out of sentences proportionate to their crimes and
they are angry about a lack of public acknowledgement for the severity of the crimes. In a
similar vein, a survey by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA) in 2002 asked Croatians how much trust they had in the international
institution of the ICTY. Of the 1,010 participants 20.1% (n=207) answered “trust very
much or trust a fair amount” (IDEA 2002). This finding also demonstrates that the
tribunal’s decisions are of consequence in Croatia.
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Graph 4.1: Do people care about the ICTY decisions?
How much do you care about the decisions made by the ICTY in
war crimes trials?

Not at All, 25%
Very M uch, 31%

A Lit t le, 15%

Some, 28%

A related question in the Gvozd survey asked, “Do the decisions of the ICTY
affect how safe you feel to live in Croatia?” Concern about safety speaks both to the
impact of the tribunal and the importance of a sense of security as an aspect of the rule of
law. To this question almost half (49%, n=65 of people answered that the decisions of the
ICTY affect how safe they feel to live in Croatia “some” (27%, n=36) or “very much”
(22%, n=29) (See Graph 4.2). Fifteen years after the end of the violence, apprehension
about safety is still prevalent. These results show that the tribunal’s decisions can
influence future actions of the people involved in the conflict. Threats to safety could be
used to justify new violence or perceptions of a safe environment could lead to the
building of bridges between groups. Admittedly, the real degree to which safety is
perceived and how that affects actions is complex to assess. These survey results simply
show that the tribunal does have some effect on perceptions of safety for the majority of
people in this community.
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Graph 4.2: Do the ICTY decisions affect feelings of safety?
Do the decisions of the ICTY affect how safe you feel to live in
Croatia?

Very Much, 22%
Not at All, 28%

Some, 27%
A Little, 22%

In a rule of law context, safety is often equated with security or reliability. A
sense of safety may refer to personal safety, financial security, job security, or a trust that
certain repercussions will follow actions, such as a punishment after a crime. Based on
my research experience I believe that locally the trials do affect a feeling of safety in the
sense that successful trials (however that may be defined) may provide a satisfactory
resolution to the wrongdoing and therefore reduce desires to “resolve” the wrongdoing by
resorting to violence. Concerns about safety likely stem from the possibility of interregional conflict recurring due to dissatisfaction with the current borderlines and powersharing arrangements. Other forms of insecurity exist as well. In my conversation with
one woman in Gvozd she asserted that gaining financial security was the most important
change needed to improve her life. She also stated that the future of her housing was
uncertain because the government won’t definitively grant or deny her rights to the home.
The trials won’t have a direct effect on these issues, but the incorporation of laws and
policies required by the ICTY and EU integration may change her future prospects.
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The impartiality of the courts is a key aspect of the ICTY’s goal to strengthen the
rule of law. In most conversations people agreed that the tribunal’s judges are more
impartial than those of Croatian courts, despite the concern over political biases noted
above. Most often they also said that the tribunal was the best place for war crimes trials
over domestic or regional options, except a few who expressed a strong opinion that such
trials should only take place in domestic courts. In response to the survey question,
“Which judges are better able to make impartial decisions in trials of war crimes that took
place in Croatia?” most people answered ICTY judges (64%, n=85) over Croatian judges
(25%, n=33). One interviewee elaborated that, “Croatian courts are not fair and effective,
they don’t punish their own people”. In this statement impartiality is implied to be a facet
of fairness. Do people want fair trials? Do fair trials bring justice for violations of human
rights? According to the people who completed the survey in Gvozd fair trials are integral
to achieving justice. When rating their agreement with the statement, “Conducting fair
trials is the best way to achieve justice,” nearly half of the respondents (48%, n=64)
completely agreed (See Graph 4.3). The level of agreement to this question was higher
than I had anticipated and can be interpreted as substantial support for the tribunal’s
mission. It also supports the need for trials in any post-conflict situation with human
rights abuses.

84

Graph 4.3: Are trials the best way to achieve justice?
Rate how m uch you agree w ith the follow ing statement: Conducting
fair trials is the best w ay to acheive justice (1=Com pletely Agree,
5=Com pletely Disagree).
60%
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Most people appear to have a general understanding of human rights and the
UN’s role in defining and reinforcing those rights. The sources of their understanding are
multiple and diverse. Based on my interviews, those sources include the media,
politicians, word of mouth, and interaction with UN and ICTY representatives.
Suncokret, the organization where I volunteered in Gvozd, received portions of its
funding from the European Union, the World Bank, and various departments of the
Croatian government which bring obligations to be a resource for public education on
many different issues including human rights. Workshops are conducted there on conflict
resolution and understanding human rights in addition to the provision of assistance
navigating the bureaucracy involved with receiving aid. Representatives of Suncokret are
often invited to national and international conferences regarding civil society and human
rights and so become information sources on these topics.
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The media is a great influence on conceptions of justice and perceptions of the
ICTY because it includes daily news of alleged criminals-at-large and the trials. A
question also exploring knowledge of human rights asked how often the participant read
or heard something about the ICTY. Answers were varied and there seems to be two
general trends, one in which people are regularly being updated with news of the ICTY
and another in which people infrequently follow the news. Precisely half of the
participants read or heard something about the ICTY daily or weekly (24%, n=32 said
daily, 25%, n=34 said weekly), only 17% (n=23) selected the once or twice a month
category and 33% (n=44) said that they rarely read or hear anything about the ICTY. I
asked people about different sources of information on the ICTY and how much they
trusted those sources. Only 17% (n=23) of respondents trusted news direct from the
ICTY at a level of 4 or 5 (1 being no trust, 5 being complete trust) which was lower than
trust in newspapers, television, friends and family as sources, but just higher than trust in
the Croatian government and religious leaders. Overall, friends and family were the most
trusted source of information on the ICTY with 35% (n=46) choosing a 4 or 5 on the
scale. Most likely those friends and family are getting their information the media and
other friends and family.
The views represented by the media are commonly dictated by politics. In
Croatia, the HDZ, a successor to the old Communist Party, stepped in to be a strong force
for Croatian independence. With the leadership of Franjo Tuñman Croatian nationalism
became publicly accepted, though there was significant opposition, as it had not been
under Tito’s long rule. Gagnon’s (2004:182) evaluation of the causes of the violent
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia points strongly to the media’s role in instigating
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nationalistic ideologies, mainly as a tool of politicians scrambling for power after the fall
of communism. That bias has surely not disappeared from the Croatian media today, and
continues to be quite strong in some publications.
Regarding the ICTY, the media presented a picture of Croatian outrage at General
Ante Gotovina’s arrest and relocation to The Hague. Gotovina’s leadership of Operation
Storm was portrayed as a completely defensive action and his success a thing to be
celebrated by all Croats. Since that time there has been more public acknowledgement
that some crimes were committed by Croats that extended beyond defense as noted
above. One of my informants had friends who were soldiers under Gotovina who
described their experience of the conflict to her. They said that during Operation Storm
the non-Croat people they encountered were treated badly, more so than was needed to
reclaim possession of the territory, but that was not how it was presented publicly.
However, in the past few years politicians have publicly acknowledged some wrongdoing
by Croats during Operation Storm and other situations, most of this change went along
with a stated desire to join the EU and thus conform to international human rights
standards.
The overall reaction to the arrest of Karadžić’s was more positive, though the
court’s weaknesses in taking so long for the arrest and still having Mladić at large were
emphasized (since that time Mladić has been arrested and his trial is underway). Much of
the media coverage focused on allegations that Karadžić had been traveling around the
region in full sight and with seeming immunity for a number of years prior and that he
enjoyed a hero’s status in Serbia. Still, most of the blame appeared to be put on the
Serbian government for harboring a criminal rather than on the ICTY for incompetence.
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When I asked people what they felt about Karadžić’s arrest many expressed a feeling joy
and said they immediately called family and friends to share the news. No one said that
the arrest was wrongful, including the Serbs I spoke with, which may be due to the lack
of direct connection with Karadžić’s actions in Gvozd since most of his operations took
place in Bosnia and targeted Muslim populations. The arrest was front page news in the
newspapers and prominent on television for weeks.
People’s confidence in the international courts and the domestic, Croatian courts
to conduct fair trials was assessed for comparison. For the international courts, 5% (n=6)
answered that they had lots of confidence, 36% (n=48) answered some confidence, 43%
(n=57) answered a little confidence, and 16% (n=22) answered no confidence (see Graph
4.4). Overall, these results were higher than the data regarding Croatian courts of which
3% (n=4) answered that they had lost of confidence, 31% (n=41) some confidence, 38%
(n=51) a little confidence and 27% (n=36) with no confidence (see Graph 4.5). When
asked which judges are better able to make impartial decisions in trials of war crimes that
took place in Croatia 64% (n=85) said ICTY judges rather than Croatian judges.
However, only 24% (n=32) of participants stated that the ICTY has the best interests of
Croatia in mind when making decisions in the courts. It can certainly be debated whether
or not the ICTY should have Croatia’s best interests in mind or if that would be a breach
of impartiality. Also this question could be reworded to be more specific and thus allow
for clearer interpretation.
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Graph 4.4: Confidence in International Court
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Graph 4.5: Confidence in Croatian Courts
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Human Rights and Domestic Courts
The ICTY was created because the United Nations Security Council decided the
crimes that occurred during the dissolution of Yugoslavia qualified as violations of
human rights that required justice and accountability. The existing domestic courts were
not considered to be capable of conducting fair trials (for various reasons) and the UN
felt obligated (again, for various reasons) to provide a judicial mechanism for justice.
Nearly twenty years after its inception the ad-hoc tribunal is struggling to complete its
mandate. The volume of cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the court is well beyond
its capabilities as a short-term court and so the referral of low- and medium-profile cases
to Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia is a necessary part of its completion strategy. Many of the
challenges to providing a fair trial in these domestic courts still exist even though the
ICTY has taken some efforts to educate and inform politicians, judges, lawyers, and staff
through the Rules of the Road program and legal reforms have taken place to comply
with EU and UN standards. Throughout the existence of the ICTY trials have been held
at the local and state-level courts, many of which, particularly earlier in this period, did
not fit the criteria of international standards for war crimes trials. Common problems
were the poor protection of witnesses, biased judgments, unqualified staff, trials held in
absentia, and prosecution of only select ethnic groups. These problems reflect the social
and political environment in Croatia and certainly are a factor in the local development of
a rule of law culture.
The ICTY and other international tribunals are criticized for the extensive length
of time required for conducting investigations, trials and appeals. In response, the ICTY
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previously announced a strategy to, “finish investigations by 2004, trials by 2008, and
appeals by 2010. The remaining war crimes cases will be turned over to the former
Yugoslavia for domestic prosecutions (Zoglin 2005: 42)”. As we now know, this
schedule was altered several times and some trials will extend into 2014 (projection for
Mladić’s trial, see icty.org). The UN has also created a new entity called the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to commence in July 2013, overlapping with
the ICTY’s completion, to take on some of the tasks required to fully complete the
tribunal’s work and then maintain its records (Meron 2012:14). Zoglin (2005) and others
present a grim picture of the domestic court systems in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Serbia, and warns of their inadequacy for carrying out war crimes cases passed down
from the tribunal. The lack of witness protection measures and the lack of an independent
and trained judiciary are the main domestic concerns (Zoglin 2005). The two Croatian
trials against ethnic Croats that have attracted the most media attention are those of Lora
and Gospić. Both included strong witness intimidation, carried further in the Gospić case
with the murder of an ethnic Croat who had complied with tribunal investigators. These
examples do not provide much faith in the ability domestic courts to enforce judicial
accountability. A report by the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (CHC)
lists the major problems of the Croatian courts as, “a large number of unsolved cases, the
long duration of trials, the corruption of the judges, the lack of uniformity among the
trials - especially the trials of war crimes, etc. (CHC 2007)”. This list reinforces
complaints about inefficient bureaucracies and corruption in government.
During my time in Croatia I met with individuals from Documenta in Zagreb and
the Center for Peace, Human Rights, and Non-violence in Osijek. Along with a third
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organization, the Civic Committee for Human Rights, they share the task of monitoring
domestic trials for war crimes that are otherwise only sparsely documented and reported
to the public. In addition the Center for Peace, Human Rights and Non-Violence in
Osijek published its joint report on domestic war crimes monitoring where it stated that,
“The greatest problems occurring year after year are yet again the adverse political
context, insufficient personnel and technical conditions for the processing of war crimes,
insufficient application of the existing legal instruments for witness protection, and a
large number of verdicts reached in absentia” (Center for Peace, Human Rights and NonViolence 2009:7). The comprehensive report explains in detail the political climate that
affects war crimes trials in Croatia and presents recommendations to resolve
shortcomings. The NGOs monitoring domestic war crimes trials recommend: (1)
strengthening the role and capacity of the special war crimes courts in Zagreb, Osijek,
Rijeka and Split; (2) publishing list of verdicts reached in absentia to inform convicted
persons; (3) increasing cooperation with judiciaries in the region; (4) alter constitution to
disallow parliamentary immunity for serious crime; (5) adopt clear stance toward victims
of war crimes (Center for Peace, Human Rights and Non-Violence 2009:28-29). These
are substantial changes that directly relate to the rule of law.
These three NGOs had a large presence in the recent ICTY Outreach
Programme’s 2009 conference in Zagreb to evaluate the legacy of the ICTY in Croatia
because of their knowledge of both the tribunal and domestic trials for war crimes and
they will undoubtedly play a crucial role in the future of domestic war crimes trials. I
attended a conference they organized titled “War Crimes Trials in Croatia: Analysis,
Plans and Priorities” that discussed their joint report on domestic war crimes trials. There
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was a revealing moment during President Mesić’s speech at the conference when Vincent
Degart, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Croatia,
made a snickering laugh in response to Mesić’s announcement that Croatia should
comply with EU standards in its domestics war crimes trials, “not because we want to
join the EU, but because this is needed for us to prevent collective guilt on all sides. To
face the truth in ourselves and others we must establish individual responsibility.” It
seemed that Degart was not convinced of Mesić’s sincerity. Mesić added later that it was
important not to send clear or hidden messages to criminals that there can be impunity for
war crimes and that there is no statute of limitations on such crimes. Also, Mesić stated
that fair and effective trials were important in order to be a state that is trusted
internationally. In this statement he is recognizing the impact of human rights abuses on
reputation within the international community.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors
domestic trials on behalf of the ICTY. Their assessment of domestic trials does show
many areas that need improvement, especially regarding impartiality and the continued
practice of trials in absentia, however they do indicate that progress has been made over
time. Today there is a stronger commitment from the Croatian government to publicly
support unbiased war crimes trials and to give the courts needed resources. Several
county courts (Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka and Split) have been designated and equipped to
deal with war crimes cases, though many cases are still being handled in the local
community in which the crime took place, adding to the potential for impartiality. During
my research in Gvozd I was not aware of any local war crimes trials taking place nearby
and typically people paid less attention to domestic trials than to those at the tribunal.
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Local Ideals of Justice
What is justice? What constitutes a just punishment? Is there any consensus on
what justice for such an extreme crime as a violation of human rights should be? These
are difficult questions to answer, but, nevertheless, are important to explore in order
understand if the local legal consciousness is conducive to the ICTY’s rule of law
initiatives. As in most communities today, people in Gvozd have a pluralistic legal
system they can employ (or try to avoid) that intersects with all areas of life. In the past,
and particularly in rural communities, most disputes with other community members
were resolved within the community as similar to many other European and
Mediterranean cultures (Pitt-Rivers 1954). Here I am referring to disputes over things
such as land use, theft and those within families. In Gvozd the conflict and the resulting
patchwork community of Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees have altered the
previously existing community framework to a great extent. The non-Serbs who lived
there before the war did not return or are no longer alive so that segment of the
population is not present. The Serbs who did return represent only a portion of who was
there before and those that did return are disproportionately elderly and unemployed.
This group did not have any previous ties with the Bosnian Croats who are now part of
the community and that group is not a simple resettling of a town, but a hodgepodge of
people from different areas in Bosnia who did not necessarily know each other prior to
coming to Gvozd.
The result is a flimsy network of relationships and no reliable history to inform
social interactions, a very different situation than in the past. At the same time there is
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this push to strengthen the rule of law which encourages the use of local and domestic
legal institutions because they can be more impartial and consistent in their application of
the law (“can be” doesn’t infer that they are so). Does this mean that people report more
crimes to the police and are more aware of their legal rights? I hesitate to say yes. My
research in Gvozd found that people generally do not have faith in legal institutions to
enforce laws or act in a fair manner. How then to people resolve disputes? I will respond
to that question in the next section. Here I present the findings that contribute to a more
theoretical understanding of what justice means in Gvozd.
A revealing question that I posed in the survey asked, “Which of the choices
below is most important to you personally regarding trials for war crimes such as
genocide?” Response options were: 1) that major political and military leaders be tried in
a court for their actions, 2) that local people who committed war crimes be tried in a court
for their actions, 3) that all people involved in war crimes, regardless of whether they
were a leader or not, should be tried in a court for their actions, 4) or that it is better not to
have any trials for war crimes. The number of people including the first option, “that
major political and military leaders be tried in a court for their actions,” was somewhat
lower than expected at 34% (n=45). Only 13% (n=18) included, “that local people who
committed war crimes be tried in a court for their actions”. The highest percentage of
people, at 68% (n=93), responded, “that all people involved in war crimes, regardless of
whether they were a leader or not, should be tried in a court for their actions. These
results indicate that trials are a critical component of post-conflict reconstruction. The
fact that only two people (1%) responded that, “it is better not to have any trials for war
crimes,” is also substantial support for having trials, especially because one of these two

95
participants chose multiple options, including that all people should be tried regardless of
being a leader.
In an effort to understand priorities in achieving justice participants were asked,
“If a serious crime took place, what would be most important to you: The victim feels
that the criminal was justly punished/The victim forgives the criminal/The criminal was
justly punished according to a court, though the victim may not agree with the
decision/The criminal was justly punished according to the community, though the victim
or a court might not agree”. The majority included the first option, “the victim feels that
the criminal was justly punished,” with 69% (n=91) agreement. Some people who
answered this way chose an additional response as well, though 63% (n=85) chose this as
their sole answer. This ideal would be difficult for a court to attain and would be likely to
go against legal procedures. Of the other participants, 8% (n=11) chose “the victim
forgives the criminal”, 22% (n=29) chose “the criminal was justly punished according to
a court, though the victim may not agree”, and only 1% (n=1) chose “the criminal was
justly punished according to the community”.
Participants were also asked to choose the best description of their personal
reasoning for why wrongdoers should be punished and the options represented major
theories in criminal philosophy. Based on the survey I conducted the purpose of
punishment most closely resembles arguments of deterrence in which repercussions must
be costly enough to outweigh the benefits one might get from breaking the law. The most
common answer was for the reason of deterrence, “to make the crime costly so that others
will think twice about committing the same crime,” with a total of 69% (n=93)
participants including this answer (63% selected it only, n=84). Another 25% (n=33)
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chose the retributive reasoning, “to equalize the harm done to the victim of the crime”.
The smallest number of participants chose the rehabilitation option, “to reform the
wrongdoer so they will become a better person,” with 11% (n=15). What I find
interesting about this finding is that it goes along with what many studies of disputes say
– that people make a decision to commit a crime or not based on an evaluation of the
costs and benefits of the action – but there are good reasons to think that is not how
people truly make those decisions. In Sibley’s review of legal consciousness she cites that
ethnographic studies of law find that people are not making a cost-benefit analysis when
posed with such emotional struggles that are instead influenced by local norms and
morals (Silbey 2005:339). The low percentage of people who chose that rehabilitation is
the purpose may also say something about this community. Perhaps there is not a strong
belief that people can change their ways after committing a crime, but instead remain a
“bad” person. If this is a true assessment then it would also help explain long-held
grudges and cycles of violence stereotypical of this region.
Other questions I asked referred to moral reasoning in particular scenarios. One
scenario concerns debates over the responsibility of lower ranking perpetrators for their
actions. It was presented as, “A soldier takes part in mass killings of people based on
their ethnic identity. He was following orders from military superiors. He is declared
innocent by the court when tried for those actions. Is this judgment just or unjust?” The
crux of this debate lies with the degree of free will the soldier was able to exercise and
that factor is left open to interpretation here. Based on the limited scenario presented,
23% (n=31) of the participants felt it was just for the soldier to go free and 76% (n=102)
felt it was unjust. This seems to show that people in Gvozd think that soldiers in the
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conflict did have enough free will in their decisions to join the fighting and take part in
certain actions to be responsible for what they did under orders.
So what are the local ideals of justice? There are many views represented here.
Holding wrongdoers accountable is a shared priority, though the emphasis on major
political and military leaders is not shared by all. There is support for making crimes
costly, i.e. providing hefty punishments for serious crimes. There is also support for
victim-centered approaches to justice considering the large number of people who chose
that it was most important that the victim be satisfied by the wrongdoers punishment.
This type of approach has not been employed in the former Yugoslavia as much as in
Latin American countries and in South Africa, most are part of grassroots organizations
that focus on a specific town or municipality. A wider picture of local conceptions of
justice will come from understanding how people maneuver through the conflicts they
face daily.

Negotiating Everyday Conflicts
The ICTY is attempting to strengthen the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia
and its success will depend on what people currently think about the rule of law within
Croatia. It depends on perceptions of accountability for wrongdoing, the impartiality of
the application of law, the predictability that rules will be followed and feelings of
security. The extent to which people value these components of the rule of law is shaped
by local experiences of conflict and resolution. The kinds of conflict and interaction with
the law that people experience daily includes petty disputes, contestation of property
rights, bureaucratic maneuvering to obtain permits and licenses, and access to
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government assistance. My examination of everyday experiences with conflict shows that
there are many challenges to public support for the rule of law as it is defined by the
ICTY.
To start, the general reputation of domestic institutions is far from stellar. There is
a lack of trust in the Croatian government at all levels, including the court system and law
enforcement. Croats’ level of confidence in their political and legal institutions is quite
low. Members of parliament and other government positions hold little regard from the
public. The democratic processes are viewed as corrupt, lacking true representation for
the people of Croatia. The 2005 Eurobarometer reports that, “only a quarter of the
respondents trust the legal/justice system which indicates that in Croatia legal insecurity
predominates (Standard Eurobarometer 64 Jesen 2005)”. This survey also shows
evidence that political parties are “considered disreputable organizations” and that there
exists “continued very low confidence” in the Parliament. This extreme distrust in
governmental institutions has a strong effect on the legitimacy of domestic trials for
violations of human rights and extends to perceptions of the trials of the ICTY.
All actors in the criminal justice system – judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and police – lack skills, training, resources, and the
infrastructure to do their jobs effectively. Moreover, minority groups are
poorly represented in the judiciary and law enforcement. Unfortunately
political pressure and ethnic bias are also all too common. Not
surprisingly, the public distrusts and lacks confidence in these legal
systems. (Zoglin 2005: 45-46)
It is the lower profile cases that will be transferred to Croatia’s courts and the outcome of
these trials will hold great meaning locally. “The justice systems of almost all of the
states of the former Yugoslavia are simply not equipped to provide fair and impartial
trials for all ethnic groups, and this sad fact is even more true in the war crimes context
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(Tolbert 2002:12).” The European Court of Human Rights accused the Croatian
judiciary system of violating citizen rights “due to lengthy proceedings and excessive
delays” in 2002 (Zoglin 2005:54). Zoglin declares that “citizens understandably have
little confidence in the legal system (Zoglin 2005:55)”.
The political climate has been dominated by distrust in the government. Pusić
(1998) views the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) that included President Franjo
Tuñman (elected in 1990, 1992 and 1997) as a counter-part to Milosević’s Serbian rule in
many ways. Tuñman was a “communist-turned-nationalist” who was “seen by some as a
guarantor of stability” and to others “as a warmongering, archaic autocrat” (Pusić
1998:112). Many Croats supported Tuñman as a response to Milosevic’s threat of
Serbian control over Yugoslavia. However, Tuñman went beyond a defensive stance and
actively planned to control portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a battle between
Croatia and Serbia over the country consisting of ethnic Croats, Serbs and Muslims.
Pusić argues that Tuñman used manipulation to maintain control:
The heavily majoritarian electoral system, bequeathed by the outgoing
Communists and perfected by the current government, has magnified the
HDZ’s relative electoral majorities into absolute parliamentary majorities.
The HDZ has also launched several attempts to seize control of the
judiciary. On the highest level (with the notable exception of the
Constitutional Court), these efforts have mostly succeeded. (Pusić
1998:115-116)
This disturbing level of influence over the judiciary has lessened since Tuñman’s
death and with the reforms required to comply with EU standards. The current
government consists of many coalitions, some more conservative and nationalistic
and others more progressive and eager for EU membership.
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Political corruption, as opposed to consistent, unbiased application of law, is seen
as the norm. A young man described the situation to be that the politicians pick the music
and the Croatian people are forced to dance to it. He elaborated to say this meant that
politicians do what they want with minimal accountability and that the general population
has little to no political clout. This feeling of powerlessness applies to both national and
local politics and goes beyond politicians to all government institutions notorious for
their lack of consistency and favoritism. When asked to rate the importance of several
problems in Croatia the clear “winner” was political corruption indicated by 59% (n=79)
of the people choosing it as a 5 on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not a problem and 5 being a
major problem, see Graph 4.6). People were asked to rate the current importance of the
following problems in Croatia on a scale of 1 to 5: Political corruption, Economy, Quality
Education, Affordable Education, Ethnic Divisions, and Lack of Infrastructure. On this
scale 1 represented no problem at all and 5 represented a major problem. The largest
consensus was that political corruption was a major problem, 59% rated it a 5 (n=79) and
22% rated it a 4 (n=29). Forming the second largest consensus, 42% rated the economy at
a 5 (n=56), 26% a 4 (n=35) and 20% a 3 (n=27). The most common rating for quality
education (38%, n=51) and affordable education (34%, n=45) was a 3 on the scale. The
data regarding ethnic relations again appears to show polarization. For this social
problem, 31% rated it a 5 as a major problem (n=42), 19% rated it a 4 (n=26), 24% rated
it a 3 (n=32), 8% rated it a 2 (n=10), and 13% rated it a 1 (n=17). This shows that the
people surveyed had quite different views about the degree to which ethnic relations are a
concern. The problem of a lack of infrastructure was rated highest for 5 with 33% (n=44),
then 4 with 27% (n=36) and 3 with 25% (n=34).
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Graph 4.6: Rating of Problems in Croatia
Rate the current importance of the following problems in Croatia on a
scale of 1 to 5 (1=Not a Problem, 5=Major Problem).
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Law enforcement and courts are no exception to the institutions that lack trust by
the public. In the survey I asked, “How often do you think people who commit serious
crimes, such as theft, destruction of property, or violence, are justly punished for those
crimes in Croatia?” and the most common response was that those crimes are rarely justly
punished (54%). Notably, 12% responded that they were never justly punished and, in
contrast, only 4% of respondents felt such crimes were always justly punished (see Graph
4.7). If serious crimes are not justly punished, is it likely that smaller crimes are
effectively resolved?
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Graph 4.7: Just Punishment
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Based on the knowledge that there is a lack of confidence generally in the
Croatian government I asked people in Gvozd specifically, “How much confidence do
you have in the Croatian courts to conduct fair trials?” They answered that they had lots
of confidence (3%), some confidence (31%), a little confidence (38%) or none (27%).
These results are heavily weighed by people who said they had little or no confidence in
the Croatian courts. This low level of confidence is likely a factor contributing to the low
levels of crime reporting in Croatia. Only about half of the incidents of robbery and
personal theft are reported and only 40% of incidents of assault or threats.
There is little evidence of effectiveness in the domestic mechanisms of judicial
accountability. Croatian courts are engaged in domestic trials for violations of human
rights related to the conflict, but the legal processes are not considered a success. The
defendants in the trials include ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs, which is an important step
for any domestic trials (Zoglin 2005). This may be the only consequential success of
domestic accountability and even this one requires further examination. The vast majority
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of domestic trials have been of ethnic Serbs and the fairness of these trials is highly
criticized (Tolbert 2002, Zoglin 2005, OSCE 2006). The domestic legal institutions are
not equipped to handle cases of war crimes and a strong bias against ethnic Serbs remains
in effect.
In interviews I heard a great range of opinions about crime in Gvozd. Although
most people thought crime really did not exist, at least not above the level of petty
crimes, some said that crimes were always punished and others said they were not
punished. Several people complained about unfairness from the police and with the
courts. A local policeman I interviewed said that probably small crimes like stealing take
place in the town and that people who commit those crimes are punished if found
(Interview #9 2008). This same person, an ethnic Croat who fought in the conflict, did
not think the ICTY is effectively achieving justice because in his opinion Serbs and
Croats are not held to the same standards. A waitress in Gvozd stated that many crimes
take place, including fighting and stealing (Interview #12). In her opinion very little of
those crimes are punished and it does affect her sense of personal security. At work she is
pushed around by customers and reporting it to the police has not led to any action. She
described an extreme incident when a man tried to physically assault her by stabbing with
scissors. This man is locally known as being mentally unstable and overly aggressive. I
was advised to avoid him as much as possible and did so, especially after learning about
this incident. The police gave her excuses that he was too troublesome to interfere with
and she heard that he was related to one of the policemen and so the others didn’t want to
get that person on their bad side. After realizing the police wouldn’t keep the man out of
the café, her boss decided to take the matter into his own hands and physically threatened
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and assaulted him as a way to resolve the situation. She was grateful for her boss’s
actions and disappointed by the police. This woman’s boyfriend said these kinds of
actions are often necessary there; people must fend for themselves because law
enforcement is not dependable.
Another woman in Gvozd stated that crimes are not often brought to justice in
Croatia and gave a local example of corruption. She described a situation in which the
defendant was well-known to be guilty and the trial appeared to be reaching the same
verdict until the judge was bribed by the defendant. Though her knowledge was second
hand, the perception of corruption is commonly held by people I spoke with there.
Certain types of bribery appeared to be commonplace to the people I interacted with in
Gvozd. I was told by several people that it was normal to give gifts of food and drink to
doctors at the local clinic and in hospitals in order to avoid excessive wait times and
receive better care. A special report on corruption in Croatia was conducted by the
UNODC in partnership with the Institute of Economics, Zagreb in response to the high
perception of corruption in this region. The study was based on administrative corruption
mostly in the form of direct experience with bribery. It found that, “a considerable
number of Croatian citizens (510,000, equivalent to 18.2% of adult population aged 18 to
64) had either direct or indirect exposure to a bribery experience with a public official in
the 12-month period in question” (UNODC 2011:13). These incidents were almost
equally experienced by men and women, contrary to most other countries with high rates
of bribery, and were most often with doctors, nurses, police officers, and car registration
officers.
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Other incidents of bribery in the special report included social protection officers,
tax officers, judges/prosecutors, land registry officers and municipal elected
representatives. Women were more likely to pay bribes with food or drink and men to
pay with cash. The report states that, “bribery is often used to overcome deficiencies and
weaknesses in public service delivery,” which is evidence by the percentage of bribes
paid to speed up a procedure (35%), to receive better treatment (18%), and for the receipt
of information (13%) (UNODC 2011:21). In general this report found that bribery was
more common in urban areas, however, in the regions of Lika, Kordun and Banovina
where Gvozd is located rural bribery occurred about as frequently as that in urban areas.
Of the 11.2% of people who paid bribes in the twelve month period on average each
person paid out four bribes, one about every three months. Note that some of the 18.2%
people with direct or indirect bribery experience refused to pay the bribe. Overall this
shows that bribes are a fairly regular part of interactions with representatives of
government institutions and the perception of corruption has some grounding in reality.
The number of people who responded that they knew of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights was quite high at 86% (n=115). However, based on results of in-depth
interviews, I expect that most of those same individuals cannot correctly identify specific
rights listed in the Declaration. This knowledge of the Universal Declaration of human
rights shows an awareness of human rights in Gvozd, though it is not clear how well the
content of the Declaration of Human Rights is known. Nor is it apparent to what level
people embrace these rights or claim them. There does seem to be a greater knowledge of
domestic legal rights and successful effort to claim those rights. Interviews and
observations indicate that domestic welfare programs are utilized by many people in the
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local community who qualify as returnees, refugees and minorities who were displaced
by the conflict. The high level of unemployment and tough economy likely contribute to
the need for welfare assistance. In one case a local Serb woman declined to pursue
divorce proceedings against her absent husband that would have allowed her to have
significantly more welfare support for herself and three sons. This is an instance of not
claiming rights that may be different because of its domestic nature and stigmas against
divorce, but still it is also an example of how knowledge and even assistance with
claiming rights is rejected. Members of Suncokret worked closely with this particular
woman’s family, explained the law and options, and even arranged for the help of a
lawyer, but ultimately the woman did not pursue the divorce.
There are many people who live in Gvozd that are known to have committed war
crimes, most of whom are Serbs who helped control the region as Serb territory from
1991 to 1995. The people who know of these crimes are mostly other Serbs who were
present, not the Bosnian Croat refugees. Those refugees from Bosnia mostly came to
Croatia as victims of displacement from the area surrounding Banja Luka. There was one
exceptional case of an ethnic Croat from Bosnia whose actions during the conflict came
to light while I was living there. In Gvozd he was known as an ardent Croat nationalist
who headed the local HDZ political organization. Rumors began circulating the village
that he had committed war crimes in Bosnia as part of a surprising connection. He is
wanted in Bosnia based on the claim that he joined a Muslim group that committed
various war crimes against Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. It was sure that his name matched
the one associated with the claims and that he came from the area in question, but it was
not clear whether or not he admitted guilt for the accusations. This likely history of
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violence against Croats did not sit well with leaders of HDZ and his position was soon
stripped and membership revoked. His presence in Gvozd was also reported to a national
Croatian NGO, though I don’t know that anything came of it. Other than these few
situations, few people in Gvozd, regardless of their ethnicity, have close to a first hand
experience of international human rights legal proceedings.
Religion is a major part of Croatian culture which influences perceptions of
justice in multiple ways. The Catholic Church is embedded in the Croatian government
and so heavily influences policies and law. In Gvozd older women are only seen outside
the home during the morning markets on Mondays and Thursdays or for church
attendance. The Catholic Church in Gvozd used to be housed in an old, leaky building
near the marketplace. Over the three years that I traveled to Gvozd I saw the building of a
new Catholic Church and adjacent home for the priest that nearly overshadowed the
impressive church structure. These buildings have a large presence located in the very
center of town by the health care center, library and school. The priest has a reputation
for being strict and some of his sermons include the dangers of Barbie as a role model for
young girls because she is not married and is without children and the dangers of the
practice of yoga calling it a cult. He uses his influence very actively to support certain
political leaders and initiatives, such as the local mayoral elections that took place during
my stay in 2009. My understanding from interviews and observation is that the people
who attend church regularly do give credence to the priest’s advice. Others, particularly
ethnic Croats less involved in the Catholic religion, look critically at the messages from
church leaders. The Catholic religion is a major influence for many Gvozd Croats as it is
it for the nation as a whole.

108
Gvozd does not currently have an Orthodox church so the devout must travel to a
neighboring town for services in Vojnić or Topusko (approx. 15 minutes by car). There
are several old Orthodox churches in the area which are now only ruins due to destruction
during the WWII era, mostly by anti-Serb Ustaše forces. Gvozd Catholics I spoke with
viewed the Serb population as being quite unreligious, saying that most Serbs stopped
devout practices many years ago and now are without God. Some Serbs talked about how
the Orthodox religion lost much of its following here because of the Ustaše actions and
Tito’s policies, but stated that the Orthodox religion is still very strong in Serbia.
Although I know of at least two Muslims living in Gvozd, none of the people I surveyed
identified with the Islamic religion. However, I did interview a Muslim woman from
Sarajevo who previously worked as a journalist. She appeared more interested in the local
unemployment rate and assistance with extensive health problems than discussing
religious practices. The survey data showed that most people who identify as Croat (48%,
n=64) also identify as Catholic (n=58), reinforcing the link between these two forms of
group identification. The same trend was found with people who identified as both Serb
(44%, n=59) and Orthodox (n=53). Only one individual identified as Serb and Catholic,
crossing the usual ethno-religious divisions. From the sample, 16% (n=21) gave atheist or
blank responses for religious affiliation and 8% (n=11) opted not to identify with a
particular ethnic label. Nearly half (48%, n=60) of all participants attend a house of
worship only rarely or not at all. Of the people who identified as Catholic, 0% (n=1)
stated they attend church daily, 34% (n=21) weekly, 20% (n=12) once or twice a month,
6% (n=4) once or twice a year, 34% (n=19) rarely. Of the people who identified as
Orthodox, 0% (n=0) stated they attend church daily, 8% (n=5) weekly, 8% (n=5) or twice
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a month, 22% (n=11) once or twice a year, 56% (n=31) rarely. Though a large number of
both ethnic groups only attend religious services rarely there is a distinct difference in the
patterns that shows less attendance by the Orthodox population that may be partly a
consequence of the distance from a place of worship.
My own experiences with government institutions fit with the ones presented in
this chapter. American citizens can stay in Croatia for three months without a special
visa, but a longer stay requires an extensive visa approval process based on the reason for
your stay. My first attempt to obtain a visa was with the assistance of friends who live in
the United States and own property in Croatia near Zadar where their parents lived until
their teens. A helpful language instructor also went to great lengths to facilitate the
approval during inquiries at the police station. I found that although all the required
paperwork was submitted the first time I requested the visa (after being literally elbowed
out of line several times) each time I would return to check on the status the clerk would
say I needed additional paperwork that usually needed official translation and notary
approval. After months of attempts with no progress it became apparent that it would not
be approved, at least not before I needed it to stay legally. I hoped my trip to neighboring
Bosnia would “reset” my time allowed upon re-entering the country. It appeared to work.
What is the message I received from this experience? It is better not to try to do
things the “right” way. Although I was never asked to pay a bribe I did get the impression
from the clerk that my request was not given any priority and one might have helped.
However, before another extended stay I initiated paperwork through the Croatian
Consulate in New York City for stay in Gvozd where I was already know by the
community, including some police officers. It took some time, but the visa was approved
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the day before I left for Croatia with the prodding of friends there. The bizarre
bureaucratic twist was that even though it was the Gvozd police department that
ultimately made the approval, my passport had to be stamped by the consulate in New
York City - not Gvozd or Zagreb or anywhere else in Croatia. So after arriving in Gvozd
I mailed my passport to New York for the official stamp and crossed my fingers that I
would get it back quickly (or at all). Thankfully I did.
Another peculiar interaction with the local bureaucracy caused quite a conflict for
a friend of mine trying to help me stay in the country legally. My visa required that I be
registered at a local house that would be subject to random checks by the police to ensure
that all was as it should be. My friend was told by the local police that she needed to
show proof of her house number in order to document that I was staying with her. The
existing documents didn’t seem to count and we had to drive to the town clerk in
Topusko for additional verification. After several trips to find out if they had concluded
their research the office there said that her house number is not the one she thought it
was, but is 17A rather than 16. This is despite her deed (the house was only purchased a
few years ago) and utilities all listed as number 16. More paperwork was needed to
correct the numbering and finally we could go back to Gvozd and prove the house
number. All in all, this fairly simple task took about two weeks, several hours of driving
and lots of waiting and arguing to complete. A policeman did come to check on me at the
house there soon after.
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Chapter 5 – An Assessment of the Rule of Law in Croatia

In this chapter I will examine the reasons why conceptions of the rule of law are
as they appear and analyze the connections between global initiatives and local
perspectives. Each aspect of the rule of law is addressed separately and then reviewed
together to establish if the local legal consciousness can be classified as a “rule of law
culture.” This is done by identifying the norms and structures that represent conceptions
of the rule of law. Then I single out the data on victim identification to explore
connections between victimhood and perceptions of the tribunal. In the following
analysis I often refer to information that was presented in the previous chapter including
scholarly works and my own research data, but I will not repeat it in full.

Understanding Local Legal Consciousness
The goal of this dissertation is to understand the local legal consciousness
regarding the rule of law with the intention to evaluate how salient the ICTY’s initiatives
to strengthen the rule of law are locally. Legal consciousness is understood through a
synthesis of many elements that have been presented above: the history of the region, the
crimes that took place during the 1990s conflict, the proceedings of the tribunal, the
interaction between Croatia and the tribunal, domestic institutions and politics, local
perspectives of the tribunal, and, perhaps most importantly, local experiences with law
and conflict. In general terms legal consciousness is not the law as written or law as
action, but a conceptualization of the law that links the two.
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Accountability
One of the components of the rule of law that I have singled out for this analysis
is accountability. Does accountability exist? Do people want accountability? The forms
of accountability under consideration here are the accountability of political leaders to the
public, the accountability of courts and law enforcement to the people, and personal
accountability for wrongdoing. In the context of the rule of law accountability, at a
minimum, refers to political leaders being held accountable for their actions toward
citizens (or, in older times, a king to his subjects). Limits are placed on what leaders can
do and must, to some degree, do as the people wish. More importantly, the possibility
that leaders may abuse their power and the people is constricted.
The tribunal represents an attempt for accountability, whether or not you consider
it to be fair. People alleged to have committed war crimes have been arrested and held for
trial, all those indicted were brought to The Hague with the exception of a few who died
before arrest. Several have been convicted of war crimes and sentenced to time in prison
as punishment. The question to answer about the tribunal is how much accountability
does it provide? Some opportunities were missed with the deaths of Tuñman, Milošević
and others. The way individuals in Croatia perceive the tribunal's delivery of
accountability will likely depend on their personal experience in the conflict and, to some
extent, be influenced by their ethno-religious identity. Based on my research many people
think positively of the accountability provided by the criminal trials even if it is not
considered to a full realization of justice.
The tribunal’s conviction of political and military leaders for war crimes is a
strong example of accountability at the international level. However, it does not
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exemplify that domestic legal systems will hold violators of human rights accountable.
Though the tribunal has its own meaningful implications, it is more of an imposed rule of
law than an internal adoption of the rule of law. In fact, the tribunal was created precisely
because the domestic courts were not considered to be competent in this regard. The
tribunal’s role in creating accountability at the domestic level lies in its attempts to
improve the legal and judicial systems in the states of the Former Yugoslavia where war
crimes took place.
The Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian governments are shaped by the existence of
the tribunal and have conducted war crimes trials of their own. The majority of trials in
Croatia have faced heavy criticism from international and domestic human rights
organizations for their bias against Serbs, failure to try Croats, lack of witness protection,
trials held in absentia, and the incompetence of judges and prosecutors. There is,
however, a trend of improvement in these areas. The domestic monitoring and reporting
of war crimes trials has helped to increase standards through the attention it brings to the
media and politicians. The tribunal's Rules of the Road program has taken steps to
address these issues through education, training and sharing resources. The capacity and
motivation to hold perpetrators accountable have increased since the conflict period, but
there are few instances to show it has really taken place at the domestic level.
In Croatia there is a perception that very little accountability exists at all levels of
government, as detailed in the previous chapter. There is a commonly-held belief that
politicians are not working for the needs of people in their constituency, but instead base
decisions on how the outcome will affect their own agendas. The widespread corruption
is a major concern in the political realm and throughout government institutions. My own
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research and many other sources noted above show that trust in government is extremely
low which demonstrates that accountability of the political leadership to the people is
weak.
The situation in Croatia is similar to the one in Bosnia that Nettelfield describes:
“Petty, nonresponsive, and power-hungry bureaucrats often violated the human rights of
the country’s citizens through the exercise of significant influence and discrimination in a
labyrinth of prewar, postwar and wartime institutions. This inefficient public
administration affected the daily lives of most” (2010:235). People in Croatia also must
contend with a bureaucracy that is seemingly impossible to navigate. The rules are not
often known, understood or adhered to, especially because there is a confusing mix of old
and new practices of democracy-building, development efforts, and compliance with EU
standards makes them incredibly complex. The confusion and complexity also leave it
open to circumnavigation from a position of power. Many media, utility and financial
companies are state-owned, a continuation from socialist governance, and the lack of
privatization calls into question their impartiality. This assessment leads me to say that
the accountability of government institutions and representatives to the public is quite
low. While there may be a trend toward more accountability (or at least the potential with
EU compliance) and it gets a fair amount of lip service from politicians, the sum of the
current corruption, distrust, and abuse present in government translates to a low degree of
accountability.
The research finding that more than half of the people believe crimes are rarely or
never justly punished in Croatia demonstrates that people’s perceptions of accountability
are also low. People I spoke with in Gvozd, Zagreb and Zadar gave examples of people
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committing offences for which they were never held responsible. In addition to the
situations already detailed there were many others that reinforced the lack of
accountability locally. There were rumors that the mayor was caught drinking while
driving, but the charge was dropped by people he was friendly with in law enforcement.
Other allegations included school officials that hire only people of the same ethnicity
(including at least two family members) without any way to effectively contest the
choice. The librarian supposedly got her job as a favor to her boyfriend and barely works
yet still gets paid well. There were several instances of petty theft (ex. a pig, small
amount of cash) and a store break-in when I was there. The lack of repercussions for
breaking the law was sorely felt by several individuals I spoke with on the subject of the
company who promised to utilize a vacant factory for its business and create local jobs in
return for government funded financial perks. After a good deal of media hype about the
project the company never used the space or created the jobs, though it received the
perks. People brought up this situation to me when trying to explain the difficulties they
encounter finding jobs and lack of real government effort to help. In most of the
anecdotal accounts I heard during interviews, like the scenario described in the previous
chapter about the waitress who was threatened at work and no action was taken by the
police, these everyday conflicts are not adequately responded to by local law
enforcement. The result is that people generally do not feel protected against wrongdoing
by the government.
A separate question to answer is: do people in Croatia want accountability? Based
on my fieldwork the answer is yes. Overall the international tribunal is considered to be
“better than nothing” and a good percentage of people think the tribunal is effectively
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achieving justice (25%, n=33). There is a great deal of support for holding the military
and political leaders accountable, though who exactly is meant by that may depend on the
person’s perspective. Basically everyone I spoke with felt their lives had been affected by
the conflict and nearly half (48%, n=62) of the people surveyed considered themselves to
be a victim of the conflict. There is a consensus that corruption is a major problem in
Croatia, both based on my research and numerous other sources noted above. What can
an individual do in a situation like the one in Croatia where there is clear evidence of
little accountability by the government? How do you hold someone accountable? Who
can you go to if you are wronged? If experience is telling you that governmental
institutions are not effective means of resolving conflict then what do you do to get
justice?

Fairness (Consistency and Impartiality)
Is the tribunal considered to be fair? Based on my local research fairness is best
determined as a relative concept. When simply asked if the tribunal is fair most people
answer in a negative way, but a full review of the work presented here leads to me to
answer the question with a qualified yes. It is qualified because the fairness is generally
perceived to be better at the tribunal when compared to domestic institutions and when
compared to the theoretical absence of the tribunal. It is, therefore, a relative degree of
fairness. The significance of this relative fairness should not be overlooked because the
establishment of evenhanded procedures is a real benefit in any transition. Conversely,
the lack of evenhandedness has the potential to produce a more volatile state of affairs. In
this evaluation I combine consistency and impartiality under the category of fairness
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because they are aspects of the rule of law that are closely related even if they could be
separated to an extent. For example, one way to assess the impartiality of a law is to
determine if it is consistently applied to all ethnic groups in the same manner.
Impartiality has to do with the unbiased and fair application of law and punishment.
Consistency refers to the consistent application of laws and the consistent consequence of
punishment for wrongdoing. While the tribunal is considered to be relatively fair, at the
same time there are several ways in which the tribunal could improve the fairness of its
practices. Is the tribunal consistent in the application of law and in the consequence of
punishment for wrongdoing?
It can be argued that the tribunal is the only attempt to apply international human
rights law and punish those responsible for the major crimes of the conflict, and,
therefore, represents the most consistent application of human rights law for this
particular conflict because there is no real alterative (to say this, domestic efforts must be
considered irrelevant in this way). That may be so, but there are other criticisms of the
tribunal’s consistency. There is a lack of consistency simple due to the fact that the ICTY
is the first truly international war crimes tribunal and human rights law is developing
through its decisions that have little precedent. It is difficult to argue that the application
of law is consistent when there are few examples for comparison. The absence of
examples for comparison may also be a way to critique the tribunal’s consistency in its
own right because how can the prosecution of trials for the Former Yugoslavia be
justified when many other violations of human rights take place without legal
intervention. These criticisms are often voiced in Croatia and elsewhere in the region and
while there is some basis for them, the arguments fall short when considering the crimes
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that took place and need to establish the consequences for such atrocities. Nevertheless,
this is a point that the ICTY, ICC and other international trials must bear in mind.
Selectivity is an issue that affects both the consistency and the impartiality of trials.
People in Gvozd, and throughout Croatia, point out the tribunal’s selectivity when
choosing which alleged perpetrators from within the Former Yugoslavia to indict. In
Minow’s analysis she considers the challenge of selectivity in any situation where there
are so many people implicated in the crimes to be a negative of any transitional justice
approach that includes trials (1998:40). The perception of fairness is also shadowed by
aspects of the tribunal considered to be biased and therefore lacking impartiality. If it is
not possible to prosecute all perpetrators then some criteria must be made and the fairness
of those criteria will be questioned, especially when perceptions of responsibility are
skewed by different factions so that there is not one unified narrative of the conflict.
Allegations that the tribunal targets mostly Serbs or too many Croats were common in my
research and in other data sources.
The next question deals with the impartial application of law at the domestic
level. Do biases affect government functions? My research indicates that they do. As
presented in the chapter on a local perspective above, there is a clear lack of trust in
domestic institutions which are thought to be biased, inconsistent and inefficient. One of
the major critiques of domestic war crimes trials is that they are one-sided, with more
trials against Serbs and harsher sentences for Serbs. The corruption that affects
accountability is also significant in the analysis of fairness. Mafia-type networks are
prevalent in Zagreb, the coastal cities and elsewhere. Rumors abound in Zagreb about the
“hand shakes under the table” made in the construction business. A contact in Zadar
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explained to me how a local group controls cafés by requiring regular bribes to be
“allowed” to operate. The repercussion for not complying, at least in the example given,
was progressive destruction to the property that led up to exploding a bomb and the
owner giving up on the business venture altogether. As commented by people in Gvozd,
hiring decisions are perceived to be far from impartial.
Some 18 per cent of Croatian citizens, or members of their households,
applied for a job in the public sector in the three years prior to the survey,
but of those whose application was successful one in six (16%) admits to
paying some money, giving a gift or doing a favour to help secure their
position. Among those who failed, there is a widespread perception that
factors such as cronyism, nepotism or bribery played a decisive role in the
recruitment process, while only 16 per cent believe that the selection was
made on merit. (UNODC 2011:4)
The prevalence of bribery and preferential treatment for family and friends demonstrates
that there is a lack of fairness that is sure to influence the local legal consciousness.
Do people in Croatia value fairness? I think it is straightforward to answer yes to
this question, but defining what is fair makes it much more complex. People do complain
about unfair practices and mistreatment in their everyday interactions. In practice the
desire for consistent application of law and impartiality may be reserved for situations
when it is an advantage. This, of course, isn’t a true commitment to fairness, but in
practice this limited application is hardly absent from any society. There are certainly
many claims of unfair treatment and demands for justice as evidence of people’s wish for
fair legal institutions. The research findings that showed people were concerned about
biases and wrongdoers going free also add to the evidence that fairness is valued here.
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Security
Does the tribunal affect feelings of security in Croatia? In this analysis of the rule
of law, security is looked at in a fairly broad manner to include security from violence,
financial security, job security, and a general sense that there is a safety net in case of
misfortune. It is manifest in the way that people interact, how they mitigate conflict, and
in major life choices such as where to live. In most of Croatia people feel insecure about
their job status, finances, housing and future prospects. Recovery from the destruction of
the conflict and global economic crises had a great effect on the state’s economy and
every sector of public life. This period of transition from socialism to democracy,
communism to capitalism and from Yugoslavia to an independent Croatia is by nature a
time of insecurity. As with all transitions, this is a time of social liminality in which old
ways are shed and new ways learned. In the anthropological study of transitions and
rituals this time is seen as precarious because normal rules of behavior do not apply and
uncertainty prevails. This is a time when norms change. The future of Croatia is being
shaped by decisions made today. The choice to join NATO and the European Union will
impact how any future violence in the region is resolved. The reaction of politicians and
the public to the tribunal is a gauge of tolerance between ethno-religious groups and the
degree to which people are willing to scrutinize their own actions. The characteristics of
Croatia’s next incarnation are not set, but rather are in a stage of development.
One way that the tribunal impacted security is in conjunction with EU
requirements and international pressures to adopt new standards and procedures that
prioritize the rule of law and human rights. The tribunal influenced changes to Croatia’s
legal and judicial systems as well as garnered support for further change from other states
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and international organizations. The trials brought attention to minority issues in its
determination of what qualifies as a crime against humanity, such as with the tribunal’s
decision to include rape, and what is required to apply the term of genocide or ethnic
cleansing. The tribunal is also linked to accountability and security because if
perpetrators are not held responsible people may feel more vulnerable to future violence.
A personal feeling of safety can be linked to the tribunal. The survey question
targeting this subject revealed that 49% of the respondents believed the decisions of the
ICTY affect how safe they feel to live in Croatia “Very Much” or “Some” (See Graph 4.2
above). That the tribunal is seen to be so influential on feelings of security is telling of the
importance placed on accountability through criminal trials. Based on participant
observation and interviews I conducted the feelings of safety referred to in the question
were likely related to the safety from violence as well as a general stability in the current
state of affairs and the ability to make informed decisions. If violators of human rights
aren’t held responsible than what else might take place without consequence? People are
unclear about the current policies and don’t know if they may change, particularly those
policies regarding refugees and returnees that impart a tenuous claim to housing and
financial assistance.
The Croatian government plays a major role in the security of its people through
its laws, policies and interactions. It is at this level that many needs are not addressed.
The lack of trust in politicians and government officials demonstrates that people have
difficulty addressing conflicts and needs through government channels. The lack of a
neutral government arbitrator forces people to resolve disputes in other ways.
Unfortunately there are a number of divisions and challenges that contribute to feelings

122
of insecurity in Croatia. During a discussion I had with Vesna Pusić in Zagreb she
identified the status of refugees and returnees to be an ongoing point of contention in
domestic politics. The current economic challenges, housing shortages and high
unemployment rates have led some Croats who lived there before the conflict to blame
their hardships on the Bosnian Croats given housing and financial assistance by the
Croatian government because of their refugee status. This is translated as less jobs and
opportunities for the “Croatian Croats.” My survey research in Gvozd showed that ethnic
relations are perceived to be worse now than in the 1980s, before the conflict and
independence. Clearly, inequalities and fear persist while the Croatian state inadequately
negotiates conflicts.
An account of war-time violence related to me by a young woman from a small
coastal town near Zadar demonstrates the hostility of some social environments that
people must face, even now, in an attempt to return to life as it was before. In this town
the home of the one family of Serb ethnicity was vandalized and a group of local men
killed the owner in a grotesque manner by cutting off his head. The family has not come
back to claim the property and it is falling apart from neglect and looting. It is easy to
understand why the family would be hesitant to return despite the time that has passed.
And it is easy to understand why that family might harbor resentment and hatred towards
members of the town and more generally to people of Croat ethnicity. Public
acknowledgement that crimes were committed by Croats in Croatia and the leaders put
on trial might ease some of the resentment and hatred.
Do people value security? My research indicates the answer is yes. People’s
feelings of security are shaped by their own interactions with family, community and
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institutions. Tamanaha’s theory states that formal legality can be a positive addition in
situations where “ties are thin” (2004). I have shown that ties are “thin” in the patchwork
community of Gvozd for many reasons and to the extent that there is a real distrust
among groups and no effective way to mitigate disputes through government institutions
as they arise. People are left feeling unsatisfied and some find other means, like physical
violence or animosity, to right the wrong. While people generally feel safe in their
community, measures are taken to keep unwanted people at a distance. There is a
common practice by people who believe that some protection for their home is warranted
in rural areas like Gvozd to most keep a guard dog or have some sort of friendly
arrangement with neighbors to keep watch (UNODC 2011:49). Many of the homes in
Gvozd do have a dog that is left outside at all times and their incessant barking after dark
is a continual reminder that only friends are welcome.
People in Gvozd do not have an immediate fear of physical violence, but the
horrific experience of the conflict, which ended only eighteen years ago, surely heightens
a sense of insecurity. There is also a high degree in instability in the region because the
cease-fire created by the Dayton Peace Accords left a political power-sharing
arrangement that leaves no one satisfied, particularly across the very close border with
Bosnia. Many of the Bosnian Croat refugees in Gvozd came from the area near Banja
Luka which is now part of the Republika Srpska territory of Bosnia. These refugees have
no close history with the Serb returnees in Gvozd, but know they participated in
ethnically cleansing the town of non-Serbs in 1991 and may think it is possible to happen
again. From the opposite perspective, before 1991 the Serb returnees were likely targets
of efforts to purge non-Croats from job and positions of power when Croatia began its
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separation from Yugoslavia and were certainly forced to flee the town by Croats in 1995
during the destruction of Operation Storm. Some might feel justified to think the Croatian
government would give priority to the Bosnian Croat refugees or even make things more
difficult for the Serb population. A re-emergence of violence in Bosnia could spark
turmoil in this area too. In light of these fears for security, the decisions of the tribunal
are noticeably being watched. In theory, and with some reinforcement by my research,
the tribunal’s success in holding major perpetrators accountable will ease tensions and
lessen the possibility that additional violence will occur in response to unaddressed calls
for justice.
In the new patchwork community of Gvozd the building of security and trust is
complicated, and even more so due to the new round of Bosnian Croat refugees due to
join the village. The government is giving a group of Bosnian Croat refugees who have
been in temporary housing outside of Zagreb since the conflict (for at least seventeen
years) a permanent home in a section of the village that is walking distance from the
center. People currently in Gvozd from both groups are not happy about this addition,
especially because there will be a new general store in the settlement that many people
fear will keep the two areas divided. The lack of a cohesive community in Gvozd impacts
perceptions of security because it deters the building of social relationships and effective
mean to resolve conflicts.
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Comparison with Other Rule of Law Measures
Any evaluation requires the subject to be well defined and so there are many
concerns about past and current efforts to strengthen the rule of law that have not taken
this first step before deciding how to take action. Rule of law initiatives in general have
been criticized for their difficulty to be evaluated. There is often a rote enthusiasm for the
rule of law driving development and human rights initiatives without a solid research
base that demonstrates real change is affected by the approach of those initiatives
purported to strengthen the rule of law. Still, public support for rule of law initiatives
grows and positive correlations are seen, even if their real cause is difficult to ascertain
(Carothers 2009:50). It is possible to examine particular aspects of the rule of law once
they are clearly identified and the need for research is starting to be recognized. Several
methods of evaluation are currently being suggested and employed to better understand
these connections. Sen proposes that comparison of multiple situations can bear
meaningful information about the successes and failures of rule of law initiatives (Sen
2009:58). A comparison of Croatia to its neighbors Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina does
shed some light on the importance of the tribunal’s outreach and Rule of the Road
initiatives. The ICTY concentrated most of its outreach initiatives to Bosnia with the
rational that this is where most of the extreme violence took place. The outreach included
communication efforts through conferences and presentations and more action by the
Rules of the Road Program to build a domestic justice system capable of conducting trials
of crimes against humanity to the standards of the United Nations. A special court was
created for this purpose in Bosnia and later in Serbia, but not in Croatia. Instead, a
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handful of courts in Croatia were selected for assistance to work toward international
standards of justice for war crimes trials, but these courts do not exclusively handle war
crimes cases and their capacity to do so is heavily criticized. Generally, communication
efforts of the ICTY in Croatia and Serbia were less extensive than those in Bosnia. Some
of these shortcomings are reflective of a lack of funding and the prioritization of Bosnia
as the place where most human rights violations occurred.
Statistical comparison of crime in Croatia to other states is useful for a frame of
reference. One common statistic used is a homicide rate which tells how many intentional
homicides occurred per 100,000 people over the course of a year. This rate does not
include war-time killing or homicides orchestrated by a large group. According to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 1995 the homicide rate in
Croatia was 3.6 per 100,000 people and that has trended down to 1.1 in 2009. Relatively
speaking the homicide rate in Croatia is low. In 2009 the homicide rate of the United
States, known for high levels of crime, was 5.0 and in Japan, known for low levels of
crime, it was 0.4 (UNODC 2012). The rule of law may actually be considered strong in
this aspect, since homicides are relatively rare and people generally feel safe walking
alone at night. However, at the same time, the amount of corruption and lack of trust in
government are areas in which the rule of law is not strong so how you assess the rule of
law makes a difference and it can span a wide range of issues.
The World Bank aggregates a number of independent studies to come up with a
series of reports on world governance. They include the rule of law as one indicator of
world governance in a report that uses data from 1996-2009 to rank countries (Kaufman
et al 2010:6). Croatia starts off in 1996 at the 30th percentile, meaning 30% of countries
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rank worse than Croatia on measures of the rule of law and 70% rank higher. In 2009
Croatia’s rank increased to about the 60th percentile which does appear to be a significant
increase using this method of assessing the rule of law. The increase may be due in part
to the change in the political climate, the incorporation of EU standards and the tribunal’s
efforts to strengthen the rule of law. This method of measurement gives only a very
general idea of the rule of law that requires a great deal of extrapolation to determine
what data was used and the related drawbacks.
The quantitative method developed by the World Justice Project (WJP) along
with the American Bar Association identifies several aspects of the rule of law and breaks
them down into small measurable components. Their assessments are claimed to evaluate
the de facto rule of law, law in action rather than in books. The WJP Rule of Law Index
for 2011 found that Croatia ranked in the middle of most categories when compared to
the other 65 countries indexed that year (World Justice Project 2011). The report states
that,
Despite recent progress, Croatia’s institutions still lag behind those of
other high-income countries. Its public administrative bodies, for example,
are inefficient, and the judicial system, while generally accessible, is still
slow and subject to political influence and corruption. The country is safe
from crime (ranking 6th), but further work is needed in terms of openness
(ranking 33rd) and equal treatment of ethnic minorities. (World Justice
Project 2011)
This evaluation supports many findings of my research in Croatia and the 2011
UNODC report on bribery discussed previously. It points out that adherence to
the rule of law is not the norm in Croatian politics and law, even so many years
after the conflict. Some of the factors where Croatia ranked the lowest were in the
stability of laws, the clarity of laws, limitation of government powers by the
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judiciary, effectiveness of correctional system, a criminal system free of
discrimination, unreasonable delays in civil justice, and the effective enforcement
of civil justice.
It also found that people resort to violence to redress grievances which
may be the most pertinent factor in relation to the argument that effective justice
can end cycles of violence, though it must be interpreted in conjunction with the
finding that there is a relatively low level of crime and civil conflict. It seems that
the occasional times when people do have a grievance the justice system is not
effective and so alternative methods are used and that often means the use of
violence. The justice system’s lack of effectiveness, still a major issue in 2011,
does validate the uncertainty people have about their future prospects that
perpetuates ethno-religious divisions. The general lack of enforcement and
corruption does little to instill confidence that the Croatian government will step
in to end and impartiality resolve future conflicts.

A Victim Perspective
Thus far I have examined components of the rule of law, accountability, fairness
and security, based on my research to show that the local legal consciousness does show
some congruence of norms with rule of law initiatives. In order to look closer and
determine what differentiates people on their opinions of the tribunal and the rule of law I
looked for correlations between certain questions in the survey conducted in Gvozd. I
was reminded of similar discussions with many people in Croatia that brought up the idea
of victimhood. They said that some people identify strongly as a victim such that it

129
shapes their perceptions of nearly all social relations. There were complaints that people
used their victim status to receive economic assistance unfairly and acted as though
entitled to a “free ride.” Other complaints were that some people wallow in self-pity with
a worldview that their hardships were caused by what people did to them, not based on
their own choices in any way. A common sense of being a victim is reinforced by its use
as a justification for violence by all sides during the conflict. All of the people living in
Gvozd can make some claim to victim status as a refugee or returnee, yet about half said
they felt they were victims and half said they were not. Considering oneself a victim is
clearly complex and what it says about someone’s outlook on life could be quite
meaningful for understanding the impact of the tribunal.
The self-identification as a victim of war crimes says much about a person’s
experience and view of justice. There is an important psychological dimension to the
study of human rights abuse and the feelings of victimhood that often follow such
tragedies (Hamber 2009). In this particular region of the world, identification as a victim
has been long connected with ethno-religious identities and conflict, whether Serb, Croat
or Muslim. In the survey conducted in Gvozd 46% said yes (n=62), they were a victim of
war crimes, and 51% said no (n=68). This question could be thought of in different terms
and certainly all of the participants could have some claim to being a victim by reason of
forced displacement and, in most cases, the permanent loss of their home and jobs. Many
people were affected to an even greater degree by the loss of loved ones, decline in
physical and mental health, or other consequences of the violence.
Self-identification as a victim may be linked to other factors like ethno-religious
identity. Interestingly, my survey did not show that ethnicity correlated with a person
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answering that they were or were not a victim of war crimes. Actually an exact 50%
(n=31) of Croats answered yes and no to being a victim of war crimes. The situation was
basically the same for people who identified as Serb of whom 45% (n=26) answered that
yes they were victims of war crimes and 55% (n=32) answered no. If about the same
proportion of each ethnicity identifies as a victim that indicates ethnicity is not a predictor
of victimhood and nearly an equal amount of Serbs and Croats identify as a victims.
What else could be related to that identification as a war crimes victim? My data
showed that age was not a good predictor of victim identification when comparing people
who were adults at the start of the conflict period to those who were younger. As
presented above, knowledge of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights only
correlated with a person’s identification as a victim of war crimes to a small degree when
looking at people who did not have knowledge of the UDHR. Victimhood seems to be
more correlated with the person’s gender and their ratings of the ICTY. The men who
completed the survey were slightly more likely to answer that they were victims of war
crimes (53%, n=39 said yes; 47%, n=34 said no) and the women were more likely to say
that no they were not a victim of war crimes (38%, n=21 said yes; 62%, n=34 said no).
Still, there was not a significant difference between genders regarding victimhood.
There does appear to be a greater connection between identification as a victim
and the whether or not the ICTY is considered to effectively achieve justice – a key
question for this study. Of the 25% (n=32) of people who said that the ICTY is
effectively achieving justice for the human rights violations they were twice as likely to
say that they were NOT a victim of war crimes than that they were a victim (69%, n=22
said not a victim, 31%, n=10 said yes a victim). Another way to look at this data is to
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consider only the people who said that they were not victims of war crimes. Of these
people, 33% (n=22) said the ICTY is effectively achieving justice and 67% (n=45) said it
was not. So when compared to all people who completed the survey, people who did not
consider themselves victims were more likely to hold a positive view of the ICTY (See
Table 5.1). Conversely, people who did identify as victims were more likely to be
negative of the ICTY.

Table 5.1: Is the ICTY effective?

Do you feel that
you are a victim
of war crimes?
Total

Do you think the ICTY is effectively achieving justice for
the violations of human rights that occurred during the war
in the 1990s?
Yes
No
Total
Yes
10
52
62
31%
54%
22
45
67
No
69%
46%
32
97
129

Lambda (sym.) = .074, p = .476; Pearson Chi-square = 4.819, p = .028

The most interesting links with identification as a victim are with the two survey
questions that ask about how the ICTY decisions affect individuals. When looking
separately at who identifies as a victim and who doesn’t the “spread” of responses is
different. People who identify as victims are more likely to care “very much” about the
decisions of the ICTY than those who do not identify as victims (Table 5.2). People who
identify as victims are also more likely to say the decisions of the ICTY “very much”
affect how safe they feel to live in Croatia (Table 5.3). I interpret these results to indicate
that regardless of ethnicity some of the population “buys in” to the ICTY as a necessary
and legitimate institution for pursuing justice and some people of each ethnicity also
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reject it. The people who identify as victims are more critical of the ICTY while at the
same time they indicate its decisions are more meaningful. It makes sense that people
who feel like victims would be more concerned about holding violators of human rights
responsible and concerned about their safety. For these people the ICTY holds more
meaning.

Table 5.2: How much do you care?

Do you
feel that
you are a
victim of
war
crimes?
Total

How much do you care about the decisions the ICTY makes in war crimes
trials?
Very
Much
Some
A Little
Not at All Total
Yes
28
14
6
14
62
70%
No

38%

32%

41%

12

23

13

20

30%

62%

68%

59%

40

37

19

34

68
130

Lambda (sym.) = .18, p = .005; Pearson Chi-square = 12, p = .007

Table 5.3: Does the ICTY affect how safe you feel?

Do you
feel that
you are a
victim of
war
crimes?
Total

Do the decisions of the ICTY affect how safe you feel to live in Croatia?
Very
Much
Some
A Little
Not at All Total
Yes
20
12
16
14
62
69%
No

34%

57%

39%

9

23

12

22

31%

66%

43%

61%

29

35

28

36

66
128

Lambda (sym.) = .143, p = .09; Pearson Chi-square = 9.863, p = .02

In this evaluation of the rule of law it is important to find out what precisely the
tribunal contributes to local populations in this period of transition. The research
presented here shows that being a victim is based on perceptions rather than simply an
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experience of war crimes. It also shows that people who perceive themselves as victims
have a heightened need for the rule of law in that it increases accountability, fairness and
security which are lacking in the Croatian government.

A Rule of Law Culture?
In this section I will discuss if the components of the rule of law - accountability,
fairness and security - present in the community of Gvozd are evidence of a local legal
consciousness that values the rule of law. I use my own research and experience in
conjunction with other studies to look at the rule of law at the level of norms and the level
of structures (such as institutional reforms). A positive valuation of the rule of law may
be indicative of what we can term as a “rule of law culture.” What is needed to make
such a distinction? In order to claim that a rule of law culture is in existence the
principles of the rule of law must be integral to decision-making processes and
perceptions of the law in its many facets. There must be a pathway for people to
effectively dispute the actions of the government and fellow citizens. In the context of
Croatia, rule of law and human rights initiatives are inter-related. The UN’s intentions for
the ICTY include the promotion of human rights and the rule of law or, perhaps more
accurately, the promotion of human rights through the strengthening of the rule of law.
I will examine the presence of a rule of law culture in a manner similar to that
taken by Julie Mertus to evaluate the presence of a human rights culture in the United
States (2005). Mertus states that, “Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a
population develops its own shared (although often contested) understanding of the
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prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the
identity, interests and expectations of individuals and groups (Mertus 2005:325).” Her
assessment recognizes the use of human rights talk and the presence of human rights
movements that influence policy making, but determines that the shared belief and
understanding of human rights norms in the U.S. falls short of a human rights culture
(Mertus 2005:326). A rule of law culture is viewed similarly as norms manifest in
“identity, interests and expectations of individuals and groups.” The norms valued by a
human rights culture overlap with a rule of law culture, at least they do when based on
the definition of the United Nations that explicitly states the rule of law is consistent with
international human rights norms and standards (UN Secretary General 2004:4).
In Gvozd people do engage in human rights talk and have an awareness of human
rights norms. The findings of my survey in Gvozd showed that 86% of the participants
had heard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), knowledge that
contributes to the way human rights and the rule of law are perceived in society. This
finding is quite striking when compared to surveys in the United States. Mertus cites
Amnesty International’s survey that found, “94 percent of American adults and 96
percent of American youth have no awareness of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights” (Mertus 2005:326). That data translates to only 6% of American adults having
knowledge of the UDHR compared to the 86% reported by adults in Gvozd. How can we
account for this enormous difference in findings, particularly when the United States
professes to be a global proponent of human rights (which is contested on many fronts)?
My own survey of undergraduates at the University of Connecticut found that
67% of the students knew of the UDHR, still notably lower than the results in Gvozd and
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from a small range of people in terms of age and education. All of the community
members in Gvozd have direct experience of human right violations – be it genocide,
ethnic cleansing, forced displacement, or otherwise. Very few Americans alive today
have had this type of experience that compels people to alter their worldview to make
sense (as may be possible) of the events in their life. What may be most important is the
perceived relevance of human rights and the rule of law to everyday life. For people
dealing with refugee policies and appealing to minority rights in order to defend claims to
property and employment “rights talk” is a useful language to learn.
Rights talk is becoming part of the norm in Croatia. People across the country that
I spoke with had opinions to share about crimes against humanity and used some of the
terminology like “genocide”, “ethnic cleansing” and “victim rights”. Most people could
identify violations of human rights that had occurred during the conflict and identify who
was responsible. The language of human rights and the rule of law is widely used by the
media and in government communications. At one time I was even told by a very
adamant Zagreb college student that “Smoking is a human right!” during a debate about
the newly enacted policy banning smoking in public areas and restaurants.
Based on my research people in Gvozd and more generally in Croatia do share
values consistent with the rule of law, to some degree. The fairness of the ICTY over
domestic courts is viewed as important. Trials are considered to be a legitimate method to
address wrongdoing. Another reason to say that some elements of a rule of law culture
exist is that people are concerned about the government’s ability and willingness to help
secure their jobs, homes and investments. There are complaints about the high level of
corruption and ethnic biases in government and hiring decisions. People who consider
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themselves to be victims place more meaning on the decisions of the tribunal. Does that
mean there is a rule of law culture? Not quite, to say there is a rule of law culture is too
strong of a statement in this case. The rule of law is valued, but its tenets sometimes clash
with other norms.
One problem with stating there is a rule of law culture is that calls of
accountability are too often biases toward about getting personal issues addressed rather
than the consistent application of law. This may, however, be an artifact of the past and
influence of the current situation that forces people to look out for themselves in order to
navigate complex and inconsistent bureaucracies. A mindset like this that seeks some
personal advantage is understandable, though not implicitly moral, where corruption
pervades. That situation appears to be changing with indications that the rule of law is
gaining strength in the content of law and policies of institutions, at least partially due to
the tribunal.
It could be said that a rule of law culture is present in Croatia, but it is not one that
matches exactly the definition of the rule of law advocated by the UN and ICTY. There
are reasons to say the rule of law is valued and some aspects of a rule of law culture exist.
It is one thing to say whether or not a rule of law culture exists in Croatia and another to
say whether or not the local legal consciousness values the rule of law. My research
indicates the later. The rule of law is valued in the local legal consciousness, but not to
the degree that it constitutes a rule of law culture. Accountability, fairness and security
are reflected in people’s norms through their criticisms of the ICTY and Croatia’s
attempts to provide justice. This may seem an odd statement, to say that norms of the rule
of law are evidenced by critiques of attempts to strengthen the rule of law, but I think it is
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a legitimate claim. For example, though the ICTY professes to hold high standards, and it
made great progress from previous attempts, it is not the ideal of the rule of law realized.
It is only “fair” that its own degree of accountability, fairness, and security be evaluated
as it attempts to strengthen the rule of law in the Former Yugoslavia. The fact that people
are critical demonstrates that they are aware and interested in its proceedings.
Another indicator of the rule of law is the degree to which people comply with the
law. How do people make their choices to conform with or disobey the law? My survey
found that most people consider deterrence to be the biggest motivator in decisions to
comply or disobey the law, but that assessment conflicts with the findings of other
research on this subject. “Most people, most of the time, conform to laws because they
are part of the taken-for-granted world they inhabit, not because they calculate the
relative costs of violation and compliance (Merry 2006:979).” This explanation relates
back to the importance of norms in understanding the feasibility of rule of law initiatives.
If people have share a rule of law culture then compliance with initiatives to strengthen
the rule of law will be more salient and therefore likely to be more successful. This can
be so even when the influence of taken-for-granted norms is not explicit, maybe even
more so in this scenario. I interpret the survey results valuing deterrence to show that
people want accountability. Deterrence refers to an actualized punishment for
wrongdoing that sends a message that future crime will also be punished, certainly
congruent with the rule of law.
To get a sense of the rule of law before the conflict period I spoke with people
about life under Tito in Yugoslavia and there was a fairly even division between people
who thought more positively and those that thought more negatively of that regime.
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Those with negative connotations cited instances of being shut out of opportunities,
mostly jobs, for not completely supporting the communist political party or referenced
the suppression of the Croat identity. The people who were positive about Tito’s
Yugoslavia romanticized it as a time when there was little to no crime, everyone got
along, and everybody had what they needed, though most had few material possessions.
There is evidence of a desire for a rule of law from both sides views presented here –
people felt wronged by the lack of impartiality in job selection and wished for less
corruption. In this analysis I do not fully analyze the rule of law in Tito’s Yugoslavia, but
discuss it only for some knowledge of previous circumstances that certainly continue to
shape current norms.

139

Chapter 6 - Obstacles to Rule of Law Initiatives

During my investigation of the local legal consciousness it became clear that any
initiative to strengthen the rule of law would encounter several challenges. This is
particularly so when considering that strengthening the rule of law requires a fundamental
change to power relationships within the society. Several groups and individuals that I
interacted with in Croatia were attempting to make changes in the political, legal and
civil sectors, some directly related to the rule of law and others not, but they confronted
similar and significant obstacles to their initiatives. Those obstacles can be summarized
as: (1) the nature of law, (2) the prevalence of ethno-religious nationalism, (3) the impact
of insecurity and (4) a lack of political agency. In this chapter I explain each obstacle in
turn and relate it to the ICTY’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule of law.

The Nature of Law
There is a basic conflict when the rule of law is sought to be a remedy for mass
atrocities. The benefits of trials that determine responsibility for crimes against humanity
cannot fulfill all of the many needs of a society in transition. Trials are valued for their
impartiality and consistency that cause them to be impersonal, technical, and “by the
book.” It is because trials are intended to be disconnected from emotion that strictly legal
approaches will fall short of some expectations. Judges and lawyers apply the law rather
than create it. As discussed earlier, international human rights law in particular is in a
state of development. Law may change and is subject to interpretation, in other words it
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is not truly objective. A declaration of guilt or innocence depends on the crimes charged,
evidence presented and the definition of crimes. Terrible deeds may be carried out and
not fall under the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Evidence may not exactly fit the strict
criteria for proving guilt allowing wrongdoers to avoid a public declaration of guilt and
punishment. Some of the complaints I heard about the ICTY stemmed from these
problems. People were upset that certain defendants were given short sentences, only
proven to be guilty on some charges, or acquitted based on technical definitions of the
crimes and lack of evidence. From their perspective, it was quite clear that the defendant
was guilty and committed horrible crimes, yet the tribunal failed to provide justice.
Decisions made at the tribunal are a strong statement about what is permitted and
what is not in our increasingly global community. For example, if someone is acquitted
of a genocide charge who is widely known to have ordered a great number of deaths of a
particular ethnic group with intentions to exterminate that population it makes a
statement. The statement is not that genocide is wrong, but that the targeted mass
extermination of a group is permissible under some circumstances. The outcome of trials
is not always in agreement with a “commonsense” determination of right and wrong.
Defenders of legal approaches say that the detached nature of law is what allows law to
work as a mechanism of justice; the separation of emotion from an evaluation of
responsibility is what can break a cycle of violence. This is true, but the law is only one
aspect in a complex context.
This dilemma of the nature of law that conflicts with expectations of justice ties in
with Tamanaha’s point discussed earlier about the shortcomings of the rule of law in its
formal legality. It also relates to the people in Croatia who value principles of the rule of
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law while their experience with conflict leads to a personal notion of justice rather than a
lofty, idealistic one. People who hold hope that the tribunal can provide justice are
usually looking for more than a trial that follows due process. The extent to which that
expectation is feasible is a separate topic.

Ethno-religious Nationalism
How do ethno-religious divisions obstruct rule of law initiatives? Everyday
conflicts are often not handled impartially or consistently and representatives of the law
are not always held accountable for corrupt practices. It seems that the best way to
navigate the tricky web of bureaucracy is to fall back on ethno-religious connections, and
the resulting importance of those networks bolsters nationalist zeal. Ethno-religious
identity is often the starting point of analysis for studies of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.
Nationalist calls for ethnically-pure states are named as the cause of the 1990s violence in
a way that makes it seems inevitable, though the situation was certainly more complex
and other factors played more prominent roles (Gagnon 2004:5). My research in Croatia
demonstrated that ethnic identities are not the singular motivation for people’s actions
and that an ethnic identity is far from being a uniform, static concept. In fact the
identification of someone to a specific ethnic group is far from clear cut and even if
ethnicity is known the person’s experience during the conflict cannot be delineated. I met
Serbs who were pacifists, Croats who fought with Muslim extremist groups against
Croats, individuals whose parents were from different ethnicities who had to choose an
alliance or leave (or worse) and Croats who publicly voiced disagreement and disgust
with Tuñman’s policies against Serbs and Muslims.
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This research approaches the labels of ethnicity, religion, and nationality with
care, attempting to understand the situational nature of identity rather than accepting as
given the ethnic compartmentalization of people in this region (Verdery 1998; Bringa
1999). It adopts Jansen’s (2002) approach that focuses less on ethnic identity and more
on “home and belonging”, terms that have a less problematic history and I think come
closer to a true understanding. This research also takes on Sen’s (2006) call to consider
the complexity of people’s identities, rather than emphasizing singular, often religious,
identities. Sen sees theories that generalize at the level of civilization, religion, or
ethnicity as over-simplifications that play into the hands of fundamentalists and
politicians manipulating identity to gain power. This sounds famailiar in the context for
the Former Yugoslavia. Conceptions of justice as found in the “plural social relations” of
people in Croatia serve as the premise for theorizing identity and justice in this research.
“The socially situated nature of ethnicity is made even more complex by the many
different ways it is situated (e.g., nationally, politically, historically, internationally) and
the many different ways it is mediated (e.g., by economic inequality, by territory, by
language, by physical markers) (Ragin and Hein 1993).” The way in which this approach
to ethnicity shapes an understanding of local conceptions of justice and the rule of law
will be clarified next.
The labels of Croat, Serb and Muslim are regularly used as part of the way people
refer to each other. They may be used derogatively or simply as a way to differentiate
cultural practices, religion, experiences or background. These labels are associated with
historical instances of autonomy and power as well as oppression, persecution, and
struggle. The many descriptions of corruption and lack of trust in government presented
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above led me to wonder about how these problems connect with persistent ethnoreligious divisions. Croatia, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslavia, has
institutionalized ethnic labeling. In Gvozd two flags fly by the town government building,
one Croatian and one Serbian, because there is a large enough ethnic Serb population that
it is required by law. Several Croats complained about the Serbian flag to me, saying that
this is Croatia, not Serbia, and the flags only encourage separation. Also, only certain
minorities are given such distinction, for example throughout Croatia Jewish and Roma
populations are not recognized in the same way as Serb or Muslim populations. In Gvozd
several cafes are associated with only one particular ethnic group and nationalistic music
is played at times. Here the two main populations have different ethno-religious
backgrounds and experiences of the conflict, on top of continuing clashes over
conflicting claims to housing and competition for the few available job opportunities.
One goal of the local organization Suncokret recognizes this division and explicitly sets
out to combat it. That goal is to “support development of dialogue and interpersonal
tolerance in a multi ethnic community,” by creating a space and opportunity for members
of all groups to learn about each other as individuals (www.suncokret-gvozd.hr, accessed
8/15/2012).
I spoke with several youth at Suncokret who were open to talking about ethnoreligious labeling in their community. Most young children aren’t very aware of who is
considered a Serb or Croat, but that changes by their teens. In one discussion a group of
three described to me how people start spending more time with friends of the same
ethnicity when they get to the high school level. They explained that part of the change
has to do with the history that is taught in those grades. The curriculum perpetuates
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labeling by using an “us versus them” mentality in explaining the regional history. The
local schools in Gvozd are equivalent to a K-8 school in the United States, so teens must
be bused to neighboring towns and cities to attend the high school level grades. A new
school separated from old multi-ethnic groups of friends seems to encourage new
friendships developing more exclusively within ethno-religious groups. This may be
especially so because kids are now starting to date and family pressures to choose
someone viewed as marriageable, meaning within their ethno-religious group, are voiced.
One young man considered to be against the continuation of ethnic divisions and
a steady participant and volunteer at Suncokret seemed to be changing as my stay in
Gvozd came to an end. He was starting to listen to Thompson, a singer with a reputation
for being a strong Croat nationalist, and shunning some of the multi-ethnic activities.
More recently he also talks about getting a stable, decent paying job as a waiter on the
coast, at least for the summertime. This job path is common for people in the area, going
to the Croatian coast or even to Germany or Austria to work in hospitality for many
months. One local mother of three travels to Austria for up to six months at a time to earn
money for her family that lives with her husband and in-laws. To get a job nearby you
must have an “in” which usually means you share ethnicity and have a family connection
with the person hiring. Several people complained to me that they were well qualified for
local job openings at the school, but were passed over because the principal is a Serb who
doesn’t like them (coming from a Bosnian Croat background). In Gvozd where resources
and opportunities are scarce, ethno-religious labels are reinforced as people look to
support themselves and their families.
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Corruption in hiring practices reinforces the ethno-religious divisions because
much of the time favors are to people of the same ethnicity, whether that is because those
people simply know each other better or it is an ethnic bias is unclear. In Gvozd
particularly and in Croatia more generally the people an individual knows best are of the
same ethnicity and those are the people who get better treatment and more attention from
people in positions of power. In Gvozd a Serb is most likely to know other Serbs better
than Croats in the town because they have known each other longer, even over
generations, and have a shared experience of the conflict period. Likewise, Croats are
more likely to have a common experience of the conflict with other Croats as refugees
from Bosnia and the shared challenges of creating a new home in a new country, though
they may not have known each other personally because the people in Gvozd came from
several locations in Bosnia to Croatia. The persistence of divisions along ethnic lines may
be more defined by the prevalence of corruption and the patchwork communities created
by the conflict than differences associated with ethno-religious labels.
One of the major obstacles for rule of law initiatives is the acceptance of ethnic
Croats as war criminals. There is great hesitation to call any ethnic Croat who committed
violations of human rights a criminal instead of a hero. They are heroes from the
perspective of preserving the independence of Croatia and protecting the people from real
harm. They are criminals if your perspective prioritizes international human rights law
and a “clean” reputation in the international or European Union communities. Initially, no
ethnic Croats were transferred to the ICTY voluntarily by Croatia and this only changed
due to strong international pressure to comply with ICTY from the European Union and
the United States (Tolbert 2002).
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The first ethnic Croats handed over were from Bosnia, not Croatia, which was an
easier thing to accept. Zoglin states that, “Croatian authorities have sent inconsistent
messages to the public regarding war crimes, and the European Commission has
described Croatia’s attitude toward the ICTY as ‘lukewarm’. They have not turned over
indicted war criminal General Gotovina, who remains at large and is regarded by many
Croats as a hero (Zoglin 2005: 58).” Since then Gotovina was found in the Canary
Islands and stood trial in The Hague before being sentenced to twenty five years in prison
for war crimes. While in Zadar in 2007 I noticed pillows and trinkets for sale with
Gotovina’s picture on them and graffiti labeling him as a hero. The area is known to be
strongly in support of Gotovina because he was born on an island off the coast and his
military actions helped to free the area from Serb bombardment. Many people I spoke
with throughout Croatia explained Gotovina’s actions as defensive and the only plausible
alternative to doing nothing. The United States backed the Operation Storm offensive. If
there had not been a military response to Serb take-overs it was thought the Croat people
would suffer unjustly with no real hope of outside intervention. Pusić explains the denial
of criminal acts as an act of defense in an unstable time, “A confrontation with the truth
about this war has been postponed by the Croatians’ sense of relative instability and their
feelings that the country still faces an outside threat (Pusić 1998:114-115).” There is
evidence that people in Croatia of all ethnicities are beginning to confront some of these
truths.
Under Tito’s regime ethno-religious identities were forced to take a backseat to a
Yugoslav identity with the motto “brotherhood and unity,” but the suppression of
religious beliefs and calls for autonomy did not cause those aspects of identity to
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disappear. Nationalism may lose ground if there are effective alternatives to the problems
of corruption in Croatia. There are other avenues to unite and build trust among people
besides the pretension of one-dimensional identities; some that can even embrace
complicated and inter-related social relationships. A commitment to human rights and the
rule of law may prove to be one path if trials publicly demonstrate that perpetrators will
be held accountable regardless of ethnicity, if politicians follow through with institutional
reforms, and everyday experiences with conflict have a fair chance at being fairly
resolved.

The Impact of Insecurity
Some of the same reasons that ethno-religious nationalism is an obstacle for rule
of law initiatives apply to our understanding of how insecurity makes an impact. The
dissatisfaction with the current situation - political, social, economic and otherwise –
looms over the region. A persistent lack of trust in government to genuinely work for the
good of the people is at the root. This type of insecurity is hardly a unique problem for
Croatia, but here it has its own set of complications. The level of trust citizens have in
their government has real consequences for their interpersonal relations, cooperative
undertakings and observance with the law (Levi 1998:82). In the discussion of security as
a component of the rule of law in the previous chapter I argue that a lack of security
exists in many areas of life. That lack of security affects the local legal consciousness and
although it demonstrates a need for the rule of law to be strengthened that is reinforced by
people’s demands it also inhibits the development of a rule of law dependant on trust in
governmental institutions. The violence, displacement, and destruction of the conflict that
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occurred only about twenty years ago continue to be felt in daily life making it
understandable that people are concerned about security and the government’s
commitment to look out for their interests.
The ineffective civil and criminal justice systems lead people to look elsewhere
for resolution of conflict. In trying to understand the alternatives sought for conflict
resolution I look to the region’s history with some hesitation. For hundreds of years this
was a border zone between the Christian and Muslim empires that required people living
here to experience conflict on a regular basis which lead to classification as a warrior
society. My hesitation to bring up this history stems from the trend of journalists and
some scholars to overemphasize the violent past and use it to claim that recurrent
violence is inevitable because of ancient hatreds (Gagnon 2005). That is not my purpose
here. Instead I would like to explain past conflicts and the methods of their resolution as
one aspect of many that informs the current local legal consciousness. There is a history
of blood feuds along with a culture of honor and shame in this region similar to those
documented throughout the Mediterranean and other areas of the world. In the Former
Yugoslavia the practice of feuding goes back hundreds of years and some instances are
recorded up through recent history.
Boehm (1984) compiles accounts of feuding by Serbs of Montenegro and
Albanians throughout history and analyzes how the feuding system actually serves to
regulate and minimize violence in many ways rather than incite chaotic anarchy as it may
be perceived. Many of his observations are reinforced by contemporary theory of conflict
resolution. The Montenegrins studied by Boehm were more likely to engage in a feud
with a clan from a different tribe versus a clan within their tribe which would have more
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social, economic and political repercussions. Feuds that included an entire tribe against
another tribe were rare because they also were disruptive to the welfare of everyone.
Feuding was initiated by an insult that dishonored someone to the point that they felt
inaction would cause unbearable shame. Boehm describes the feuds as being an activity
only for men to the point that women could stand outside homes with torches at night to
help their men aim their guns at enemies with no fear for their own lives.
The history of feuding does inform my discussion of the local legal consciousness
in many ways. It helps to understand why conflict starts and under what circumstances a
truce or resolution of conflict could come about. In Croatia, to some degree, elements of a
culture of honor still exist as does a paternalistic control of power. The history of feuding
in the area gives some insight into possible sensitivities and pathways for reconciliation.
The truces that were required before an agreement to end the feud came about when the
death score was even according to the strict scorekeeping and the group that held the
position of more honor, as opposed to the group that would be the next to retaliate due to
a lower position of honor, suggested the truce. A truce was most often agreed upon at
times when the men needed to be outside to harvest or plough the fields, also a time when
they would be vulnerable to attack. Other factors included the prolonged emotional and
physical toll on the clan and relative size of the clans that may lead one or the other to
have a disadvantage. Outside efforts by religious leaders and later government officials
sometimes aided the pacification. The aspects of the culture that reinforced the feuding
were the importance of a “manly” or “macho” character, an honorable reputation, and the
clan as an organizational unit.

150
Today families often do have a paternalistic structure and honor is valued, but the
emphasis is less and a clan-based structure is not the norm. Still, during the 1990s
conflict many people did turn toward members of their ethnic group for solidarity and
against others even though they may have been long-time neighbors and friends. I should
note there were many exceptions to this trend as well (for example in Tuzla, Bosnia and
Herzegovina). Now that the conflict is over and Croatia is a developing democratic
political system, the claim of a rule of law that embraces accountability, fairness and
security is that government will resolve conflict justly and without the need to rely on
ethno-religious groups for security. But the justice system is not very effective and does
not hold the confidence of the people. There appear to be two choices: (1) try to change
the government or (2) use an alternative means to resolve conflict and injustices. The
alternative often means relying on ethno-religious group connections.

The Role of Political Agency
When people attempt to make positive changes that combat ethno-religious
nationalism or motivate people to create a stronger civil society they often face great
challenges. According to several evaluations the civil sector is identified to be underdeveloped in Croatia (OSCE 2006). There are some grassroots organizations founded to
address various post-conflict issues that continue to operate and often collaborate with
European and international organizations (some mentioned in earlier discussions). The
organization that I interacted with most in Croatia was Suncokret in Gvozd. The main
objective of the NGO is to combat ethno-religious nationalism and the people who work
there and participate in its activities do come from diverse backgrounds. While the
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organization is clearly popular with the local youth, mixed messages are sent from the
adults. It is sometimes difficult to bring together adults from each ethnicity to work
jointly on projects and initiatives. Some adults and older youth avoid the center because
of the emphasis on interaction between groups.
The organizers of Suncokret recognize that their goal is not shared by everyone in
the community and aim to win critics over. Aside from the political challenges to
securing space and funds locally one of the most difficult tasks is to motivate community
members of all ages to take charge of certain projects or come up with their own ways to
make improvements. This goes along with the previous topics of ethno-religious
nationalism and insecurity because the lack of political agency is related to selfidentification as a victim and a general disenchantment with government. There is a
pervasive attitude that efforts to alter the status quo are destined to fail. There are
numerous factors contributing to why this is so, including the history of Tito’s policy of
suppressing dissidents and Yugoslavia’s bureaucracy. The close relationship between the
Catholic Church and the Croatian government discourages actions perceived to be a
threat to those institutions.
The persistence of corruption in Croatia certainly adds to the feeling that
movements to improve the political climate will not succeed. In a 2009 news report by
the BBC local Croatian journalist Gordan Malić is quoted saying, “Organised crime has
become part of the establishment. It's a problem to recognise it, to see what makes it
different from the other parts of the establishment. And it organises itself far better than
the country, than the government, and the society" (Prodger 2009). There appears to be a
choice to work against corruption or work with it for personal gain, yet most people seem
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to do something in the middle. They complain about the high level of corruption, but use
connections or pay bribes because that is “how it works.”
This is echoed by the conclusions of the UNODC report on bribery that says, “In
general, corruption is not accepted by Croatian citizens – they voiced great concern about
it in the survey – yet bribery appears to be tolerated as a tool for getting things done and
receiving better treatment” (UNODC 2011:52). It will require a change of norms to alter
the perception that some bribes are merely signs of gratitude. Instead, a rule of law
culture views bribes as an unfair practice and places value on the consistent and unbiased
application of rules and regulation. My research shows that value is placed on a rule of
law, but the reality experienced is quite different. While this inconsistency persists the de
facto rule of law will not be strong in Croatia. For the development of political agency
this presents a dilemma because to make political change without building alliances and
connections through existing channels (i.e. corrupt) seems to be a nearly impossible task.
The lack of transparency in government is a major deterrent to political agency.
Without knowledge of when and how decisions are made people cannot try to influence
the outcomes. An example of this occurred during my time in Gvozd when a garbage
dump was proposed to be located close enough to affect water quality and contribute to
other pollution concerns. This site would be the dumping grounds for roughly half the
population of the country because it would include the areas of Zagreb and Sisak.
Members of Suncokret followed the developments as they could, tried to raise awareness
locally and protested to government representatives. After it was reported that another
solution would be found details came to light that a behind-the-scenes agreement had
been made to go ahead with the garbage dump in that location anyways. Rumors are that
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the deal was heavily influenced by a politician who did not want a dump in her own
district. While it is important to differentiate between facts and perceptions, the volume
of examples like this certainly add to a culture that has little faith in their government’s
commitment to the rule of law and an individual’s ability to alter the political system.
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions

In this chapter I return to the guiding question of this dissertation: To what degree
are the tribunal’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule of law in post-conflict
Croatia reinforced or opposed by a local experience of the rule of law? I have presented
evidence that the tribunal’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule of law took a
mostly institutional approach by focusing on criminal trials of the highest level
perpetrators, gaining support of domestic politicians by leveraging international alliances,
encouraging and aiding domestic courts to operate according to international standards,
and taking some steps to educate the public. Those efforts by the tribunal must now be
examined from the viewpoint of the local legal consciousness to understand how the local
experience of the rule of law reinforces or opposes the tribunal’s agenda. The tribunal is
an institution that both lifts expectations of a highly idealized conception of the rule of
law and falls short of those expectations. Here I am assessing the impact of the tribunal in
the sense that I can explain local attitudes based on my research and compare them to
declared and actual efforts by the ICTY to strengthen the rule of law. If there is local
support for a strong rule of law we can say the ICTY is attempting to fulfill peoples’
needs and desires and therefore those efforts will find a more receptive audience and have
a greater chance of success.
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The Tribunal and the Rule of Law
The perception of fairness is crucial for the tribunal’s credibility and public
support. In 2002 former ICTY Deputy Chief Prosecutor Tolbert made the claim that,
“The critics have been proven wrong: the ICTY has grown into an effective court, which
has painstakingly administered trials that are widely perceived as fair (Tolbert 2002:8)”.
In the sixth annual report of the tribunal, Judge McDonald reported the ICTY’s advances:
“The tribunal’s decisions on both procedural and substantive matters are on the cutting
edge of the development of international humanitarian law. Many of the legal issues
adjudicated by the tribunal have either never been dealt with before, or have been
dormant since the end of the Second World War (Sixth Annual Report of the ICTY
1999)”. The ICTY’s implementation of human rights law helped create the momentum to
finally put into place the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) conceived at
Nuremberg (Robertson 1999). Its example has “served as the sine qua non of the ICC
(Tolbert 2002:18),” establishing a new permanent and international mechanism for
judicial accountability. These are significant contributions to the future of human rights
law and achievements that surely do impact Croatia in particular and extend to all states
to some degree. In terms of a “justice cascade” the ICTY does play a significant role that
I do not wish to downplay, but do want to be realistic about in this assessment.
The prosecutions of the ICTY document an authoritative historical account of the
conflict. Wilson (2005) stresses the importance of this role in de-mystifying local, biased
accounts. “In the most general terms, justice is compromised because history occupies a
central place in nationalist myth-making and because domestic trials become a battlefield
over the official history and future identity of a country (Wilson 2005:919).” The ICTY,
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situated in The Hague, avoids this danger because it is an international effort, rather than
an instrument of the victor’s will. The historical accounts do not blame “ancient ethnic
hatreds” or consider the violence to have been inevitable. Additionally, they are at odds
with extremists in Serbia and Croatia that deny any wrongdoing during the conflict.
Subotić (2009) emphasizes that real change in the Former Yugoslavia must come from
within rather than imposed from the outside. This is true, and only calls to end a culture
of impunity from the public can facilitate a rule of law system. However, the tribunal has
certainly not been ignored by the media, politicians, or public in Croatia, in other words it
does have influence and the positive impacts it has made should not be overlooked. I
agree that improvements to the rule of law are only cosmetic if they do not go beyond the
level of institutions and coincide with a true development of faith in the rule of law.
The success of the ICTY is also measured by the status of the individuals who are
arrested and prosecuted. The indictment and arrest of Slobodan Milošević along with his
fall from power in Serbia, were pivotal in the perception of the ICTY as a legitimate
mechanism for judicial accountability (Chiclet 2001, Tolbert 2002). Milošević was
charged with crimes against humanity in Croatia and Kosovo, and genocide in Bosnia
Herzegovina. Milošević’s death in 2006 before conclusion of his trial left many people,
in the former Yugoslavia and internationally, disappointed at the lack of authoritative
record that would have come from a fair prosecution (Zimonjic 2006). It also left some
space for supporters of Milošević to maintain his hero image for some Serbs. The trial of
the Croatian General Gotovina demonstrated that the military actions of Croatia were not
all defensive and crossed the line to violate human rights. The tribunal took the stance
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that people from all sides of the conflict committed war crimes and the case of Gotovina
represents the impartiality of the court.
Statistically, it is difficult to evaluate the ICTY’s record for enforcing retributive
justice because there is no true comparison for the tribunal. The closest comparison
would be with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, though each situation has
unique circumstances and context. The ICTY lists 161 persons indicted for the violations
of crimes under its jurisdiction of which none remain at large. Proceedings against 136 of
the accused have concluded including 69 sentenced as guilty (www.icty.org, accessed
3/10/2013). Twenty five cases are still in progress. Certainly, these proceedings have
been more effective and larger in scale than any other attempt at judicial accountability
for war crimes.
The results of the ICTY are mixed, falling short of expectations in some key
areas. The lack of enforcement powers that were such an obstacle at the beginning, have
been overcome to a degree. The ICTY was instrumental in the development of the ICC,
but also provided examples of what not to do in future international prosecutions. The
major difficulty stems from the distance between the ICTY and the region it is
investigating, the former Yugoslavia. Surely, this separation has some advantages in
minimizing the influence of nationalist agendas. However, the ICTY’s impact in the
region will not be significant without improvements in the education of domestic legal
professionals, strengthening of the local legal institutions, and the education of the public
on human rights (Tolbert 2002).
These issues are so critical because it is the domestic courts that will continue the
war crimes trials after the dissolution of the ICTY and present domestic courts do not
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meet international standards (European Court of Human Rights 2002). Tolbert condemns
the absence of a provision for outreach to domestic courts in the ICTY’s mandate: “While
the tribunal was established as a mechanism to restore peace and security in the region, it
was not given any specific role in constructing or improving the domestic justice systems
or assisting in local war crimes prosecutions (Tolbert 2002:12).”
The lack of public education has been discussed as one of the greatest downfalls
of the ICTY and a major difficulty domestically. Zoglin emphasizes the critical
importance of internal reform and education for long-term changes to take place. “The
international community needs to focus on capacity-building and public education in the
former Yugoslavia if war crimes trials are to be fair and meaningful and for the rule of
law to take root (Zoglin 2005: 72).” There have been some efforts in this area, but
without sufficient funding and authority it has fallen short. The ICTY has an Outreach
Program funded by voluntary contributions, not by the United Nations. “This program,
which has been in operation since 1999, is aimed at educating the peoples in the region,
starting with local legal professionals, about the tribunal, its purposes, and its work
(Tolbert 2002:13).” This program was created because a lack of authoritative
information on the ICTY had led to many misconceptions and manipulations of the
ICTY’s role. The program has had some successes, but the impact has been small.
Tolbert elaborates that, “Despite the importance of the Outreach Program, it was only
intended to serve a limited purpose and role as a public information vehicle, and there has
been little systematic effort by the tribunal or by the international community at large to
make the work of the tribunal relevant to the national justice systems in the region
(Tolbert 2002:14)”. The activities of the Outreach Program include helping transfer
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cases from The Hague to domestic courts and working to increase the impartiality and
competency of those domestic courts. The 2005 annual report from the ICTY recognizes
the great need to educate legal professionals and the public about war crimes
prosecutions in order for the ICTY to be effective in the region. The external reforms
were given a “major emphasis,” including “efforts to build capacity through training of
judges and lawyers in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICTY 2005).” These
actions are reviewed by Judge Meron to show that, “The Tribunal has laid the legal and
logistical groundwork for the successful transfer of lower-level prosecutions to national
jurisdictions (ICTY 2005).” Zoglin and others dispute this analysis.
In conjunction with general public education, there is a lack of qualified legal
professionals in Croatian courts. The Rules of the Road Program added to the efforts of
the Outreach Program in this endeavor. This program includes a review of all war crimes
prosecutions by the ICTY prosecutor before proceeding in domestic courts. The review
against international standards checks for legitimate reason to proceed with a prosecution
for war crimes. Again, this was only a small step because the Rules of the Road program
gives no training to domestic prosecutors and is only viewed as a side note to the ICTY’s
purpose (Tolbert 2002). More recently, the ICTY does claim that it has aided the
development of local judiciaries as evidenced by reforms, higher standards of education
and new witness protections written into Croatian law (www.icty.org/sid/10642, accessed
March 10, 2013). To date, two war crimes cases have been transferred by the ICTY to
Croatian courts. One of these, the Ademi-Norac case, is reported to have been
“successfully dealt with” by the Croatian courts.
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More recently, the tribunal has tried to focus more of its efforts on outreach
activities and given some attention to its potential long term impact in the region. With
the assistance for the ICTY four county courts in Croatia have been designated to handle
war crimes cases, Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka, and Split, though war crimes cases continue to
be conducted at other courts and their ability to conduct these trials is questioned (Center
for Peace, Human Rights and Non-Violence 2009). The Outreach Program also
represents the ICTY at regional conferences and other public events, but does not have a
presence in the rural community of Gvozd or generally in areas outside the major cities.
In response to the many critics calling for more outreach activities the United
Nations Security Council created The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals
(MICT) (www.icty.org, accessed 3/10/13). Unfortunately its ambiguous name will leave
people wondering about its purpose. The ICTY’s website describes the activities of the
“mechanism” to be continuing the trial proceedings, though not initiating new trials, and
archiving records of the trials. It does not seem that communication to local populations
will be part of its work. The creation of the MICT allows the ICTY to officially close in
the near future while proceedings may continue under the authority of this new entity.
The tribunal as an institution representing international interests set out to change
the way people view the rule of law and, more generally, law itself. The intended change
goes beyond an adjustment of individual cost and benefit analyses (ex. to make it more
costly to commit a war crime) to alter the social and political relationships people have
within communities and across states. It is not just the criminal trials in The Hague that
are the mechanism for change, the tribunal’s investigations have influenced domestic
courts, judges, lawyers and staff, it has affected domestic laws and their interpretation, it
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allowed victims and witnesses to contribute to the trials (at least to some degree), and it
persuaded other states and organizations to pressure the Croatian government to comply
with international rule of law standards consistent with the protection of human rights.
What is the sum of these efforts? How are they responded to by individuals and social
communities such as Gvozd? Have they made the level of change describe by Borneman
to be necessary?
The impact of EU membership rivals that of the ICTY in strengthening the rule of
law. Both have likely prompted Croatia to pass reforms on the election of judges,
political financing, and transparency. Croatia also ratified the Council of Europe’s
Criminal Law Convention Against Corruption in 2000 and Civil Law Convention
Against Corruption in 2003 as well as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
in 2005 (UNODC 2011:9). Internal capacities to scrutinize and take action against
corrupt practices have increased showing a commitment to strengthen the rule of law. On
its website the UNODC lists about thirty laws enacted in Croatia that relate to anticorruption efforts. These include witness protections, public access to information, court
procedures, criminal codes, conduct of civil servants, police regulations, and laws
preventing conflicts of interest (www.track.unodc.org/legallibrary, accessed 3/3/13). The
critical question to ask is whether or not these reforms improve people’s everyday
experiences to a point that justifies faith in the rule of law.

Local Experience of the Rule of Law
It is clear from the information presented in this dissertation that the local
experience of the rule of law diverges from the way it is conceptualized and idealized by
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the ICTY. All of Croatia continues to wade through repercussions of the violence and
destruction in some way or another. Patchwork communities like Gvozd face additional
challenges due to the distrust that is felt towards the government and people in the
community from different backgrounds. Throughout Croatia the bureaucracy is slow and
corrupt, leaving crimes unpunished. Few Croats have been held accountable for war
crimes by domestic courts. Civil cases are left unresolved because of their volume and
inadequate resources. The fairness of politicians and institutions is highly doubted by the
public and specific examples of corruption are easy to come across. People live with
uncertainty regarding basic needs such as employment and rights to housing and the
potential for future regional violence is a valid concern. These are difficult circumstances
for anyone to overcome.
The local legal consciousness is shaped by the conflicts that people encounter on
a daily basis. Though many of these conflicts are petty in comparison to the crimes of the
1990s they are telling of the larger problems and are meaningful for the people involved.
The government does not provide effective channels or a neutral setting for the resolution
of disputes or for the placement of complaints about unfair treatment. There are few
negative consequences for government representatives if they act inconsistently or with
bias in their duties; some act more based on personal agendas than as representatives of
the state.
Some two thirds of the population believe that corrupt practices occur
often or very often in a number of important public institutions, including
central and local government, parliament, hospitals, judiciary and the
police. Almost half of Croatian citizens (47%) believe that corruption is
actually on the rise in their country, 44 per cent believe it to be stable and
a further 9 per cent think it is decreasing. Perceptions, it should be
underlined, are nothing more than opinions and are not to be confused
with the actual experience of corruption that provides the main focus of
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this report. Nevertheless, such a perception can be interpreted as an
expression of citizens’ awareness of one of the principal challenges facing
Croatia, both now and in the years to come. (UNODC 2011:5)
In this quote the United Nations acknowledges that perceptions of corruption in Croatia
are very high and perceptions, though distinct from actual incidences, are significant.
I agree with Jensen (2002) that the idea of “home” plays a major role in places
like Croatia and is useful in understanding the root of problems often blamed simply on
ethno-religious divisions. Home is a place that is safe and brings together the people you
love. When it is threatened people do strange things in the name of that home. When it is
secure it is much more difficult to convince someone to take part in violence. People in
Croatia want to feel secure and there are promises that it is so, but their experience tells a
different story. The concept of home for returnees and refugees in particular has been
turned upside down.
One woman’s account of life in Gvozd exemplifies why people have little trust in
the government’s commitment to the rule of law. She describes people of different
ethnicities getting along well and intermarrying before the conflict period. Then, in 1991
things changed and ethnicity mattered. In 1995 she and her family were forced to flee
from their homes to Serbia where they lived in refugee camps for four years. Raising
young children under those conditions was quite a challenge. At that point they were told
by the Croatian government that they could not return to their homes because Bosnian
Croats were now living in them. Instead her family was sent to Canada for another four
years until the Croatian government allowed them to return to their homes in town,
apparently forcing the Bosnian Croat family occupying the house to a new location. This
change in the government’s policy is likely a consequence of international influence on
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domestic policies toward minorities and people displaced during the conflict and the end
of Tuñman’s leadership. She is glad to be back in her home and proud that Croatia
provides health care to its citizens, pointing out that the U.S. does not do this, but doesn’t
understand why she was forced from her home and kept from returning for so long. Most
of the Serb residents in Gvozd had similar experiences that leave many questions
unanswered and, understandably, little faith that the government is looking out for their
interests.
Despite some obstacles, my research findings provide substantiation that the local
legal consciousness includes norms that are consistent with the rule of law. A majority of
people surveyed do think that trials are the best avenue to provide justice and the major
political and military leaders are considered to be the most important to hold accountable.
People, especially those who consider themselves to be victims of war crimes, care about
the ICTY’s decisions and consider those decisions consequential enough to affect their
feeling of safety living in Croatia. There is a segment of the population that considers the
ICTY to be effectively achieving justice. The complaints of corruption and insecurity
also point to a desire for a stronger rule of law. People want more transparency in their
government and justice to be served.
The people in Gvozd that I knew best shared their everyday conflicts with me as
well as their times of togetherness and joy. It was obvious that family and friends are
greatly valued and their support is what makes it possible to live through hardships.
Disruptions to social networks, like those that occurred during the conflict, are hard to
repair. The strength of those bonds is apparent in the importance of sharing meals and
frequency of favors exchanged. The gatherings for a group meal were the highlights of
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my experience both because I learned about relationships and social practices and
because I felt included in the strong personal networks that tie people together. In this
community there exists a high regard for a good joke, spot-on nickname or story.
Hospitality and generosity continue to be prioritized even when there is little to give,
making it all the more meaningful. These qualities were present in both groups of people
in Gvozd and have the potential to bring the community together.

Reinforced or Opposed?
This dissertation is an evaluation of local experience of conflict as it informs the
local legal consciousness, in order for a rule of law culture to be successfully cultivated
there must be faith that the principles of the rule of law will be followed by people in
positions of power. This faith indicates confidence in a social contract between the
members of the society, that mysterious quality that makes the rule of law “work.” The
rule of law as perceived in local legal consciousness is such a significant factor in
understanding the impact of the tribunal because without a real connection between the
two the tribunal’s actions do not bear meaning locally. Ursula LeGuin, daughter of
anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, writes about the idea that “all knowledge is local” in her
science fiction novel Four Ways to Forgiveness that is perhaps similar to Tip O’Neill’s
well-known quote that “all politics is local.”
To me LeGuin’s quote refers to the relationships between knowledge, truth and
culture. What is considered to be true in one society may be viewed as a falsehood
somewhere else; this is a basic idea behind cultural relativism. For me “all knowledge is
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local” is a reminder of the strength personal experience has to develop an individual’s
worldview and the amazing flexibility of that worldview which can seem to be solid as a
rock or fluid as water. The concreteness of the local knowledge, despite its known or
unknown validity elsewhere, can be incredibly strong, so much so that people deny the
possibility of its untruth and may defend it with violence. The implications of going
against the norms formed by that knowledge, be they social, economic, political, religious
or whatever, are real and alter people’s lives. The power of local knowledge is very
influential in this manner. This poses many questions regarding the universality of truth
in the face of strong local knowledge which is experienced rather than read about or
theorized. In a way the tribunal, as an instrument of the United Nations, is asking people
to change their worldview from one shaped by local knowledge to one based on
principles considered to be universal that may be conflicting.
Public support and “buy in” are critical for a strong rule of law system. A true
belief in the rule of law must be consistent with experience, at least to some degree.
Law is also a normative system that resides in the minds of the citizens of
a society. As rule-of-law providers seek to affect the rule of law in a
country, it is not clear if they should focus on institution-building or
instead try to intervene in ways that would affect how citizens understand,
use, and value law. To take a simple example, many rule-of-law programs
focus on improving a country’s courts and police on the assumption that
this is the most direct route to improve compliance with law in the
country. Yet some research shows that compliance with law depends most
heavily on the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the laws,
characteristics that are not established primarily by the courts but by other
means, such as the political process. An effort to improve compliance thus
might more fruitfully take a completely different approach. (Carothers
2003:8-9)
It seems that Carothers is referring to what I am defining as legal consciousness in his
discussion of law as a “normative system” and interventions that “affect how citizens
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understand, use and value law.” He considers the possibility that institution-building is
not the best route to strengthening rule of law, but rather targeting a change in what I am
labeling as the local legal consciousness. The specific ways that can be done are not
detailed by Carothers, though he does point to perceptions of fairness and legitimacy of
law as well as the political process. I presume he alludes to a greater transparency in the
political process as is valued with substantive definitions of the rule of law.
The answer to the question of whether the local experience of law reinforces or
opposes the ICTY’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Croatia is not simple. The
concept of the rule of law itself refers to many different aspects of society and
experiences of the rule of law vary. The best answer to this question based on my
research is that local experience reinforces rule of law initiatives in some respects and
opposes it in others. There is evidence that the ICTY’s imposition of formal legality is
increasing security and lessening corruption to some degree at the institutional level. The
local legal consciousness does appear to value principles consistent with a strong rule of
law like that conceptualized by the UN. Yet I don’t see evidence of a transformation in
power relations on a scale that would indicate a tipping point has been reached and norms
truly altered. Croatia does appear to be on this path, but the obstacles of the nature of law,
ethno-religious nationalism, insecurity and lack of political agency are substantial. Most
people simply want to live in a safe home with their family comfortably. They do not
rally for change. Still, there are some influential individuals and organizations that are
embracing norms of the rule of law and those of human rights. These “norms
entrepreneurs” push issues like corruption and institutional biases into the public’s eye
and are gaining support.
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Another way to understand how local legal consciousness affects the success of
the tribunal’s agenda to strengthen the rule of law is to go back to Tamanaha’s statement
that, “Pervasive societal attitudes about fidelity to the rule of law – in each of the three
meanings – is the mysterious quality that makes the rule of law work” (Tamanaha
2004:141). Does the rule of law “work” in Croatia? This dissertation sought to determine
what the “pervasive societal attitudes” are in this context. Those attitudes do place value
on a fidelity to the rule of law and that has some significant implications for the future of
Croatia’s adherence to accountability, fairness and security, both by government and in
the public sector. People who consider themselves to be victims of war crimes do look to
the ICTY to hold perpetrators accountable. The trouble is that the fidelity to the rule of
law is hindered or even contradicted by other existing norms thus making the
transformation called for by Borneman more difficult. The rule of law does not entirely
“work.” Croatia is a state in transition and the path it follows is not set in stone. This is
what is so exciting and daunting about transitions, Croatia and elsewhere. Despite the
obstacles there are reasons to believe Croatia’s rule of law will continue to strengthen and
edge closer to the idealized conception of the United Nations: 1) the influence of EU
membership, 2) desire for a good international reputation, 3) internal demands to end
corruption, 4) to reduce future divisions and violence, and 5) economic advantages.
It is not clear how much importance the ICTY places on transformative, local
changes to the legal consciousness in a self-assessment of its success. At times it is
recognized and at others it is left out. Most statements focus on the court proceedings
rather than the communities affected by war crimes.
While hybrid and international tribunals have done much to prosecute the
main perpetrators of international crimes, a lot remains to be done
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regarding residual mechanisms, in particular with regard to the transfer of
pending cases to the concerned States in accordance with international fair
trial standards, witness and victim protection and the location,
management and securing of archives and records. (United Nations
Secretary General 2011:64)
In this quote the UN Secretary General recognizes that the goals of the ICTY and other
international tribunals go beyond trials for high-level leaders to include a change in
domestic legal institutions, but does not go beyond that to consider the local legal
consciousness as a critical component of strengthening the rule of law.
Later, in the same report, a more critical statement is made that acknowledges a
disconnect between the international courts (the ICTY and others) and the people affected
by war crimes. “International transitional justice mechanisms are often detached from the
reality of the concerned States as regards language, acceptance in the population,
outreach, influence on good governance and rule of law initiatives” (United Nations
Secretary General 2011:64). Here the UN Secretary General acknowledges that
international tribunals are disconnected from the “reality of concerned States” in regards
to what amounts to aspects of the local legal consciousness. Overall, the statements say
that intentions of international tribunals to strengthen the rule of law have not gone far
enough in the vein of institution-building and have done little beyond that to affect local
norms of the rule of law. It does not, however, stipulate if or how that may be corrected.
Although I find that the local legal consciousness reinforces the rule of law
initiatives of the tribunal and, at the same time, opposes it in other ways, I do consider
there to be enough support for the rule of law to indicate people are open to initiatives. If
efforts to strengthen the rule of law target an improvement of people’s everyday
experiences with conflicts that may meet with success. The UNODC report of bribery in
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Croatia concludes by saying, “As the data pertaining to the perception of corruption in
this report reveal, public opinion about corruption in Croatia shows a considerable level
of concern about the issue. A window of opportunity is, therefore, open and it is likely
that the citizens of Croatia would warmly welcome the further implementation of anticorruption policies” (UNODC 2011:52). I also interpret my research findings that people
value tenets of the rule of law to show a “window of opportunity” for a stronger rule of
law to develop in Croatia.

Legitimizing Authority with the Rule of Law
How is a democracy legitimized? Core principles must be reinforced by the
society’s values, and the worldview must justify authority. Is the ICTY’s authority
justified? Is the Croatian government’s? Whose authority is justified by the current
worldview? The existence of a rule of law culture is needed to justify the authority of the
international tribunal because it depends on a belief in rule by rules. The ICTY’s agenda
to strengthen the rule of law is also an agenda to alter the local worldview to one that
favors the authority of the United Nations. The ICTY requires support from politicians in
Croatia to be effective. Politicians in Croatia do not depend so heavily on a rule of law
culture to justify their authority and indeed may find it counter-productive in some cases.
This is why aligning the agendas of the ICTY and Croatia is such a tremendous task.
Croatian politicians have more success when aligning themselves with ethno-religious
groups, or at least in not offending them.
The success of the ICTY and more generally the success of international human
rights law rely on a certain level of legitimization that can be measured by the degree to
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which a rule of law culture is adopted. Does this mean that a rule of law culture is
necessary for the existence of a human rights culture? Not exactly, but the two do support
each other. A human rights culture may exist separately in a commitment to human rights
ideals, but any enforcement must include the components of the rule of law singled out
here: accountability, fairness and security. These components are complementary to
human rights ideals of freedom from torture, then need for due process, et cetera. It is
important to keep in mind the caution from Carothers and Tamanaha that a strong rule of
law does not infer fairness or equality as is often assumed. Any rule of law initiatives that
are intended to reinforce a substantive concept of the rule of law that fits with ideals of
human rights and democracy must be explicit about that relationship.
Instead of asking if people in Croatia trust in their government this research has
asked if people in Croatia trust in the ICTY as an institution taking over some functions
of state government. As it turns out, understanding how much people in Croatia trust their
government helps to answer this question about the ICTY. As stressed by Borneman,
political and personal accountability are crucial to establish the state as a “legitimate
moral authority” (1997:165). He considers adherence to the rule of law to help end cycles
of violence and facilitate the success of a new regime. Ideally this is a transformation to
what we can term a “rule of culture.” The ICTY has contributed to a stronger rule of law
in Croatia in ways that would not have been likely without its efforts.
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A Justice Cascade in Croatia?
Sikkink’s idea that support has grown for the norm of individual criminal
accountability in Latin America and beyond in a justice cascade ties in well with this
evaluation of the rule of law. In her analysis of human rights trials in Latin America
Sikkink recognizes that the promotion of the rule of law and human rights often occur as
parallel and complementary processes and rejects the notion that the rule of law must be
in place before initiating prosecutions for human rights violations (Sikkink 2011:155).
She centers on one definition of justice, that of judicial accountability, and evaluates that
on an international scale. Her definition encompasses the components of the rule of law I
focus on here: accountability, fairness and security.
Three key ideas underpin the justice norm: the first is the idea that the
most basic violations of human rights – summary execution, torture, and
disappearance – cannot be legitimate acts of state and thus must be seen as
crimes committed by individuals. A second, related idea is that the
individuals who commit these crimes can be, and should be, prosecuted.
These seem like simple, even obvious ideas. But they run counter to
centuries of beliefs about the state. It took a major movement to move
such new ideas forward, embed them in law, and put them into practice.
The third idea is that the accused are also bearers of rights, and deserve to
have those rights protected in a fair trial. (Sikkink 2011:13)
The connection regarding accountability is outright. Fairness is present in the call for
recognition that summary execution, torture, and disappearance are basic human right
violations and in the recognition that the accused bear rights as well. Security is implied
by the expectation that individuals who violate human rights will be punished and the
idea that all people should live free from violations of human rights. Does the research
presented here demonstrate that people in local Croatian communities hold this norm?
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When broken down in this way by Sikkink, people in Croatia do not show great
support for justice through individual criminal accountability. With the very first idea
underpinning the justice norms we already encounter some doubt. There is still a
significant population in Croatia that views the state’s actions during Operation Storm to
be valid defensive actions. There does seem to be support for the idea of individual
accountability for violations of human rights, but decisions about who should be held
responsible are not without bias. The third idea proposed by Sikkink, that the accused are
also bearers of rights, probably gets the least amount of support in Croatia. People are
more inclined to place responsibility based on public opinion than on a trial that follows
due process. This, however, may be more a result of the lack of trust in government and
the ICTY than rejection of the idea.
Croatia does not follow exactly the example of Argentina described by Sikkink
(2011). It has its own unique set of circumstances yet it may be more similar to the
average state in the degree to which the public and government embrace individual
criminal accountability for violations of human rights. In Argentina local groups gathered
support for this cause that then partnered with international organizations to initiate
domestic trials. In Croatia a few groups and individuals called for scrutiny of the
government’s actions during the conflict period before the tribunal began international
trials, but there is little doubt that domestic trials at that time would have fallen short of
the UN’s standards. Like in Argentina, critique of the state’s actions during the conflict
period has grown.
The example of Croatia also differs from Argentina in that Croatia became
independent during this period and human rights violations that took place in Croatia are
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inter-related with those that occurred elsewhere in the Former Yugoslavia. It is not only
an issue of holding Croatia’s leaders accountable, but also those from neighboring states.
These circumstances complicate a call for the end of impunity. The conclusion of the
ICTY’s trials will mean that domestic trials take on a higher level of consequence. How
they fare by international human rights standards is yet to be seen. They will be a good
measure of Croatia’s commitment to the rule of law.
There is a progressive trend of public support for trials of human rights violations,
regardless of ethnicity, but a clear “tipping point” doesn’t stand out and the obstacles to
the rule of law outlined above present a real challenge for the justice cascade to gather
momentum. Rather, to take the analogy further, the cascade must contend with dams built
up to block it and occasional droughts. Still, it trickles through and norms of individual
criminal accountability are taking hold. The political climate has changed and I present
evidence that the rule of law is, at least in part, compatible with the local legal
consciousness.

The Intersection of the Local and Global
Is there local validation for the international agenda? There is, but more
communication and interaction with the local population is needed to make a greater
impact.
For those states that fail to live up to their obligations, the consequences
are mostly shame and pressure from other states and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), along with economic pressures such as reductions
in foreign aid, foreign investment, and foreign tourism. Some activists
seek to humiliate heads of state at international public events. But these
pressures are indirect and serendipitous. Moreover, as sociolegal studies of
law within nation-states indicate, compliance depends largely on
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individual consciousness and commitment, not policing and force. Most
people, most of the time, conform to laws because they are part of the
taken-for-granted world they inhabit, not because they calculate the
relative costs of violation and compliance (see Ewick and Silbey 1998).
Thus, the creation of a new global legal order depends on the creation of
new global cultural codes. Here, the gaps between normative ideas
generated in international meetings and those within local communities
pose enormous challenges for the implementation of human rights. The
insights of sociolegal scholarship about how rights operate in everyday
social life are highly relevant to the human rights domain. Sociolegal
research shows that rights do not constitute a coherent system but are
contingent, fragmented, and unevenly supported by the general public.
Much work suggests that the articulation of rights does not guarantee their
performance. (Merry 2006:979)
In this quote by Merry she places great importance on the congruence of local and
international norms as a requirement for the success of international human rights law, a
system of law built upon principles of the rule of law. She indicates that global initiatives
cannot succeed without local support, which is exactly why I chose to look at the local
legal consciousness in Croatia to evaluate the success of the international tribunal. I think
it is clear that in the case presented here not enough attention was paid to the local
population by the tribunal, particularly in Croatia. You could argue that it was not the
tribunal’s job to do so; rather the task was to conduct trials. Still, the tribunal was always
more than criminal prosecutions. It had a mission to promote peace, justice and the rule
of law. It was a non-military way to attempt condemnation of the atrocities that took
place, thus saving lives of a peace-keeping force. It was also just one of many tools for
the United Nations to alter global norms of the rule of law and human rights.
One thing that has surprised me about this research is that although it is
examining the relationship between the international and the local much of that
relationship hinges what is happening at the level of the state. Local experience and
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interpretation of what is happening at the international level is greatly influenced by how
the state interacts with other states and international organizations and how the state
interacts with local communities. Much of the ICTY’s efforts to strengthen the rule of
law are filtered through state government and this is critical to keep in mind when
international efforts like this are organized. On the other hand, the ICTY represents the
possibility of bypassing the state government to right grievous wrongs and pressure the
state from the outside to make institutional changes. The increasing emphasis placed on
rule of law and human rights by policy makers across the globe changes the “rules of the
game” in this respect which is a sign that norms are changing. It also point out that local
legal consciousness has the potential to be more influential beyond its borders than ever
before.

Implications for Transitional Justice and Beyond
In this dissertation I utilize legal anthropology to show micro-mechanisms that
facilitate and obstruct norms of the rule of law. Some aspects of the rule of law are valued
in local communities and while the ICTY appears to have some positive influence other
factors are also significant. A sense of fairness or even-handedness is critical in postconflict situations. The ICTY contributes to a sense of fairness, though only to a degree
and not without controversy. Its presence is significant, but only a partial solution. The
local experience of law must be considered by initiatives to impose change and the result
will be less of an imposition and more of a partnership. This type of approach is more
likely to be a productive one.
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The success, and even the possibility, of war crimes trials is often hard to fathom
soon after violations of human rights. This time of transition amplifies a need for the rule
of law. The passing of time creates distance from the volatile emotions that come with
violations of human rights. Sikkink (2011) points this out as well. She states that early on
in Argentina people didn’t even consider trials as an option and later it became a
possibility, a necessity and a reality. Does that mean trials should be stalled until there is
more public support for them? I don’t think so. Trials for the political and military leaders
should take place as soon as possible and in a short time frame, though not at the expense
of the alleged perpetrators’ rights to due process. Often this means international trials
must start the process, as in the case of the Former Yugoslavia. The end of international
trials and “passing on” of trials to the domestic level is just as significant. For a fledgling
democracy in particular this is a critical step to break the present from the past and create
the new regime’s moral legitimacy. It makes the statement that from now on violations of
human rights will not be tolerated. It also shows that the government places value on
accountability, fairness and security.
In the case of Croatia domestic institutions play a major role in connecting or
disconnecting the local legal consciousness with the tribunal’s initiatives to strengthen
the rule of law. The government institutions do not provide accountability, consistency,
impartiality, or security, in fact divisions are deepened by distrust and justice is sought
elsewhere. People in Croatia are attentive to the proceedings of the international tribunal
and the decisions it makes have an effect on perceptions of the rule of law, both in
Croatia and internationally. The tribunal can contribute to the rule of law at the
international level through the war crimes trials. It can contribute to the rule of law at the
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domestic level by influence over law and policy. At the individual level the significance
is more difficult to pinpoint, but I think my research shows it is meaningful there too. It
does not assist individual catharsis, but through the higher level acknowledgments of
wrongdoing and changes toward a human rights-based rule of law it does impact
individuals.
While this research did not explicitly seek to understand why people violate
human rights it does contribute to a discussion of this by helping to identify what is
needed by the survivors to move on to a new future without violence. To achieve justice
the elements of the rule of law (violators held accountable, evenhandedness, consistency,
security) are more important than the method (international, domestic, or local trials),
though at present in many cases international trials are most capable of incorporating
those elements. The findings show that international actions are locally meaningful. The
tribunal’s prosecution of war crimes, though flawed and obstructed, is crucial in this postconflict situation. Other factors that contribute to the rule of law should be given greater
emphasis by the international human rights community. At present most rule of law
research does not give much consideration to the local legal consciousness. This is
needed to understand the mechanisms that shape norms of the rule of law. Knowledge of
what those norms are and how they can be altered is instrumental in creating effective
change to strengthen the rule of law and protect human rights. It is also significant for the
development of a culture that not only values human rights, but enforces them.
Levi and Epperly (2009) bring up the concept of a costly signal given by their
“principled principals” in order to strengthen the rule of law. While the dynamics of
costly signals are usually the domain of behavioral ecologists and economists, they are
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usefully applied here as well. I agree with Levi and Epperly that politicians who take a
strong stance of commitment to the rule of law and demonstrate that through actions
rather than give it only lip service or passing attention are giving what can be considered
as a costly signal and that this level of commitment is necessary to provoke real change.
It is costly because in the political environment of Croatia it could end your political
career and likely your social life and financial standing as well. It is a gamble with great
risks if it is not successful. In their evaluations of Croatian politics both Del Ponte (2009)
and Peskin (2008) recognize the dilemma faced by anyone who shows strong support of
the tribunal and its objectives in this fragile, new democracy. That support comes at the
price of alienating much of the population and risking potential political coalitions which
are conditions that do not portend great success for the agenda or individual. The degree
to which this is true was certainly higher when Tuñman was president and has lessened
since, but there still exists a perception that alignment with the tribunal is a move against
Croatia’s independence.
What are the best ways to strengthen the rule of law? Institutional approaches
must go hand-in-hand with approaches that more directly alter the local legal
consciousness. Those include the creation of fair and efficient bureaucracies through the
implementation of grievance procedures without fear of retaliation that are treated with
consequence, incentives for government representatives to conduct business without bias
with clear consequences for the contrary, and open communication about policies to the
public. The importance of targeting a change in norms as well as structural changes to
institutions must be given serious attention. Samuels builds on the analysis by Carothers
(2003) in her critique of rule of law initiatives to say, “A key point to emphasize is that
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law reform in any country requires demand for change. For the changes to be sustainable
and implemented there must be a demand among the population, and local champions of
the changes to drive the reform, be it citizens, membership organizations, human rights
activists, opposition parties, etc.” (2006:20). Local champions like these are the “norms
entrepreneurs” that Sikkink (2011) credits as building the internal momentum to change
the prevailing norms of the society to demand individual accountability. I know several
people in Croatia that qualify as norms entrepreneurs and they are affecting change, some
on a small scale in local communities and others in the scene of domestic politics.
The research presented in this dissertation shows that the tribunal’s initiatives to
strengthen the rule of law are missing a critical component. Too much emphasis is placed
on institutional changes that assume, incorrectly, that normative change will
automatically follow. An understanding of the local legal consciousness can allow
initiatives to build upon existing norms that support the rule of law and combat those that
conflict. If rule of law initiatives are implemented in a way that is more salient to the
population they will gain more local support, and only then can transformational change
take place. Critics from a legal perspective may claim that the tribunal’s role is only to
prosecute war criminals, not alter societal norms, but the tribunal is removed from
political, social and economic realms only in theory and its explicit purpose goes well
beyond holding trials. If the tribunal did more to embrace and promote its potential
impact in local communities its proceedings would contribute more to a positive,
peaceful future. If the people directly involved in war crimes don’t see and feel a stronger
rule of law exemplified in the resolution of their everyday conflicts the tribunal’s
influence remains limited.
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Epilogue

The outcome of Gotovina’s trial was reversed on appeal in November 2012. He
was acquitted of all charges by a close margin (3-2) and with reservations by the judges.
The public reaction to the acquittal rivaled the one to Milošević’s death mid-trial.
Generally speaking Croats reacted with joy and Serbs with a new outcry of injustice. The
reaction from human rights advocates has also been mixed, mostly consisting of
disapproval and frustration. Strikingly, Gotovina has taken some steps to distance himself
from Croat nationalists since his return from The Hague. In an interview with a Serb
newspaper he called for a move forward from the past and supported the return of
displaced Serbs to their homes in Croatia (Tanjug 2012).
The success of the appeal may be interpreted in many different ways locally. It
might help the ICTY to be viewed more positively by some people in Croatia because
ultimately their “war hero” was not convicted of wrongdoing, despite the commentary by
the judges that wrongdoing did occur though Gotovina was not responsible in the specific
way charged by the prosecution. The technical definitions of crimes and the way in which
responsibility was placed on Gotovina both led to the acquittal, but in the Croatian media
and by the public the outcome is commonly understood to simply mean that Gotovina,
and therefore Croatia, did no wrong. This is problematic for many reasons. It is also an
example of how the nature of law can be an obstacle to efforts to strengthen the rule of
law due to the complexity of legal proceedings on issues that are viewed in more black
and white terms of morality by the public. Others in Croatia may view the success of the
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appeal to be evidence that the tribunal is not a better alternative than domestic courts who
likely would have declared Gotovina innocent with much less to do. Alternatively,
minority Serbs in Croatia are not likely to think positively about this outcome that
appears to justify the Croat displacement of Serbs from the Krajina region and cannot
give them great trust in their future security. It is likely that the appeal will shape the
tribunal’s pending cases of Karadžić and Mladić at the ICTY and others at the ICC.
A second turn of events took place after my research period which highlights the
symbolic power of place names. As explained in the dissertation above, several of the
Serbs who I interviewed or who participated in the survey commented that the town
should not be called Gvozd. Soon after the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 the town and
county names were changed from Vrginmost to Gvozd apparently in an attempt to break
the area away from its Serb-majority past. Serb returnees came back to a town with a new
name and new neighbors, or even someone living in their home. Complaints did not fade
away and in October 2012 the town officially changed the name back to Vrginmost by a
narrow vote and by the initiative of a political party associated with the Serb ethnicity
(Špadina 2012). Perhaps it is better that the town’s future is connected with its past or
perhaps it is an omen that the past will not leave the minds of people here. In any case it
leaves me feeling like the town and people I spent so much time with were from an
imaginary place that has since disappeared with the name Gvozd.
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Appendices

Structured Interview in English

Anthropology Survey
This survey is part of a project researching the opinions of people in Croatia about the
effectiveness of trials for war crimes. You are invited to participate if you live in Gvozd
and are between 20 and 60 years old. Participation is completely voluntary. The
information collected anonymously will contribute to the researcher's anthropology
dissertation and may be used to help improve the way international and domestic courts
attempt to achieve justice for various crimes. Please email
(katharine.hawkins@uconn.edu) or call (099 754 0841) with questions.
Title of Study:
Evaluating Retributive Justice in Croatia

Researcher:
Katharine Hawkins, PhD Candidate
University of Connecticut, USA

Complete the questions below by writing or circling your answer:
1. How old are you? _______
2. How many years have you lived in Gvozd? __________
3. Where else have you lived for more than a 6 month period?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
______
4. Are you currently employed?

Yes

No

5. What is your occupation? ____________________
6. Which statement is most true:
A. If you work hard you can succeed in life
B. Who you know is more important than how hard you work
7. Rate the current importance of the following problems in Croatia on a scale of 1 to 5:
Not a Problem
Major Problem
A. Political corruption
1
2
3
4
5
B. Economy
1
2
3
4
5
C. Quality education
1
2
3
4
5
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D. Affordable education
E. Ethnic divisions
F. Lack of infrastructure

1

1
2
1

2
3
2

3
4
3

4
5
4

5
5

8. Do you feel that you are in a better situation now than before the war of the 1990s?
Better Now
Better Before
9. Which of the following would most greatly improve your life in Gvozd?
A. More job opportunities
B. Owning a home
C. Greater trust within the community
D. Better health
E. Other: _______________
Continue on back of page
10. Do you think young people in Gvozd will have a better life than their parents?
Yes
No
11. Have you heard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
Yes
No
12. How often do you read or hear something about the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)?
Daily
Weekly
Once or Twice a Month
Rarely
13. Rate how much you trust the following as sources of about the ICTY:
No Trust
Complete Trust
A. Newspaper
1
2
3
4
5
B. Television
1
2
3
4
5
C. Family and friends
1
2
3
4
5
D. Croatian government
1
2
3
4
5
E. Religious leaders
1
2
3
4
5
F. ICTY
1
2
3
4
5
14. Do you feel that you are a victim of war crimes? Yes

No

15. How much do you care about the decisions the ICTY makes in war crimes trials?
Very Much
Some
A Little
Not At All
16. Do the decisions of the ICTY affect how safe you feel to live in Croatia?
Very Much
Some
A Little
Not At All
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17. Do you think the ICTY is effectively achieving justice for the violations of human rights
that occurred during the war in the 1990s?
Yes
No
18. What is the biggest obstacle to achieving justice for the violations of human rights that
occurred in the 1990s?
A. Political biases in the courts
B. Witnesses scared to testify
C. Governments hiding war criminals
D. Too many people need to go on trial
E. Other: ___________________
19. Which of the choices below is most important to you personally regarding trials for war
crimes such as genocide?
A. That major political and military leaders be tried in a court for their actions
B. That local people who committed war crimes be tried in a court for their actions
C. That all people involved in war crimes, regardless of whether they were a leader
or not, should be tried in a court for their actions
D. That it is better not to have any trials for war crimes
20. How much confidence do you have in the Croatian courts to conduct fair trials?
Lots
Some
A Little
None
21. How much confidence do you have in the international courts to conduct fair trials?
Lots
Some
A Little
None
22. Which judges are better able to make impartial decisions in trials of war crimes that took
place in Croatia?
A. ICTY judges
B. Croatian judges
23. Do you think the ICTY has the best interests of Croatia in mind when making decisions
in the courts?
Yes
No
24. If a person committed an act of genocide in Croatia, what is the best way to address the
crime?
A. Croatian court
B. Court in country where the criminals came from
C. ICTY
25. A soldier takes part in mass killings of people based on their ethnic identity. He was
following orders from military superiors. He is declared innocent by the court when tried
for those actions. Is this judgment just or unjust?
Just
Unjust
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26. How often do you think people who commit serious crimes, such as theft, destruction of
property, or violence, are justly punished for those crimes in Croatia?
Always
Most of the time Sometimes
Rarely
27. Rate how much you agree with the following statement:
Conducting fair trials for alleged criminals is the best way to achieve justice.
Completely Agree
1
2
3
4
5 Completely
Disagree
28. Rate how much you agree with the following statement on a scale of 1 to 5:
A court must base its judgment only on concrete evidence provided at the trial.
Completely Agree
1
2
3
4
5 Completely
Disagree
29. Should punishments depend on the circumstances of the situation or always be the same
for the same crime?
A. Depend on the circumstances of the situation
B. Always be the same for the same crime
30. If a serious crime took place, what would be most important to you:
A. The victim feels that the criminal was justly punished
B. The victim forgives the criminal
C. The criminal was justly punished according to a court, though the victim may not
agree with the decision
D. The criminal was justly punished according to the community, though the victim
or a court might not agree
31. Which of the following best describes your personal reasoning for why wrongdoers
should be punished for their crimes?
A. To equalize the harm done to the victim of the crime
B. To make the crime costly so that others will think twice about committing the
same crime
C. To reform the wrongdoer so they will become a better person
32. Have the relationships between Croats, Serbs, and Muslims in Croatia improved since
1995?
Yes
No
33. Compared to 10 years before the last conflict, the relationships between Croats, Serbs and
Muslims in Croatia today are:
Better
Same
Worse
34. Do you think Croatia should join the European Union?

Yes

35. How do you think Croatia joining the European Union will effect you:
Positively
Not much
Negatively

No
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Read the paragraph below and answer the following questions:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer.
There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that
a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make,
but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200
for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s
husband, Tom, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get together
only about $1,000, which was half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was
dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No, I
discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.” Tom got desperate and
broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.
36. Should Tom be punished for stealing the drug that saved his wife’s life?
No

Yes

37. Why?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________
38. What is your religion? ______________
39. How often do you attend a house of worship?
Daily
Weekly
Once or twice a month
40. What is your ethnicity? ______________
41. Are you male or female?
Male
Thank you.

Female

Once or twice a year

Rarely
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Structured Interview in Croatian

Antropološka anketa
Ova anketa je dio projekta koji se odnosi na istraživanje mišljenja ljudi u Hrvatskoj po
pitanju učinkovitosti suñenja za ratne zločine. Ukoliko živite u Gvozdu i imate izmeñu 20
i 60 godina, slobodno ispunite ovu anketu ukoliko to želite. Ispunjavanje ankete je u
potpunosti na dobrovoljnoj bazi. Anketa je anonimna i sve informacije prikupljene kroz
anketu, pomoći će u antropološkoj disertaciji istraživača, a mogu se iskoristiti i u svrhu
poboljšanja načina na koji domaći i meñunarodni sudovi pokušavaju postići pravdu za
razne zločine. Molim da za bilo kakva pitanja pošaljete mail na adresu
(katharine.hawkins@uconn.edu) ili nazovete na mobitel broj (099 754 0841).
Naziv ankete:
Istraživanje zadovoljenja pravde po pitanju
ratnih zločina u Hrvatskoj

Istraživač:
Katharine Hawkins, kandidat za Dr.sci
Univerzitet u Connecticut-u, SAD

Odgovore na niže navedena pitanja napišite u produžetku ili zaokružite Vaš odgovor tamo
gdje je predviñeno (gdje su već ponuñeni odgovori):
1. Koliko imate godina? _______
2. Koliko godina živite u Gvozdu? __________
3. U kojem mjestu/gradu/državi ste još, osim Gvozda, živjeli duže od 6 mjeseci?
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________
4. Jeste li trenutno zaposleni?

Da

Ne

5. Što ste po zanimanju? ____________________
6. Koja Vam je od ovih tvrdnji najbliža istini?:
A. Napornim radom možeš uspjeti u životu
B. Nije važno koliko radiš, već je važno koga poznaješ i imaš veze gdje treba
7. Ocijenite ocjenom od 1 do 5 prema trenutnoj važnosti sljedeće probleme u Hrvatskoj:
Nije uopće problem (1)
Gorući problem
(5)
A. Politička korupcija
1
2
3
4
5
B. Gospodarstvo
1
2
3
4
5
C. Kvaliteta obrazovanja
1
2
3
4
5
D. Dostupnost obrazovanja1
2
3
4
5
E. Etničke podjele
1
2
3
4
5
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F. Nedostatak infrastrukture

1

2

3

4

5

8. Smatrate li da ste danas u boljem položaju nego što ste bili prije rata, prije 90-ih godina?
Sad je bolje
Prije je bilo bolje
9. Što bi od niže navedenog u najvećoj mjeri poboljšalo Vaš život u Gvozdu?
A. Više mogućnosti zaposlenja
B. Vlastiti dom
C. Više povjerenja u zajednicu
D. Bolje zdravlje
E. Drugo (napišite što): _______________
10. Mislite li da će mladi ljudi iz Gvozda imati bolji život nego što su imali njihovi roditelji?
Da
Ne
11. Jeste li čuli za Opću povelju za ljudska prava?
Da
Ne
12. Koliko često čitate ili čujete informacije o radu Meñunarodnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju
(Haški sud)?
Dnevno
Tjedno
Jednom ili dvaput mjesečno
Rijetko
13. Ocijenite od 1 do 5 koliko vjerujete niže navedenim izvorima informiranja o Haškom
sudu:
Uopće nemam povjerenja (1)
Potpuno vjerujem (5)
A. Novine
1
2
3
4
5
B. Televizija
1
2
3
4
5
C. Obitelj i prijatelji
1
2
3
4
5
D. Hrvatska Vlada
1
2
3
4
5
E. Vjerske voñe
1
2
3
4
5
F. Haški sud
1
2
3
4
5
14. Smatrate li da ste žrtva ratnog zločina?

Da

Ne

15. Koliko Vam je bitno kakve odluke i presude donosi Haški sud ?
Vrlo mi je važno Donekle mi je važno Malo mi je važno
važno

Uopće mi nije

16. U kojoj mjeri odluke Haškog suda utječu na činjenicu koliko se osjećate sigurno živeći u
Hrvatskoj?
U velikoj mjeri
Srednje
Malo Uopće ne utječu
17. Smatrate li da je Haški sud učinkovit u ostvarenju pravde za kršenja ljudskih prava, koja
su se
dešavala u ratu 90-ih godina?
Da
Ne
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18. Što je po Vašem mišljenju najveća prepreka u postizanju pravde za kršenja ljudskih prava
iz rata 90-ih?
A. Politizacija samog Suda
B. Svjedoci se boje svjedočiti
C. Vlade bivše SFRJ još skrivaju bjegunce
D. Previše ljudi treba biti suñeno
E. Drugi razlog (napišite): ___________________
19. Koja Vam je od niže navedenih tvrdnji najvažnija kad se radi o suñenjima za ratne
zločine
poput genocida?
A. Svim političkim i vojnim voñama treba biti suñeno za zločine
B. Ljudima iz lokalnih sredina koji su počinili zločine treba biti suñeno za njihova
djela
C. Svim ljudima koji su na bilo koji način umiješani u zločine, bez obzira jesu li
visoko rangirani ili ne, treba biti suñeno za njihova djela
D. Bolje bi bilo da nema nikakvih suñenja za ratne zločine
20. Koliko vjerujete u pravednost hrvatskih sudova?
Puno
Srednje

Malo

Nikako

21. Koliko vjerujete u pravednost meñunarodnih sudova?
Puno
Srednje

Malo

Nikako

22. Koji suci su po Vašem mišljenju nepristraniji prilikom donošenja presuda za ratne zločine
počinjene u Hrvatskoj?
A. Suci Haškog suda
B. Hrvatski suci
23. Mislite li da Meñunarodni sud u Hagu ima na umu ono što je u najboljem interesu za
Hrvatsku prilikom donošenja svojih odluka?
Da
Ne
24. Ako je osoba počinila ratni zločin genocida u Hrvatskoj, kome je najbolje prijaviti taj
zločin?
A. Hrvatskom sudu
B. Sudu zemlje iz koje potječe zločinac
C. Meñunarodnom sudu u Hagu
25. Vojnik je sudjelovao u masovnim ubijanjima ljudi na osnovu njihove etničke pripadnosti.
On je samo slijedio zapovijedi svojih nadreñenih. Nakon suñenja, proglašen je nevinim
za takvo djelo. Jeli ovakva presuda pravedna ili nepravedna?
Pravedna
Nepravedna
26. Koliko često su u Hrvatskoj pravedno kažnjeni oni ljudi koji počine ozbiljne kriminalne
radnje poput krañe, uništavanja imovine ili nasilja?
Uvijek
U većini slučajeva
Ponekad
Rijetko
Nikada
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27. Ocijenite od 1 do 5 koliko se slažete sa sljedećom tvrdnjom (1-U potpunosti se slažem 5
–
Uopće se ne slažem):
Voñenje pravednog suñenja za navodne počinitelje ratnog zločina je najbolji način da se
postigne pravda.
U potpunosti se slažem
1
2
3
4
5 Uopće se ne slažem
28. Ocijenite od 1 do 5 koliko se slažete sa sljedećom tvrdnjom:
Sud mora donositi presude samo na osnovu konkretnih dokaza predočenih na suñenju
U potpunosti se slažem
1
2
3
4
5 Uopće se ne slažem
29. Da li bi kazna trebala ovisiti o okolnostima odreñene situacije ili bi za isti zločin uvijek
trebala biti ista kazna?
A. Ovisno o okolnostima odreñene situacije
B. Uvijek ista kazna za isti zločin
30. Ako se dogodio ozbiljan zločin, što bi po Vama bilo važnije:
A. Da žrtva ima osjećaj da je zločinac pravedno kažnjen
B. Da žrtva oprosti zločincu
C. Zločinac je pravedno kažnjen sa stanovišta Suda, iako se žrtva možda ne slaže sa
odlukom suca
D. Lokalna zajednica smatra da je zločinac pravedno kažnjen, iako se žrtva ili Sud s
takvom odlukom ne slažu
31. Koji od navedenih razloga najbolje opisuje Vaš osobno poimanje zbog čega bi to trebalo
kažnjavati ljude koji su počinili ratne zločine?
A. Da bi se izjednačila nepravda koja je počinjena prema žrtvi zločina
B. Da bi se zločin skupo platio, te da drugi u budućnosti dvaput promisle prije nego
počine isti zločin
C. Da bi se grešnici preobrazili i postali bolje osobe
32. Jesu li se odnosi izmeñu Hrvata, Srba i Muslimana popravili od 1995. godine na ovamo?
Da
Ne
33. Usporedivši odnose izmeñu Hrvata, Srba i Muslimana u vrijeme 10 godina prije zadnjeg
konflikta (npr. 1980-ih godina) i današnjeg vremena, ti odnosi su danas:
Bolji
Isti
Gori
34. Mislite li da bi Hrvatska trebala ući u Europsku Uniju?

Da

Ne

35. Što mislite na koji način će na Vas osobno utjecati ulazak Hrvatske u EU:
Pozitivno
Neće puno utjecati
Negativno
Pročitajte ovaj odlomak i odgovorite na sljedeća pitanja:
Jedna žena u Europi bila je skoro na samrti, bolovala je od težeg oblika karcinoma.
Postojao je jedan lijek, za koji su liječnici mislili da ju može spasiti. To je bio jedan oblik
kemijskog elementa Radija, kojeg su nedavno otkrili farmakolozi u tom istom gradu. Bilo
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je jako skupo napraviti taj lijek, a farmaceut je zaračunavao 10 puta više nego što je lijek
uistinu koštao. Radij je farmaceuta koštao 1000 k, a malu dozu lijeka prodavao je za
10.000 k. Muž bolesne žene, Tom, išao je okolo i posuñivao novac za kupnju lijeka od
ljudi koje je poznavao, no uspio je skupiti samo 5000 k. To je bilo samo pola iznosa koji
mu je trebao. Zamolio je farmaceuta da mu proda lijek jeftinije ili da mu plati kasnije
ostatak, jer mu je žena na samrti. Ali farmaceut je rekao "Ne, otkrio sam ovaj lijek i na
njemu želim zaraditi." Tom je bio očajan, provalio je istu noć u apoteku i ukrao lijek za
svoju suprugu.
36. Treba li Toma kazniti za krañu lijeka, koji je spasio život njegovoj ženi?
Ne

Da

37. Zašto?
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________
38. Koja je Vaša vjeroispovijest? ______________
39. Koliko često posjećujete crkvu / džamiju?
Svaki dan Svaki tjedan Jednom ili dvaput mjesečno Jednom ili dvaput godišnje
Rijetko
40. Što ste po nacionalnosti? ______________
41. Kojeg ste spola?
Hvala Vam.

Muško

Žensko
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